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# Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

VOLUME 7, NUMBER 3

SUMMER 1971

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# Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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# PREFACE

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Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

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The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."



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| Nr East | Near East Section |
| Sci RR | Science Reading Room |
| N&CPR | Newspaper and Current Periodical Room |
| Slav Rm | Slavic Room |

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# I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

## BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

987
Choudhury, Rafiqul Islam. RELATIONSHIP OF THE DISCIPLINES OF FOREIGN POLICY, COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A SCIENTIFIC STUDY. Pakistan horizon, v. 23, no. 4, 1970: 383-394.
DS376.P32, v. 23

Presents the group approach to the study of comparative government, foreign policy, and international relations as a conceptual framework for the selection and classification of data and the formulation and testing of hypotheses.

988
Claval, Paul, and Françoise Claval. [INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Les relations internationales. Paris, Scodel [1970] 191 p. illus. (Collection Pierre Callet) JX1395.C56
On cover: Initiation aux faits économiques et sociaux.
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--International relations: definitions and position of problems.--Structure and evolution of international exchanges.--Organization of international exchanges.--Theory of international economic relations.--Monetary problems raised by international exchange.--The methods of contacts between societies and cultures.--The results of contacts between societies and cultures.--The relations between states: their contents.--The conflicts and collaboration between states.

Discusses international relations, focusing on the definition of such concepts as nation, society, and civilization and on theories and problems involving international economic relations.

989
Coplin, William D. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS; A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW. Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. [1971] xix, 391 p. (Markham political science series)
JX1308.C66
Bibliography: p. 361-381.

Formulates a set of concepts, propositions, and theories relevant to international politics to enlarge the student's understanding of, and contribute to shared knowledge in, the field. Part 1 examines the processes within nations and intergovernmental organizations leading to international activities; part 2 deals with official interactions among states and intergovernmental organizations; and part 3 studies international politics as a system. Each chapter contains a summary outline and a bibliographical essay.

990
Coplin, William D. THE STATE SYSTEM EXERCISE: A TEACHING NOTE. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Dec. 1970: 412-426.
D839.B2, v. 14

Presents a teaching game or "simulation exercise," described as not requiring elaborate materials or extensive preparation, for introductory courses in international politics. The State System Exercise illustrates the dynamics of the factors affecting the stability of the international system, focusing on the accumulation of power and the maintenance of security in a system of competing states. The three cycles of the exercise represent the stages in the historical development of the state system. The students' judgment is conditioned by what they think is reasonable given the rules of the game and their assumptions about the behavior of other players. Coplin concludes by discussing the themes to be developed by the instructor in the postexercise discussion and analysis.

991
A DESIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH: SCOPE, THEORY, METHODS, AND RELEVANCE. Edited by Norman D. Palmer. Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1970. 307 p. (American Academy of Political and Social Science. Monograph 10) DLC

Contents.--Foreword, by Norman D. Palmer.--The study of international relations: an agendum, by Norman D. Palmer.--Trends in international relations research, by Chadwick F. Alger.--After international relations, what? by William T. R. Fox.--The social-psychological approach: overview or single view? by Kenneth W. Thompson.--Conference discussion on scope.--Theory and theories in international relations: a conceptual analysis, by Raymond Aron.--International relations: quantitative and qualitative approaches, by Hans J. Morgenthau.--Conceptualization, not theory, by Charles A. McClelland.--Conference discussion on theory.--Methodological and theoretical schools in international relations, by Bruce M. Russett.--Communication and influence patterns in the international relations community, by Richard C. Snyder.--Cohesion and divisiveness in the field of international relations: the problem of free will and determinism, by Robert C. North.--Conference discussion on methods.--Knowledge, practice, and the social sciences in international politics, by J. David Singer.--Quantification and the crucial intangibles, by Ralph K. White.--2001: a social science odyssey, by Elton B. McNeil.--Conference discussion on relevance (I).--Policy implications and applications of international relations research for defense and security, by James M. Ro-



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herty.--International relations research for defense and policy, by Amos A. Jordan.--The limits of "hard" and "soft" research in foreign policy, by Ernest W. Lefever.--Conference discussion on relevance (II).--Policy implications and applications of international relations research for foreign policy and diplomacy, by Joseph E. Johnson.--Research and foreign policy/diplomacy, by E. Raymond Platig.--Research, policy, and the political process, by Roger Hilsman.--Conference discussion on relevance (III).--International relations research: an assessment of progress and relevance by Norman D. Palmer.

Papers presented at a conference held in Philadelphia on March 13 and 14, 1969, together with discussions by participants. The conference dealt with the scope, theory, methods, and relevance of international relations research. Summarizing the conference findings, the editor concludes that international relations constitutes a distinctive field of study, that the principal actors in this field remain nation-states, that the traditional-behavioral split is giving way to pluralistic approaches, that methodological issues are receiving less attention, that a broader concept of quantification in research is emerging, and that policy implications of systematic work in the field deserve greater emphasis.

992
D'Ornellas, Cassian M. THE MORALITY OF SURVIVAL. Journal of human relations, v. 18, no. 3, 1970: 1008-1018. H1.J55, v. 18

Traces the origin of human conflict to the adherence of individuals and groups to religious, national, and cultural "mythologies" that give rise to different and often incompatible value systems. D'Ornellas outlines a theory of the relationship of the human organism to its environment, the processes of long- and short-term social change, and the meaning and mechanics of human survival. He argues that the problem of human violence, which now threatens mankind with extinction, could be solved by the propagation of a universal and objective standard of valuation, and he suggests ways to go about constructing such a standard so as to insure that behavior of a high species-survival value will be encouraged.

993
Dulles, Eleanor L. ONE GERMANY OR TWO; THE STRUGGLE AT THE HEART OF EUROPE. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University [1970] xiv, 315 p. (Hoover Institution publications, 86) DD259.4.D8
Bibliography: p. 289-304.

Contents.--Preface.--The struggle.--West Germany's room to maneuver.--West Germany's Eastern policy.--The German Democratic Republic.--Reunification.--Berlin.--The Federal Republic of Germany.--Soviet policy and plans.--Allied policy.--Germany and U.S. policy.--Chronology, 1944-1969.--Appendix: Restatement of the United States policy on Germany by Secretary of State Byrnes.--Index.

Reviews postwar political and economic developments in East and West Germany in the context of European security. Dulles foresees an eventual reunification of the two Germanys but declines to specify how this will come about.

994
ESSAYS ON MODERN POLITICS AND HISTORY. Written in honor of Harold M. Vinacke. Edited by Han-Kyo Kim. Athens, Ohio University Press [c1969] xiv, 255 p. port. D843.E75
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--America's postwar role in Southeast Asia, by John F. Cady.--India as an Asian power, by Paul F. Power.--The Johnson staff and national security policy, by J. C. Heinlein.--National policy machinery and foreign policy-making in the United States, by Edward R. Padgett.

Reviews the increasing involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia following an initial postwar preoccupation with other areas of Asia. Cady contends that U.S. support for unpopular anti-Communist regimes in South Vietnam and the establishment of an essentially artificial state in Laos are the main causes of continuing conflict in Southeast Asia. Power sees the 1970's as a time of basic foreign policy reorientation for India, whose global and nonalined roles will diminish in importance as India seeks to become an Asian power. Heinlein argues that President Johnson's staff played a relatively insignificant role in determining national security policy during his administration. Padgett focuses on ways of improving the organization and functioning of national security and foreign policy decisionmaking machinery.

995
Estey, George F., and Doris A. Hunter, comps. NONVIOLENCE: A READER IN THE ETHICS OF ACTION. Waltham, Mass., Xerox College Pub. [1971] xxi, 287 p. BT736.6.E83 1971
Includes bibliographies.

Selected articles and excerpts from books and scriptures on the theory and practice of nonviolence. The selections are divided into four parts focusing on the sources and dynamics of nonviolence, the dilemmas posed by various levels of committment to nonviolence, and the "sublime madness" of a thoroughgoing committment to nonviolence. Most of the selections are by prominent religious, social, and political thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries.

996
Feshbach, Seymour. DYNAMICS AND MORALITY OF VIOLENCE AND AGRESSION: SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. American psychologist, v. 26, Mar. 1971: 281-292. BF1.A55, v. 26
"References": p. 291-292.
Based on an "address given at the meeting of the Western Psychological Association, Los Angeles, California, April 1970."

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Scientific psychology is useful for the study of moral factors as well as other aspects of human aggression. Not only can it explain why people behave aggressively, but it also can reveal the grounds upon which people judge the aggressive behavior of others. The critical questions are whether human aggression is instinctive, whether its inhibition leads to internal conflicts and maladaptive behavior, and which mechanisms are best for its control. Finding answers requires the elaboration of a theoretical framework, according to which functional distinctions are drawn between instrumental aggression, innate aggressive reactions, expressive aggression, and aggressive drive. On this basis it is also possible to deal with such matters as the doubtful claim that the use of violence against oppressors is necessary to the dignity of an oppressed people. The use of instrumental violence to bring about radical change falls within the purview of the political scientist, not the psychologist. Psychologists have developed techniques to reduce individual conflict and, in some cases, group conflict, but they have had little success in their search for means to reduce the incidence of war and other kinds of large-scale instrumental aggressiveness. One promising possibility does suggest itself, however: man's inhibition against doing violence to his fellows can be overcome by the simple device of dehumanizing other nations and races. If this kind of dodge could be made more difficult--perhaps by showing decisionmakers computer-selected photographs of the victims of war--the frequency and scale of violence might be reduced.

997
Gardner, Lloyd C., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau. THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell [1970] 122 p. (The American forum series)
E813.G28

Three approaches to the origins of the cold war. Gardner stresses the U.S. role in bringing about the cold war, Schlesinger, the Soviet role, and Morgenthau, the role of two fundamentally opposed conceptions of the world. J. Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman compare various approaches to the study of the cold war in an introductory bibliographical essay.

998
Gorman, Robert A. ON THE INADEQUACIES OF NON-PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING THEORY. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Dec. 1970: 395-411.
D839.B2, v. 14

Hypothesizes that decisionmaking theory is implicitly grounded in three mutually exclusive philosophical interpretations of human behavior: the phenomenology of Husserl, Wittgenstein's analytical philosophy, and the concepts of causality associated with David Hume. Gorman describes how each of these approaches becomes the rationale for different elements of decisionmaking theory and illustrates the self-contradictions of the theory and its inapplicability to social phenomena. Most of his references to decisionmaking theory cite the works of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin. He concludes that until it can be justified in terms of a reasonable philosophical understanding of the behavior of individuals, decisionmaking theory will be a "confused, contradictory, and thoroughly inadequate tool for social or political analysis."

999
Gronow, Jukka, and Jorma Hilppö. VIOLENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1970: 311-320.
AS9.J6, 1970

The article is a comment on Johan Galtung's 'On the Meaning of Nonviolence' and 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' (cited as entry no. 1259, vol. 6, no. 3, of this bibliography), in which Galtung has tried to clarify and extend the concept of violence. The present paper claims that there are various omissions and confusions behind Galtung's analysis. The first theme is ethics. Any exhaustive analysis of a concept has to differentiate between the denotation and the connotation of the concept. Connotation of the concept of violence is very much dependent, through its condemnatory nature, on values, norms and interests of the user of the concept. So, any definition must take these factors into consideration. Galtung has instead tried to neutralize the concept of violence, thus neglecting ethical nature. His analysis of the dimensions of violence also seems vague. Behind his way of defining violence and behind the differences between the two definitions we detect a general shift from one ethical system (deontological) to another (rule ethics). Galtung seems not to have noticed this, nor the implicit political character of the dimensions. His definitions of violence are thus models of definitions, their contents dependent on users' political (and ethical) attitudes. The second theme concerns Galtung's typology of describing and explaining behaviour. When using the concept of structural violence Galtung has to define social structure, and seems in his definitions and examples to be a holist. So the old controversy between methodological individualism and holism is relevant in this context. Galtung's definition of structural violence as a (violent) influence relation with no (direct) subject cannot be accepted, because of the confusion in his concept of the structure. The same kind of confusion underlies his considerations on the relations of the two kinds of violence. In conclusion, on the basis of the critique above a short comment is made on violence as a theoretical concept in the social sciences. It is claimed that violence is not a useful theoretical concept although an important ethical concept. Thus, it is claimed, the problem of the definition of the concept of violence can be seen in the light of the changing problems of peace research. (Abstract supplied)

1000
Hakovirta, Harto. INTEGRATION AND NEUTRALITY. Cooperation and conflict, v. 5, no. 4, 1970: 270-274.
DL55.C66, v. 5

A review of Die Neutralen in der Europäischen Integration; Kontroversen--Konfrontationen--Alternativen, by Hans Mayrzedt and Hans Christoph Binswanger (cited as item 1371 in v. 6, no. 3, of this bibliography), and Die Westeuropäischen Integration aus Osteuropäischer Sicht: Bibliographie, Dokumentation, Kommentar, by Hans Mayrzedt and Helmut Romé (cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography). The former, intended for use by European decisionmakers, is "the first serious attempt to collect existing knowledge about the integration problems of the neutral states." The latter, a bibliography of articles, official statements, and other documents from the Soviet Union and other East European states, together with a selection of documents reproduced verbatim, gives a full picture of East European attitudes toward West European integration. Despite methodological and theoretical deficiencies and a somewhat narrow focus of interest (only the Austrian and Swiss cases are considered in any detail) both books will be of great value to the researcher in this field.

1001
Hamburg, David A. PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR. Nature (London) v. 230, Mar. 5, 1971: 19-23. illus.
Q1.N2, v. 230

"Based on the first Sir Geoffrey Vickers lecture, given under the auspices of the Mental Health Research Fund in London in February 1970."

Reports the findings of a field study of aggressive behavior among chimpanzees and baboons. Patterns of aggressive behavior and the conditions that tend to promote it were studied. The influence of the sexual variable, evolutionary development, visual stimuli, and social learning are discussed. Biological predisposition seems to interact with social-learning processes to produce aggressive propensities. Aggressive behavior may have served a useful evolutionary purpose in the lower animals and early man, but the risks inherent in human violence have increased enormously. For this reason, there is no more important area of research than that dealing with the root causes of aggression, but so far work in this field has been rather sketchy.

1002
Hartley, Anthony. WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970S: POSSIBLE ROLES. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. Europe and America in the 1970s: between détente and confrontation. pt. 1. London, 1970. (Adelphi papers, no. 70) p. 24-31.
U162.A3, no. 70

Looks ahead to Europe's future. Hartley defines three types of roles for Europe, namely, Europe as a neutral, world, or regional power, and discusses the influence of the nature of continued European integration and the development of Soviet-U.S. relations on the resulting political systems. A regional role for Europe is advocated "not only because it avoids the extremes of independence and dependence . . . but also because it provides an easy transition from national to supranational policies." The author cautions that unless European statesmen negotiate soon for the enlargement of the European Economic Community and begin to think about common defense policies, powerful trends in international politics could preempt Europe's political alternatives in the coming decade.

1003
Hassner, Pierre. [DÉTENTE AND DIALECTICS; OR, HOW TO LIVE WITH EUROPEAN CONTRADICTIONS] Détente et dialectique; ou, du bon usage des contradictions européennes. Revue française de science politique, v. 20, Dec. 1970: 1117-1135.
JA11.R6, v. 20

The most striking feature of the present European situation, particularly in East-West relations, lies in its contradictory character. Between the general acceptance of détente and the hidden expectations of the various actors, between the requirements of security (hence of stability) and those of progress (hence of change), between the continuity of existing organizations and their opening towards greater national and pluralistic diversity within and greater universality and communication with the outside world, as required by the trends of modern society, contradictions are ripe. It is desirable to handle them dialectically, which means not to ignore them or try to suppress them, but rather to seek to control them in view of a positive use and to try to go from the dialectics of conflict to those of dialog. Détente, cooperation, and security can only be reconciled if all relations, within nations and alliances and among them, respect the double rule of coexistence and reciprocity: accept competition and never resort to violence. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1004
Hogeboom, Willard L. THE COLD WAR AND REVISIONIST HISTORIOGRAPHY. Social studies, v. 61, Dec. 1970: 314-318.
D16.3.S65, v. 61

The origin of the cold war has been greatly neglected by the new social studies, despite the fierce controversy that has raged in recent years. The orthodox view is that the cold war was a consequence of Soviet aggression. Challenging this interpretation, revisionist historians have offered various alternative explanations: that the conflict resulted from America's attempts to exploit its temporary military superiority, from Western intervention in Soviet internal affairs, beginning with the Russian civil war, from America's "atomic diplomacy," or from U.S. attempts to prop up a crumbling status quo. This attack has prompted orthodox historians to modify, but not to abandon, their earlier views. The revisionists share with their student and political counterparts of the New Left a hatred and distrust of the establishment. They accuse orthodox historians of ignoring significant data and of lacking objectivity; yet the revisionists are at least equally guilty of these malpractices. Understanding of the cold war and current international relations is not advanced materially by the simplistic device of substituting one villain--the United States--for another--the Soviet Union. One must

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look to the all-too-human failings of men in power, not to covert conspiracy, to explain the web of events that brought about the cold war.

1005
Hollitscher, Walter. [AGGRESSION IN MAN. MARX, FREUD, LORENZ] Aggression im Menschenbild. Marx, Freud, Lorenz. Wien, Globus [1970] 179 p. illus. BF575.A3H6
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Asking the question.--Becoming man and becoming human.--Functions and information in the neuropsyche.--Sigmund Freud's concept of man. --Man wrongly named an animal.--Sources of illustrations.--List of illustrations.--Index of persons.--Index of topics.

Marxist examination of the concepts of the innate aggressiveness of human nature formulated by Konrad Lorenz's ethology and by Freudian psychoanalysis (as interpreted by Alexander Mitscherlich). Hollitscher ascribes the conflicts and tensions of social life to the class war and human exploitation inevitably resulting from the property relationships characterizing capitalism. He concludes that Lorenz and Freud are merely repeating the old theological doctrine of original sin. By saying that human nature cannot be changed, they are in effect obstructing any progressive effort for social reform. Marx understood that the whole of history is nothing but a continued reforming of human nature, a process in which men change their own nature by changing the world and thus releasing their dormant powers.

1006
Kromphardt, K. [THE END OF IDEOLOGIES] Das Ende der Ideologien. Physikalische Blätter, v. 26, no. 12, 1970: 553-558.
QC1.D415, v. 26

In the modern industrialized, consumer-oriented society a monistic image of the world is unrealistic. Modern ideologies are based on scientific knowledge and experience, but they are surrounded by economic, social, and individual myths, with a great gap between facts and ideals. Ideologies, with their dogmas and preachers, almost replace religion, and they play a major role in instigating hot and cold wars. They are inherently inhumane. Today's ideologies, rooted in the previous century, cannot even begin to solve the complex problems of East and West. Ideology should be replaced by scientific thinking, leading to an inner-directed politics, wherein each individual, acting from an aware conscience, would act in terms of the new ecological and social tastes of mankind. Physical and social scientists can contribute to a future in which leaders are more enlightened and responsible.

1007
Legg, Keith R., and James F. Morrison. POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM; AN INTRODUCTION. New York, Harper & Row [1971] 369 p.
JX1395.L38
Includes bibliographies.

Constructs a theoretical model to serve as a framework of analysis for understanding a wide variety of states, political systems, and political processes. This book is an introductory text, which, in the author's view, can be used as a source around which to build courses tailored to individual students' needs.

1008
Lichtheim, George. IMPERIALISM. New York, Praeger [1971] 183 p. (Praeger paperbacks, P-300)
JC359.L53
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Imperium.--The rise of Europe.--Empire of the sea.--Liberal imperialism. --Imperialism and nationalism.--Imperialism and revolution.--From Marx to Mao.--The Third World.--Index.

A historical and theoretical analysis of imperialism. Lichtheim defines imperialism as "the relationship of a ruling or controlling power to those under its dominion," pointing out that a state of imperialism often preceeds the elaboration of a theory of imperialism. He traces the development of imperialism from the Roman Empire to the present, focusing on the rival theories of imperialism advanced by liberals and Socialists since the latter part of the 19th century.

1009
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. STRATEGIC SURVEY, 1970. London [1971] 95 p. illus.
N&CPR

Contents.--pt. 1. Survey: Introduction. The Super-powers. Europe. Eastern Asia. The Middle East. Africa South of the Sahara. Latin America. Economic policies and security. Aerial piracy.--pt. 2. Chronologies.

Overview of major international events of 1970 and their effect on the strategic power balance and on the foreign relations between the major powers and Third World nations. The Institute sees the year's events as reflecting a modulation of the cold war. The existing nuclear power stalemate forced the superpowers to develop ground rules for political competition that helped prevent military intervention in a world of growing political diversity. The greater tendency of smaller nations to assert themselves, coincidental with the superpowers' difficulty in asserting their will, accounts in part for this growing complexity. Part two contains chronologies of major events in North America, Europe, the Soviet Union and China, Asia and Australasia, the Middle East and North Africa, Africa South of the Sahara, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

1010
Midgaard, Knut. STRATEGY AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Cooperation and conflict, v. 5, no. 4, 1970: 224-240.
DL55.C66, v. 5

Explores the relationship between strategy and ethics to determine whether and to what extent

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they may be logically or practically incompatible and to what degree each influences the actual behavior of states. Midgaard stresses that strategy or strategic thinking is ubiquitous, as common to politicians, businessmen, or parents as to military men, but confines his own investigation to the issues that arise in the context of national security. He concludes that while strategic considerations certainly can lead to unethical behavior, there is no necessary incompatibility between strategic calculation and ethical norms, and that states do indeed consider ethical as well as strategic factors when making decisions.

1011
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [REPERCUSSIONS FROM ASIA: AMERICA, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND EUROPE] Rückwirkungen aus Asien: Amerika, China, Russland und Europa. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 89-96.
H5.P75, v. 16

Outlines the international repercussions of the American debacle in Vietnam, which is ascribed to ignorance of the elements of guerrilla warfare, the ban on strategic targets, the failure to curtail arms shipments to Hanoi, and the maladroit piecewise escalation of operations. In reaction to this manifestation of American weakness, Japan may feel its raw material sources imperiled and seek nuclear weapons. In Korea, where war is possible at any minute, Seoul has always felt itself undervalued by Washington, and Chiang in Taiwan may be moved by memories of his student days to turn to Moscow. The warring Communist and nationalist factions in the Philippines can be united by the distrust of America. Indonesia's present pro-Americanism is jeopardized by the inevitable Soviet effort to fill the vacuum left by British withdrawal from the area. While Moscow profits from British and American difficulties, it remains confronted by China. The costs of the Siberian defense force are burdensome, and a Soviet resort to the offensive may mean prolonged war with a numerically superior enemy uniquely suited for guerrilla war. Miksche cautions Western diplomats against premature participation in European security conferences until the Chinese threat has softened Soviet attitudes.

1012
Morgenthau, Hans J. CHANGES AND CHANCES IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 429-441.
D410.F6, v. 49

U.S.-Soviet relations have been transformed during the past 20 years by five basic factors: common recognition that nuclear war would be suicidal, diminution of the ideological conflict between the two countries, the failure of either nation to win the allegiance of the Third World, U.S. recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and the growing Chinese threat to the Soviet Union. Since Khrushchev's downfall the Soviet Union has been preoccupied with extending its economic and military influence throughout the world, while the United States has been preoccupied with the Vietnam War. Direct competition and conflict between the superpowers might be revived, however, unless four crucial problems are satisfactorily resolved, namely, the nuclear arms race, which hinges on the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; the status of Germany, with which the Soviet Union hopes eventually to arrive at a new Rapallo understanding; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and revolutionary ferment in the Third World. Whether U.S.-Soviet relations will evolve toward renewed confrontation or meaningful negotiation will depend increasingly on the actions of secondary powers such as China, Japan, and West Germany.

1013
Nicholas, Herbert G. VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. London, Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1969. [2], 17 p. (Sarah Tryphena Phillips lecture in American literature and history, 1969) HN57.N53 1969
Includes bibliographical references.

Argues that both ideal and objective factors have historically produced a proneness on the part of Americans to resort to violence or accept its use by others; that in the past violence in America has been almost exclusively instrumental; and that today we are witnessing the commencement of a cult of violence for its own sake--a "theatrical violence" designed for media consumption, "violence as a style of life, addiction to it as to a drug, glorification of it as a good per se." The quantity of violence seems not to have increased greatly in recent years; it is this change in the direction or meaning of violence that is so disturbing.

1014
Noack, Paul. [INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. AN INTRODUCTION] Internationale Politik. Eine Einführung. [München] Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag [1970] 316 p. JX1311.N63
Includes bibliographies.
Dtv[-Taschenbücher] 4060 Wissenschaftliche Reihe.

Contents.--Introduction.--Foreign policy until 1914.--The interwar period, 1919-1939.--International politics since 1945.--Disarmament as an international problem.--Sovereignty and international law.--Diplomacy.--Foreign policy decisions.--International organizations.--Regional pacts.--Theory of international politics.--Concluding remarks.

A survey of international relations. Each chapter is preceded by a chronological table of events, and some chapters include an excursus analyzing political theories. Topics covered include disarmament, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, crisis management, peace research, and the relations between industrialized countries and the Third World.

1015
Norford, Richard F. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: A MISSING ELEMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING. Naval War College review, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 81-100.
N&CPR
Bibliographical footnotes.

Suggests applying systems analysis as practiced and developed in the Department of Defense to

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long-range foreign policy planning. The conventional academic analysis of foreign policy, whether the traditional "wisdom from experience" or the newer behaviorist or normative studies, is rejected as inadequate to overcome the planning deficiencies of the National Security Council and of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department. After defining systems analysis by its systemic, analytical, systematic, explicit, objective, and normative qualities, Norford gives its primary elements and refutes some prevalent misconceptions. In his view, the argument that the scope of quantification in systems analysis forbids its application to foreign policy planning is contradicted by the Defense Department's experience in planning defense problems involving highly subjective elements. Norford concludes that the purpose of systems analysis is congruent with that of foreign policy planning, that it is relevant to those areas where present planning is deficient, and that it is capable of application to qualitative problems.

1016
Ogley, Roderick, comp. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. London, Routledge & K. Paul [1970] xiv, 217 p. (The World studies series) JX5361.034
Bibliography: p. 206-207.

Texts and extracts of speeches, articles, books, and documents intended to elucidate the various meanings of neutrality. The compilation is divided into sections on the traditional concept of neutrality and the practice of neutrality during World War I, the interwar period, World War II, and the atomic era. In a postscript, the compiler tentatively concludes "that neutrality, far from being an anachronism, is a condition that states are likely to find themselves in, by accident or design, with increasing frequency in the last third of this century."

1017
Petković, Ranko. NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. Translator: Margot Milosavljević. Beograd, "Međunarodna štampa--Interpress," 1968. 42, [1] p. (Studies 1968, no. 26)
D839.S78 1968, no. 26
Translation of Nesvrstavanje u savremenim međunarodnim uslovima.

Sees the emergence of nonalinement policies as the product of two postwar phenomena: the formation of the blocs and the disintegration of colonialism. Petković analyzes the political setting of the time of the appearance of nonalinement policies. He notes efforts to synchronize the international activity of the nonalined states, namely the Cairo and Belgrade conferences, and he explains why these states need to cooperate. He concludes by enumerating the most important principles of nonalinement, among them sovereignty and the equality of nations. A supplement contains statements on nonalinement by Yugoslav officials.

1018
Quester, George H. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY; THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. New York, Dunellen Co. [1970] xxi, 327 p. illus. (University Press of Cambridge Series in the Social Sciences)
UA23.Q47
Sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Contents.--The U.S. monopoly: 1945-1949.--The monopoly eliminated: 1949-1953.--The new look: 1953-1957.--The missile gap: 1957-1961.--The Kennedy administration: 1961-1963.--From Johnson to Nixon: 1963-1969.--Notes.

Analyzes in detail the role of weapons in international relations since 1945. Quester assumes that Soviet, American, and other decisionmakers have acted on the basis of accurate knowledge of the strategic environment unless concrete evidence was found to the contrary.

1019
Rattner, Josef. [AGGRESSION AND HUMAN NATURE. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HOSTILITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS OF MANKIND] Aggression und menschliche Nature. Individual- und Sozialpsychologie der Feindseeligkeit und Destructivität des Menschen. Olten, Freiburg i. Br., Walter Verlag [1970] 261 p. BF575.A3R35
Bibliography: p. 253-258.

Contents.--Behaviorism and aggression.--On the depth psychology of aggression.--On the individual psychology of aggression.--Emotional theory of aggression.--Psychology of prejudice.--Crime as aggression.--Education leading to aggression.--War and human nature.

Considers destructiveness and hostility in human behavior. Educational and cultural deformations create these characteristics, and less social scientists must analyze individual and collective aggression to avoid their development, using depth psychology. Aggression leading to war can be triggered by nationalism, which contains a latent animosity against other states that results in open aggression when a crisis occurs; by capitalism, because it favors the arms race as an economic means to make profit; by militarism, because in its efforts to prepare even a defensive war its dehumanizing effect furthers aggressiveness, and because it relies on submitting people to the will of the state; by class structure, because it is based on power and superiority of some over others, resulting in prejudices, social wrongs, and tensions; by religion and the repression of instinctual drives, which have directly caused wars; by education, which often is authoritarian and conformist and which promotes aggressiveness through games and national-chauvinist teaching; and by tradition, because by honoring war heroes it promotes the desire of youth for power, fame, and victory and perpetuates the idea that wars are to be taken for granted instead of criticized and rejected. Belief in the unavoidability of war causes war, because it hinders research into other means of settling differences of opinion. Aside from these aggressive tendencies, which are based on fear and lack of love and understanding in early childhood, mankind also has strong feelings of solidarity and generosity. To survive the nuclear era, man must develop these traits, make needed

social changes, and put an end to the power madness of politicians who threaten to destroy the world.

1020
Renesse, Ernst A. von, ed. [REVOLT AND REVOLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES] Revolte und Revolution in Entwicklungsländern. [Bielefeld] Bertelsmann-Universitätsverlag [1969] 221 p.
HC59.7.R44
Bibliography: p. 206-211.

Contents.--Foreword.--Revolt and revolution in developing countries, by Ernst-Albrecht von Renesse.--The revolutionary impulse of Arabic socialism, by Mohamed El-Azzazi.--The second revolution in Nigeria--the military takeover and the civil war, by Heinz Schütte.--"The glorious revolution" in Ghana: model of a return to democracy? by Peter Langer and Uwe Luck.--Chile's revolution in freedom, by Monika Mehnert.--Uruguay--stagnation instead of revolution, by Margot von Renesse.--Revolution and social change in the People's Republic of Korea, by Charles T. Z. Chung.--Indonesia today--a Communist basis? by Elmar Römpczyk.--On the origin of the revolution in Vietnam, by Charles T. Z. Chung.--Maoism and the cultural revolution, by Tien-mu Cheng.--Church and revolution, by Klaus Lefringhausen.--Development policy and revolutionary movements in the developing countries, by Willy Kraus.--The authors.

Reviews the history, problems, and utility of revolutionary developments in the Third World through the examples of Egypt, Chile, China, Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Vietnam. The book attempts to give students a better insight into the problems of developing countries so that they may critically analyze economic aid programs during the second development decade. Renesse believes that decolonialization taking place against strong repression by colonial powers can be regarded as revolutionary; that achieving economic independence represents the completion of the struggle for independence, not separate revolution within a national liberation movement; that countries not yet decolonialized may undergo a social revolution in the near future; and that revolutions are a legitimate political means to achieve ocial and economic change if the social structure cannot be changed in any other way. Whether present New Left revolutionary movements in the industrialized countries can help the developing countries solve their acute problems remains to be seen.

1021
Salisbury, Harrison E. IMAGE AND REALITY IN INDOCHINA. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 381-394. D410.F6, v. 49

The images that Indochina, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union have had of each other during the past 30 years have changed significantly; they have rarely coincided with one another or with reality. President Roosevelt's anticolonialism led him to believe that the Western colonial powers in Asia, particularly France, were responsible for Japanese aggression in World War II. Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh initially saw the United States as a natural ally against possible Chinese domination. The success of the Chinese Communist revolution led to a fundamental change in the American perception of the Indochinese revolution. Following the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950, American leaders perceived Peking as a Soviet puppet and the Vietminh as a Chinese Communist puppet. It is now known that there was bitter conflict between the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders at the time, and it is possible that the Soviet Union initiated the Korean War as part of an attempt to contain China. The American view of Hanoi an an instrument of Soviet or Chinese policy is no more plausible than Hanoi's view of the United States as a predatory capitalist power bent on the exploitation of Indochina's natural resources or the Chinese belief in the mid-1960's that the United States intended to use Indochina as a springboard for an attack on China. The present U.S. policy of Vietnamization may prove just as illusory as previous American images of Indochina because Hanoi, which feels it was cheated out of victory in 1945 and 1954, will now probably accept nothing less than military predominance in Indochina.

1022
Sargent, Clyde B. NATIONAL CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NATIONAL POWER. Naval War College review, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 17-23.
N&CPR

Presents the concept of national character as a useful working hypothesis for increasing the sophistication of participation in intercultural and international affairs and as generally providing insights essential for effective international relations. Sargent calls the dominant values and characteristics of large segments of the population of a state the national cultural values and the product of these values the national culture.

1023
Singer, Ladislaus. [SOVIET IMPERIALISM] Sowjetimperialismus. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald [c1970] 223 p. maps. (Zeitpolitische Schriftenreihe, 7)
DK61.S54
Bibliography: p. 207-216.

Contents.--Foreword.--Czarist imperialism (1700-1917).--The beginning of Soviet imperialism (1917-1920).--Stalin--creator of the Soviet imperium (1921-1939).--Imperialism as the highest stage of Soviet communism (1939-1954).--Soviet neo-imperialism (1954-1970).--Conclusions.--Remarks.--Documents.--Name and subject index.

Surveys Russian imperialist and expansionist trends from the time of Peter the Great to the present. Since World War II, two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have followed imperialist policies, and China will soon join the ranks. Singer points to the fact that while the Soviet Union has been accusing West of imperialialism and stressing the need to suppress it, Moscow has been building the most powerful empire in world history. He analyzes the causal relationship and the historic continuity between Czarist and Soviet imperialism and asserts their common goal to be governing the world. In both periods

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the general population has been the dupe of political dreams. Soviet neo-imperialism uses peaceful coexistence, the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), economic aid to developing countries, arms sales to tension areas, the arms race, education of the intellectual elite of developing countries, espionage, and propaganda in the United Nations for its expansion. The Brezhnev doctrine poses a great danger to peace, and the West should distrust the Soviet's empty talk on détente, European security, and disarmament and recognize the danger indicated by the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, the Soviet military presence in Egypt, and Soviet attempts to improve relations with the West in order to promote trade and thereby overcome their economic difficulties. Perhaps the fear that Moscow will use the German Ostpolitik to loosen Germany's ties with NATO and the United States, thus expanding its influence into West Europe, is too pessimistic, and Lenin will be proved right in seeing in imperialism the "eve of the Social revolution," which he could not achieve.

1024
Törnudd, Klaus. A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF NEUTRAL FOREIGN POLICY. Cooperation and conflict, v. 5, no. 4, 1970: 282-285.
DL55.C66, v. 5

A review of Dimensionen neutraler Politik. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen, by Daniel Frei (cited as item 1423 in v. 6, no. 4, of this bibliography). The aim of this study was to "map out the realm of possibilities in neutral policy and construct a system of categories making it possible to describe and relate to each other all forms of neutral policy." The core of this program was the construction of a six-variable schema for the classification of foreign policies. Törnudd feels the book offers a good starting point for more detailed analysis and further empirical research and should be of great interest to anyone concerned with the security problems of neutral states or small states in general.

1025
Trofimenko, G. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND IMPERIALISM'S FOREIGN POLICY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1971: 49-54.
D839.I454, 1971

As the chief ideological weapon of imperialism, anticommunism is basic to the foreign policies of the leading imperialist states. Properly understood, anticommunism has a deep counterrevolutionary significance and should not be considered merely a reaction to the Soviet regime. Its main roots today are the class hatred of American imperialism for the pioneer workers' and peasants' country that is also the great obstacle to American world hegemony. The doctrine of the "containment of communism" is propagated by representatives of the military-industrial complex, who sell the aggressions of U.S. imperialism to their people as purely defensive reactions. Bourgeois theorists try to conceal the essential class character of the conflict by portraying it as an exclusively national-state and foreign-policy conflict. "Bridge building" and other concepts that succeeded "liberation" represent vain efforts to adapt imperialist strategy to changing circumstances. Now the anti-Communist strategists emphasize the galvanization of national communism as opposed to the international solidarity of the Socialist community. While displaying a "certain willingness for negotiations with the Soviet Union on some problems, in particular on limiting the strategic arms race," Washington continues to seek out opportunities for confrontations and hopes that "preventive political involvement" may prevent real revolutionary changes. The present situation is another proof of imperialism's "historical doom and its inability to oppose social progress."

1026
Tunkin, G. THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND ITS OPPONENTS. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 11, Nov. 13, 1970: 46-56.
DK266.A2R37, v. 11
Reprinted from Pravda, Oct. 2, 1970.
Slav Rm

The Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of the two competing world orders is implicit within socialism, since in the Socialist system there are no classes to benefit from war. However, to accept the peaceful coexistence principle is by no means equivalent to accepting pacifism or to submitting the Soviet Union to the sufferance of the imperialist powers. The peaceful coexistence principle is not applicable to class struggles within the capitalist states or to the national liberation movement. Right-wing revisionists fail to see that the peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism constitutes a specific form of the class struggle. They also erroneously try to apply the peaceful coexistence principle to relations between the Socialist states, ignoring the decisive fact that the relations between Socialist states are built on fraternal cooperation. The imperialists foolishly think to use peaceful coexistence for ideological subversion by "bridge building." Peace is socialism's greatest weapon, because time works for socialism's inevitable triumph over capitalism.

1027
Waterkamp, Rainer. [THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE ENSURANCE OF PEACE] Die Entwicklungsländer und die Friedenssicherung. [Hannover, Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1967.] 63 p. (Schriftenreihe der Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Friedensprobleme, Heft 4. N.T.)
D849.5.W37
Bibliography: p. 61-62.

Contents.--Introduction.--Concept and policies of developing countries.--Problems of ensuring peace.--Appendix.

Takes the premise that technical development and the population explosion in developing countries cause continual changes in their policies. On the one hand, tremendous armaments expenditures prevent effective aid to developing countries and endanger the world peace that is requisite to the economic and social development of the Third

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World, and, on the other hand, the arms race results partly from the political tensions of decolonialization. Moreover arms control and peacekeeping measures tend to solidify the status quo that is being fought by the developing countries. It is in the interest of all nations to establish a healthy balance between national security and social justice, between worldwide political stability and peaceful change in the Third World. Waterkamp argues that criteria for developing countries can be set only by economic standards; he analyzes the political positions (neutralism, anticolonialism, support for the United Nations) taken by developing countries when they deal with problems of international security and peace. He discusses nuclear disarmament, armament expenditures and aid to developing countries, nonalinement and demilitarized zones, and the roles of the army and the state in the national integration process of young nations. The government of a developing country can be either creative-revolutionary by guiding its people toward rational thinking and modern economic, social, and political views, or authoritative and militant in repressing social change threatening the status quo.

1028
Wiles, Peter. CRISIS PREDICTION. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Social information for developing countries. Philadelphia, 1971. (Its Annals, v. 393, Jan. 1971) p. 32-39.
H1.A4, v. 393

The importance of the social sciences has been much exaggerated. The social scientists are particularly bad at prediction, and so at helping us to forestall the sociopolitical crises that occur more and more often. The rate of social change has gone up very sharply for a number of reasons, so surprises are more frequent. This rate should be reduced, at least in rich countries, which face far more unknown situations. Poor countries, on the other hand, face mainly situations known from those slightly more advanced. What poor countries mostly need, therefore, is better information of old kinds, not new kinds of information. Crisis-anticipating information will mostly be valueless, since no one knows how to winnow it. It also requires many low-level informers, and the identity of these people is a major problem of political power. So is the identity of the processor and publisher of their data. Substantial improvements in information and its use might abolish democracy. (Abstract supplied)

1029
Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen. [NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT. CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT POLITICS] Nord-Süd-Konflikt. Beiträge zur Entwicklungspolitik. [Hannover] Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen [1968] 170 p. HC59.7.W57

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. A policy of the future: Part of foreign policy? Science as a help in making decisions. Cooperation with East Europe. Centers of gravity of development politics. Solidarity of helping. Dynamics of the Churches. A chance for economy. Before the dikes break. The role of social politics.--pt. 2. Problems of the Third World: African diary. The three regions of Africa. Europe and the Maghreb. Development politics in Asia. Development and revolution. Biafra--a touchstone.

A collection of articles discussing the relationship between foreign policy and the politics of development, the prospects for private industry in developing countries, disarmament, the risks of military aid, birth control, and revolution. Wischnewski states that present efforts do not suffice to cope with the tremendous and varied problems of the different developing regions. The North-South conflict is becoming more critical than East-West tensions. If worldwide crises are to be avoided it is essential that the industrialized countries of East and West act together quickly and efficiently to limit their defense expenditures in favor of development aid.

## FOREIGN POLICIES

1030
Albinski, Henry S. PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY; JANUARY-JUNE 1970. Australian journal of politics and history, v. 16, Dec. 1970: 301-319.
DU80.A945, v. 16

Delineates the domestic background against which Australian policy during the first half of 1970 was formulated for the three major concerns--defense planning and weapons procurement, Vietnam and Cambodia, and Malaysia and Singapore--and reviews the rationale of specific policy movements. Albinski thinks the period noteworthy for the performances of the new cabinet ministers, the increasing role of the defense department in external affairs, the aircraft contract with the Americans, the burgeoning of Australian manufacture of military material, and the move toward disengagement in Vietnam. While Australian eagerness for integration into the Asian-Pacific community was made apparent, Australian diplomacy is still uncertain how best to contribute to the defense of the community without restricting its own freedom of maneuver.

1031
AMERICA'S ASIA: DISSENTING ESSAYS ON ASIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Edited by Edward Friedman & Mark Selden. New York, Pantheon Books [1971] xx, 458 p.
DS518.8.A88 1971
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Oh say can you see? American cultural blinders on China, by Leigh and Richard Kagan.--The roots of rhetoric: the professional ideology of America's China watchers, by James Peck.--Asian scholars and Government: the chrysanthemum on the sword, by Judith Coburn.--The great Asian conspiracy, by John Gittings.--Occupied Japan and the American lake, 1945-1950, by John W. Dower.--Problems in dealing with an irrational power: America declares war on China, by Edward Friedman.--The United States in Laos, 1945-1962, by Jonathan Mirsky and Stephen E. Stone-

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field.--Capitalist and Maoist economic development, by John G. Gurley.--People's war and the transformation of peasant society: China and Vietnam, by Mark Selden.--Revolution and modernization: man and machine in industrializing societies, the Chinese case, by Stephen Andors.

Examines "the dynamic and destructive interaction between American perceptions and American power in the making and unmaking of contemporary Asia." The Kagans survey some of the common distortions about Communist China in American high school and college textbooks, and Peck and Coburn analyze ideological and institutional causes of misconceptions prevalent among scholars and Government advisers. Gittings, Dower, Friedman, Mirsky, and Stonefield criticize arguments for, and rationalizations of, postwar U.S. interventions in Asia. Gurley, Selden, and Andors contrast the Asian Communist and Western capitalist approaches to modernization.

1032

Apple, R. W. A NIXON-MAO DIALOGUE? New statesman, v. 81, Mar. 19, 1971: 369-370.
AP4.N64, v. 81

Evidence indicates that for the first time in 20 years the United States is reaching out to the People's Republic of China. President Nixon has dropped all restrictions on American travel to China, permitted foreign subsidiaries of American companies to trade in nonstrategic goods with Peking, and announced that American oil companies abroad would be allowed to provide bunkering facilities to ships serving Chinese ports. In his February 25 foreign policy address the President used "China's proper name--the People's Republic of China--for the first time in an official communication" and recognized the need of bringing China into the international community to maintain world order. Although further modification of American trade policies toward China appears logical, the Department of Defense and the backers of Taiwan oppose it. Yet if the United States does not push the "important question" issue in the United Nations, or if there is any other modification in its present Chinese policy, American recognition appears inevitable. Two years ago U.S. recognition and U.N. admission of China seemed fantasy, but now they are on their way to realization, and at least part of the impetus has come from President Nixon.

1033

THE ASIAN REVOLUTION AND AUSTRALIA. [Sydney, Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament, 1969] 189 p.
DS35.A86
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Two theories of Asian revolution, by John Gittings.--The nature of the Asian revolution, by E. L. Wheelwright.--The Asian revolution: what America fears, by James Flynn.--The nature of the Asian revolution, by Said Uddin Khan.--Flexibility v. rigidity in Chinese foreign policy, by John Gittings.--China: a threat in South East Asia? by C. P. FitzGerald.--U.S. policy in the Far East: alternatives, by James Flynn.--The essence and meaning of the Vietnamese revolution, by Tran Van Dinh.--The West and change in Vietnam, by Graeme Duncan.--The war in Vietnam in historical and contemporary perspective, by Wilfred Burchett.--The role of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, by John Dalton.--Japan's role in Asia, by Gregory Clark.--Australian foreign policy alternatives, by Max Teichmann.--Foreign policy after Vietnam, by J. F. Cairns.

"Papers presented at a conference [held in October 1968 in Sydney] organised by the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament to examine the nature of the Asian revolution and Australian attitudes towards it." The papers are critical of attempts by the United States and its supporters, including Australia, to suppress or contain Asian revolutionary movements; their authors contend that the Vietnam War clearly reveals the failure of this approach.

1034

ASPECTS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TODAY [by] K. H. P. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, Aug. 15, 1970: 16-17. D839.I453, v. 7

Views India's foreign policy since 1949, the foremost principles of which are anticolonialism and nonalinement. The author emphasizes India's role in world peace as chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the Korean crisis, as chairman of the International Control Commission in Indochina, and as a peacekeeper under U.N. auspices in the Congo and the Middle East. He summarizes New Delhi's views on collective security and concludes with a review of India's relations with its neighbors, especially Pakistan and Communist China.

1035

Axelbank, Albert, and Koji Nakamura. JAPAN, CHINA, USA: THE THREE-POWER GAMBLE. Nation, v. 211, Dec. 28, 1970: 678-681.
AP2.N2, v. 211

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato have secretly agreed not to recognize Communist China. This agreement is part of a strategy designed to perpetuate the status quo in Asia and to assure that neither partner will ally itself with China against the other. Japan's China policy is in fact an adjunct of U.S. China policy, although U.S. policymakers are wary of Japan's growing economic influence in Asia, including its economic domination of Taiwan. China appears to fear Japanese economic power and a revival of Japanese militarism even more than it fears either U.S. or Soviet military threats. U.S. fear of a new Japanese militarism, on the other hand, is a compelling reason for the United States to remain a strong Pacific power.

1036

Bandulet, Bruno. [THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BETWEEN THE U.S.A., THE SOVIET UNION, AND FRANCE; ALTERNATIVES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1952 TO 1963]. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen

den USA, der Sowjetunion und Frankreich; Alternativen der deutschen Aussenpolitik von 1952 bis 1963. [n. p.] 1969. 371 p.
DD259.4.B317

Inaug.-Diss.--Würzburg.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. 344-371.

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--The special relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States (1953-59).--The alternative: attempt at balanced equilibrium with the Soviet Union (1952-55).--No alternative: the absence of the prerequisites for German-French cooperation (1952-57).--The collapse of the special relationship between the Federal Republic and the United States (1959-62).--The alternative: the cooperation of the Federal Republic and France (1958-63).--No alternative: the absence of the prerequisites for a balanced equilibrium between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union (1955-63).--Conclusion.

Ascribes to West German foreign policy a freedom of choice resulting from its special position between the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. Although it is neither equidistant from these powers nor attracted to them in equal degree, Bonn nevertheless has always had alternatives to its alliance with the United States. The possibility of its recourse to such alternatives was made manifest by the response to the Soviet demarche of 1952 and the 1963 treaty with France. Bandulet describes the West German position between France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and correlates the possibilities presented by friendship with them and the permanent goals and values of German foreign policy.

1037
Barnett, A. Doak. OUR CHINA POLICY; THE NEED FOR CHANGE. [New York] Foreign Policy Association [1971] 63 p. illus. (Headline series, no. 204)
E183.8.C5B32

Contents.--The legacy from the past.--Recent changes in United States policy.--Policy trends in China.--What policies for the United States?--Prospects for the future.--Talking it over.

Reviews U.S. policy toward Communist China and proposes changes to improve relations between the two countries. Barnett urges that the United States broaden unofficial contacts with China, end the embargo on trade with China, support Peking's representation in the United Nations, continue to reduce U.S. military forces on the periphery of China, and forego construction of an anti-Chinese ABM system. U.S. military forces should be withdrawn from Taiwan, the commitment to defend the island should be precisely defined so as to minimize the possibility of conflict with the mainland, and the United States should make clear that it will not oppose any peaceful changes in the present status or regime of Taiwan.

1038
Barnett, Robert W. PERSPECTIVES PAST AND PRESENT: UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA. New York, New York University, Center for International Studies [1970] 17 p. (New York University, Center for International Studies. Policy papers, v. 4, no. 1)
E183.8.C5B25

Excerpts from a 1962 article commenting on several aspects of Washington's China policy, together with updated comments concerning future American relations with China. Barnett notes that among the notable differences between current and past policy toward China are the recognition that the Communist regime is here to stay and the realization that the Sino-Soviet dispute destroys the picture of the Communist world as a monolithic entity. He concludes that it is in the interest of the United States to cultivate relations with China by giving it the friendship and assistance it will need on the road toward economic development.

1039
Becker, Abraham S., and Arnold L. Horelick. SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1970. 115 p. (Rand Corporation. Report no. R-504-FF)
AS36.R3, no. 504

Traces Soviet Middle Eastern policy, analyzes the factors governing it, and examines future Soviet policy options in the area. The current Soviet presence in the Middle East is largely the result of ad hoc initiatives carried out by Soviet leaders in a highly fluid policy environment; it can be traced to the 1955 limited Soviet effort to disrupt the Western plan to link the Northern Tier states in a military alliance. The authors assert that what had begun as a spoiling operation against the Baghdad Pact became in the years after the 1956 Suez war "a far-reaching effort to root out U.S. influence first from 'progressive' Arab states and then from the area as a whole." They conclude that it is very unlikely that the Soviet Union will disengage from this area except as a consequence of a major setback in the Near East or the Communist world.

1040
Beloff, Max. RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: CYCLE OF MISTRUST. Interplay, v. 4, Feb. 1971: 9-13. illus.
D849.I56, v. 4

Contends that Soviet foreign policy will not change radically during the next decade. Beloff notes that especially since Stalin's death those who expected changes have been more often wrong than the more conservative-minded interpreters of the Soviet scene. He predicts that the Soviet Union will maintain the political status quo in Eastern Europe, by force if necessary. A Yugoslav crisis will occur, since Moscow sees relations with Yugoslavia as unfinished business. In other areas, the Soviets' awkward experience in Cuba may cause them to hesitate to rush into full Sovietization of countries in which they have influence. The very successful Soviet policy toward India illustrates this caution. Moscow's China policy will consist of "a waiting upon events combined with an attempt to free [Soviet] hands from other entanglements so as to be able to concentrate upon the most important problem," its eastern borders.

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1041
Bennett, Alan. THAILAND--THE AMBIGUOUS DOMINO. Conflict studies, no. 1, Dec. 1969: 1-14. map.
D839.3.C6, no. 1

Discusses Thailand's reappraisal of its ties and commitments to the West in the wake of the evident decision of the United States to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia. Bennett explores various alternatives under consideration by Thai leaders, including improvement of relations with Communist China and the formation of a regional alliance with other non-Communist Southeast Asian states. He finds Thailand better prepared to cope with Communist insurgents than it was prior to establishing close ties to the United States.

1042
Besson, Waldemar. [THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC; EXPERIENCES AND CRITERIA] Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik; Erfahrungen und Massstäbe. München, R. Piper [c1970] 493 p.
DD259.4.B48
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The determinants of the beginning.--The course to the West.--On the defensive in world politics.--The wind of change.--Continuity and change in the Great Coalition.--The raison d'état of the Federal Republic.

Reviews the diplomatic history of the German Federal Republic to establish a schematic which recognizes, among other themes, that the Federal Republic, originally the product and agent of American strategy, must now seek détente by its own initiative. Since America is now a tired giant, West Germany must strengthen its relationships with its partners in NATO, expanding the role of supranational organizations like the European Economic Community while at the same time carefully respecting national pride and interests. To demonstrate to its allies the similarity of their interests in Eastern and Central Europe, Bonn must accept existing territorial boundaries in return for a Soviet renunciation of force. As far as possible without arousing Soviet apprehensions, Bonn can work to make Central Europe into a kind of buffer zone by peaceful cultural and trade exchanges. Besson asks for popular recognition of the facts that East Germany is wartime booty the Soviet Union will never willingly relinquish and that the situation in West Berlin can be normalized only when the Federal Republic's positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and East Germany are normalized. He concludes with a call for intensive participation in the development of the Third World, which he sees as the scene of the crisis of the second half of the 20th century.

1043
Bowman, Larry W. SOUTH AFRICA'S SOUTHERN STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. International affairs (London) v. 47, Jan. 1971: 19-30. JX1.I53, v. 47

Examines recent political developments in southern Africa, focusing on South Africa's relations with the new black states and the white-governed states and on the nature of America's foreign-policy response to the political configuration thus engendered. South Africa has been able to cultivate relations with African states in the region because of their dependence on South African trade, tourism, development loans, and investment capital. On the other hand, the "unholy alliance" that exists among the Southern African white regimes is based solely on their need for mutual defense against African nationalism. Bowman contends that the alinement of forces in southern Africa poses a foreign-policy dilemma for the United States in view of the clash between its ideals about self-determination and its real economic and perceived strategic interests in South Africa.

1044
Burnham, J. Bernard. WHAT LIBERALS DON'T UNDERSTAND ABOUT VIETNAM. National review, v. 23, Jan. 26, 1971: 77-79. AP2.N3545, v. 23

The answer to the question "Why Vietnam?" is the incontrovertible historical fact that America is a Pacific power. American idealism of the kind personified by Wilson and John Foster Dulles wrought an American empire with policies that were generally "the opposite of imperial." The liberal fallacy that it is possible to exercise freedom of choice in interventions is compounded by the liberal failure to provide an effective political formula. To be successful, policy must be consistent, "and only an adequate political formula can furnish the framework that is going to make consistency possible." The pressing intellectual challenge of the Vietnam situation is to find the political formula that expresses the clearly manifested fundamental American drives.

1045
Calleo, David P. THE ATLANTIC FANTASY: THE U.S., NATO, AND EUROPE. Baltimore, John Hopkins Press [1970] 182 p. (Studies in international affairs, no. 13) E840.C34 1970
Bibliography: p. 170-174.

Calls for a reconstruction of American foreign policy based on a realistic assessment of America's capabilities and objectives. Calleo argues that it is time that the myth of the Soviet-American duopoly, which many believe is the basis for stability and the definer of future international political relationships, be scuttled because it creates instability. Indeed, the effort to make this myth a reality, especially in Vietnam, has provoked the neoisolationist reaction in America. The author contends that a revaluation of U.S. foreign policy will face its most crucial test in Europe, where the United States must devolve the heavy responsibilities it has carried since World War II.

1046
CANADA AND THE SOVIET UNION: AGREEMENT ON CO-OPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 23, Mar. 1971: 94-96.
JX351.A3, v. 23

Discusses the Soviet-Canadian agreement on cooperation in industrial science and technology,

which "is intended to promote mutually-advantageous exchanges of industrial technology and will involve the participation on the Canadian side of both government and private industry." Both countries intend to conclude a general agreement that will provide a framework for greater exchanges in culture, education, and science.

1047
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 41, Sept. 1970: 465-473.
JX1162.A33, v. 41

Reviews Canadian foreign policy as set out in the Government publication Foreign Policy for Canadians, introduced in the House of Commons on June 25, 1970. The publication comprises six separate studies of foreign policy, Europe, the Pacific, Latin America, the United Nations, and international development. Canadian foreign policy is conceived as the international extension of national policies and as necessarily framed within the context of two great Canadian political realities: national unity and living with the United States. The order of priorities for the 1970's is given as the fostering of economic growth, promotion of social justice, enhancement of the quality of life, working for peace and security, safeguarding sovereignty, and ensurance of a harmonious natural environment. Examples given of the kind of contribution Canada can make to peace and security include participation in arms control and détente, diplomatic relations with East Europe and China, disaster and refugee relief, and the promotion of international law. Canadians have special expertise in peacekeeping that should be used only sparingly.

1048
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. THE CHINESE THAW. New statesman, v. 81, Jan. 8, 1971: 35-36.
AP4.N64, v. 81

Since 1949 Communist China has existed in relative diplomatic isolation, and the Western view of its intentions and policies has been predicated "on the assessments of a handful of China-watchers, many of them peering hopefully into the wrong end of a telescope in Hongkong." There are signs that this depressing state of affairs is changing: Sino-Soviet tensions have cooled, and China's attitude toward the United Nations is less antagonistic. China's attitudes have changed as part of a general diplomatic offensive. Peking now has diplomatic relations with 50 governments, and an ambassador is to be installed in Moscow. When China emerges from its isolation it will not live submissively under a perpetual Soviet-American diarchy. With Peking's growing nuclear arms capability (the U.S. Department of Defense estimates that by 1975 China could have between 10 and 25 operational ICBM's) Communist China will become, in any real sense of the word, a superpower. The significance of the new China is not difficult to discern when placed in the context of the frustrated expectations of the Third World and the growing threat of racial conflicts across national boundaries. The crucial question is whether the West can shake off its stereotypes of China and recognize reality.

1049
Challener, Richard D., comp. FROM ISOLATION TO CONTAINMENT, 1921-1952; THREE DECADES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, FROM HARDING TO TRUMAN. New York, St. Martin's Press [1970] 184 p. (Documents of modern history) E744.C43
Bibliography: p. [183]-184.

Contents.--Introduction.--The 1920's: peace, disarmament and world affairs.--Soviet-American relations, 1921-41.--The Far East: Manchuria to Pearl Harbor.--The New Deal from isolation to war. --Foreign policy and global war, 1941-5.--The cold war and the revolution in American foreign policy.

Selected documents on U.S. foreign policy, intended to demonstrate the transition from isolationism to major involvement in world affairs before and since World War II. Challener explains the significance of the documents, many of which have been heavily edited, in essays introducing each section.

1050
[CHINA IN ASIA AND IN THE WORLD] La Chine en Asie et dans le monde. [Québec] Institut canadien des affaires internationales, 1970. 88 p. illus. (Études internationales, 1)
D849.E88 no. 1
Cover title.
Includes bibliographical references.

Discusses Communist China's role in Asia and the rest of the world, focusing on the domestic factors that influence Peking's foreign policy, the implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and China's relations with Western Europe, Japan, South Asia, and the United States.

1051
Chomsky, Noam. AT WAR WITH ASIA. [New York] Pantheon Books [1970] 313 p.
DS557.A63C47 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Indochina and the American crisis.--After Pinkville.--Cambodia.--Laos.--North Vietnam. --On war crimes.

A collection of essays on U.S. policies in Indochina written in 1969 and 1970. Chomsky contends that the United States has resorted to barbaric and inhumane tactics in a futile and misguided attempt to suppress revolutionary movements that have the support of the peoples of Indochina. He cites the diplomatic maneuverings by which the United States replaced France as the colonial power in Indochina, the systematic and deliberate destruction and depopulation of rural areas that could not be wrested from Communist control, the callous disregard of Indochinese life that has led to social disintegration and massacres such as My Lai, and the use of weapons prohibited by the laws of war.

1052
Clotfelter, James. VACILLATION AND STABILITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY. Naval War College review, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 55-61. N&CPR

Counters the argument that the vacillation and instability of mood of American public opinion toward military and foreign policy complicate the tasks of the executive branch. Clotfelter examines the polls on public support for the Vietnam War conducted by the opinion survey organizations and compares their findings with similar surveys of public opinion on domestic matters. He concludes that the public's opinion on American foreign and military policy vacillates no more than its opinion concerning domestic affairs. Since opinion about universal military training and Vietnamization is apparently the most stable, the national-prestige aspect of foreign policy "is more important to Americans than the domestic economic and social concerns long believed to be uppermost in their minds." Today, public support for presidential leadership, even in the "no-win, no withdraw" situation of Vietnam, continues essentially undiminished.

1053
Comte, Gilbert. PEKING SHOWS ITS NEW AFRICAN LOOK. Africa report, v. 16, Mar. 1971: 19-21. DT1.A217, v. 16

The reemergence of Communist China as a power in African politics stems from its use of relatively flexible and sophisticated approaches. Peking now seeks good relationships with the African states regardless of their place in the political spectrum. This change is exemplified by the quick recognition of the November 1968 Mali coup as contrasted with Mao's obvious dislike of the post-Nkrumah regime in Ghana. Peking's ability to reassure conservative and moderate African states without alienating the others explains the growth of the African pro-Peking vote in the United Nations. Except for the TanZam railroad Chinese aid is modest, although well adapted to African conditions. While Tanzania and Zambia are not now fertile soil for Peking's brand of Marxism, they may lose their freedom of choice in the pressure of events. What happens to China in Africa will be determined primarily by the future course of Sino-Soviet relations, however.

1054
Cooper, Chester L. THE LOST CRUSADE; AMERICA IN VIETNAM. With a foreword by W. Averell Harriman. New York, Dodd, Mead [1970] 559 p. DS557.A63C66
Bibliography: p. 539-549.

Contents.--The decade of Vietnam.--The colonial legacy.--Passing the baton.--Blueprint for a house of cards: Geneva, 1954.--Forging a double-edged sword: Manila, 1954.--Birth of a non-nation.--Diem, Dulles, and dominoes.--Kennedy's commitment.--Death of a mandarin.--Interregnum: Washington and Saigon.--McNamara's war.--Johnson's war.--Tragedy of errors.--End of an administration; end of a policy.--No more Vietnams.--Crusades, commitments, and constraints.--Glossary.--Chronology.--Index.

A history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam focusing on events in which the author was personally involved as a diplomat and member of the White House staff. Cooper contrasts the crusading evangelism with which the United States launched its attempt to establish a democratic, anti-Communist government in South Vietnam with the eventual disillusionment and determination to disengage.

1055
De Séverac. [RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS] Relations entre les USA et les républiques Latino-américaines. Revue militaire générale; general military review, Mar. 1971: 293-315. U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in English and German.

So far in this century the United States has intervened militarily in nine Latin American countries to protect its economic and political interests. During the past decade intervention has taken the form of economic aid carried out under the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps. Despite these efforts the economic and social situation in Latin America remains critical. Poverty is causing discontent, and Washington is supporting totalitarian military regimes to restrain demonstrations of unrest that could lead to revolutions. The United States, which has 17 military missions in Latin America distributing aid under military assistance programs, is by virtue of these programs intervening in the internal affairs of many Latin American countries. Today the United States is being more conciliatory and accepting the decline of American privileges in Latin America, and seems content merely to maintain as much American property as possible. The United States supports authoritarian military regimes that are opposed to America but that constitute a barrier against Castroism.

1056
Duncan, W. Raymond. CASTRO'S NEW APPROACH TOWARD LATIN AMERICA. World affairs, v. 133, Mar. 1971: 275-282. JX1901.W7, v. 133

The revision of Cuban foreign policy to recognize the possibilities of nationalism as a Communist way to power in Latin America has brought Havana in closer step with the Soviet Union. Specific nationalist features of Castro's own struggle, for example, the image of the leader and the external threat, in the past brought Castro and Ché Guevara's followers into conflict with holders of more orthodox Marxist beliefs. Guevara's central thesis that guerrilla warfare is the basic weapon for social revolution in Latin America contradicts the special role of Communist parties and the need for achieving specific stages of economic development as a prelude to political transitions described in Marxist dogma. Castro's attacks on Latin American Communists for their reluctance to take up arms and on bourgeois reformist governments frequently imperiled the broad united fronts sought by the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, perhaps stemming

from domestic pressures, Cuban foreign policy has recognized the legitimacy of other roads to communism. Havana's lessened criticism of Latin American governments and Communist parties and its expansion of diplomatic relations parallel the attitudes expressed by other docile members of Moscow's "Socialist commonwealth."

1057
Farrell, Robert Barry. THE MAKING OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY. [Scarborough, Ont.] Prentice-Hall of Canada [1969] 181 p.
JX1515.Z5 1969
Bibliographical footnotes.

Examines the functions and processes of Canadian foreign policymaking, focusing principally on the Department of External Affairs, but also on high Government leaders responsible for the formulation of Canadian foreign policy, and on Parliament. Farrell contends that in the long run the limitations imposed by federalism represent "the strength that enables constitutional democracies to hold their own against dictatorships." He concludes that the governmental organization for foreign relations permits stability in foreign policy; that Canadian foreign policy is weaker on long-range planning than on day-to-day decisions; and that Canada may begin to play a more important role in foreign policy involving French-speaking nations.

1058
Fischer, Louis. RUSSIA'S ROAD FROM PEACE TO WAR: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1917-1941. New York, Harper & Row [1969] 499 p. illus.
DK266.F49
Bibliography: p. 469-481.

A history of Soviet foreign relations from the Bolshevik seizure of power to the Nazi invasion of Russia.

1059
Fodorov, Mikhail. NEW MESSAGE, OLD DOCTRINES. New times, no. 10, Mar. 10, 1971: 8-9.
D839.N483, 1971

The authors of President Nixon's second foreign policy address to Congress assert their wish to extirpate world conflict at the roots and fundamentally restructure international relations. But the Americans continue to seek military victory in Vietnam and now expand the theater of hostilities in Indochina. They propose nothing new for the Middle East and continue the blank check given Israel. In addition to leaving untouched the roots of world conflict, the speech is vague and self-contradictory in its reference to Soviet-American relations. For example, how is the call for a reduction of arms to be reconciled with the increased military budget and the reinforcement of NATO's conventional weapons?

1060
Galbraith, John Kenneth. THE PLAIN LESSONS OF A BAD DECADE. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 31-45. N&CPR

Draws conclusions from a survey of the successes and failures of U.S. foreign policy over the last decade. The major success has been the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Most of the failures have occured in the Third World--Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Indochina. These experiences indicate that there are limits to U.S. power in the underdeveloped areas, that capitalism and communism are meaningful only when applied to advanced industrial societies, and that efforts to influence the course of events in the Third World lead to the establishment to an overseas bureaucracy with a life and will of its own. To prevent a repetition of past errors, the United States must contract its policy in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, close its bases and halt its military and counterinsurgency operations in these regions, confine the foreign aid program to economic development goals, restrict political activity to the traditional diplomacy, and reassert political control over foreign affairs by disestablishing the foreign-policy bureaucracy.

1061
Gandhi, Indira. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: ITS BASIC ASSUMPTIONS. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, Sept. 15, 1970: 9-11.
D839.I453, v. 7
Excerpts from a speech given at a seminar on Aug. 31, 1970.

The basic assumption of India's foreign policy is that freedom, peace, and economic prosperity are indivisible. In this light India seeks to "strengthen [its] friendships, to change indifference into friendship, and to lessen the hostility where it exists." Although it is not a rich and powerful nation, India has such intangible assets as courage, conviction, and national pride, from which its foreign policy springs. The policy of nonalinement, which it will continue to follow, enables India to support developing countries on vital issues and to stand squarely on its own feet without having to be dependent. Interdependence cannot be avoided in today's world, but dependence must be rejected, for in its path colonialism follows.

1062
Garrett, Banning. VIETNAM: HOW NIXON PLANS TO WIN THE WAR. Ramparts, v. 9, Feb. 1971: 26-31. illus. AP2.R19, v. 9

The emergence of peace forces in South Vietnam that appear to have at least the tacit support of groups ranging from the National Liberation Front (NLF) to the Nixon administration marks a cryptic phase in the war. While NLF support is not surprising, the Nixon administration's reasons for encouraging these forces require an explanation, particularly since it has not given up its hope for victory in Vietnam. Samuel P. Huntington, whose views appear to agree with those of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, has described the large-scale exodus of the South Vietnamese population from the countryside due to the terror and devastation inflicted by massive U.S. firepower and bombing as a process of "forced urbanization." Not only has the NLF been deprived of the

population necessary to conduct a successful guerrilla war, but, according to Huntington, "forced urbanization" may provide the basis for establishing a viable, urban-centered, non-Communist government in South Vietnam following U.S. withdrawal. The Huntington-Kissinger-Nixon strategy is to isolate the NLF from urban centers, which now constitute the moving forces in South Vietnamese society, in the hope that support for the NLF will then gradually wither and die. Should this last-ditch attempt to defeat the Communists fail, it is not unlikely that the Nixon administration will resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to isolate the NLF by permanently severing its supply lines from North Vietnam.

1063
Gelber, Harry G. LIMITING FACTORS IN A RECONSIDERATION OF U.S. CHINA POLICIES. Orbis, v. 14, fall 1970: 599-626. D839.068, v. 14
"An earlier draft of this article was presented to the Conference on the Foreign Policy of Communist China, held in Puerto Rico, January 4-8, 1970."

Sino-American relations will be limited by Peking's desire to balance the United States against the Soviet Union and its perceptions of the facts about U.S. policies and specific U.S. actions. In a period when America is reducing its presence in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia and its determination and will are being questioned in Vietnam, it may not be able to make many concessions to China. This suggests that a China policy should be pragmatic in attempting to maintain a balance between Moscow and Peking. While a Sino-American relationship may include diplomatic relations and a variety of contacts at different levels, it scarcely can go beyond wary coexistence. Such a relationship will not enable the United States to predict, let alone guide, Peking's reaction to U.S. policies, and it recognizes that China's emphasis on coexistence is compatible with full encouragement of national liberation wars and the removal of the United States from Asia. These limitations on prospective Sino-American relations deserve more attention than they have received.

1064
Glauert, Earl T., and Lester D. Langley, comps. THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. [1971] 204 p. (Addison-Wesley series in history)
F1418.G56

Contents.--pt. 1. The formation of a Latin American policy in the nineteenth century.--pt. 2. The era of intervention and the Good Neighbor policy, 1900-1945.--pt. 3. The United States and Latin America in the cold war.

A selection of articles, documents, speeches, and excerpts from books on relations between the United States and Latin America. Apart from introductory essays by Latin American scholars, most of the selections are by U.S. and Latin American political leaders who were instrumental in shaping inter-American relations.

1065
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. THE STABLE CRISIS; TWO DECADES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Harper & Row [1970] xiv, 221 p.
DD259.4.H24
Bibliography: p. [205]-215.

An examination of West Germany's quest for security, recovery, and reunification on the international scene from 1949 to 1969, followed by a chronological discussion of domestic issues during the two decades. Hanrieder contends that Germany's major foreign policy goals have remained remarkably constant because not just the means but the ends of Bonn's foreign policy were imposed by international circumstances beyond West German control.

1066
Holbrooke, Richard. THE MACHINE THAT FAILS. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 65-77.
N&CPR

A new foreign policy will require a restructured bureaucracy to implement it. Sheer size--too many people, too many chains of command--is the chief defect of the present arrangement. In the past, critics have concentrated their fire on the State Department and the Foreign Service, which are said to have failed in their primary responsibility of coodinating U.S. efforts abroad. What the critics fail to comprehend, however, is that the situation is well beyond the capacity of any one agency, no matter how active, to control. It is up to the President to decide whether he wants to make major changes in the present system or to work through his own personally loyal bypass mechanisms, as several of his predecessors have preferred to do. He can have a responsive foreign policy apparatus if he wants one, but only if he takes a personal hand in the tough decisions that are required. Some agencies must disappear: hard questions must be aimed at the United States Information Agency, the foreign aid program, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Foreign Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Some one agency, preferably a reformed State Department, will have to be put in charge. The effort required to make reforms will be great, but would be nonetheless worthwhile. The nation as a whole stands to gain; only the bureaucracies stand to lose.

1067
Kashin, Alexander, and Rudolf Riemer. [RUSSIA'S CHINA POLICY] Die russische Chinapolitik. München, Kopernikus Verlag [1970] 62 p.
DK68.7.C5K327
Bibliography: p. [63].

Contents.--From the beginning to the October Revolution.--First Soviet actions toward China, 1917-1927.--Mao's victorious campaign for China, 1927-1949.--The Sino-Soviet friendship and its end, 1949-1959.--The irreconcilable enmity, 1960-1970.--Chronology.

Distinguishes the causes of the present Sino-Soviet conflict in the tsarist China policies of

the 19th century. Today ideological contradictions are dominant, but the territorial arrangements of the "unequal treaties" are still resented by the Chinese as symbolizing the era of colonialism.

1068
Kiba, Simon. VIEW POINT: WHAT FUTURE FOR FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS? Africa report, v. 16, Mar. 1971: 22-24. DT1.A217, v. 16

Despite France's intense involvement in the affairs of its former African colonies, it usually refrains from overt intervention into internal politics. The francophone African states go their own way at the United Nations and in foreign affairs generally, although usually uniting with France in the major international financial bodies. France now confidently works for better relations with Guinea, Nigeria, and even the anglophone states. The long-term impediments to full Franco-African friendship remain Paris' support of South Africa and the Somali claim to the Territory of the Afars and Issas. There are occasional evidences of irritation with French businessmen or French economic practice, but generally French expenditures on the developing countries (relatively the world's highest) have been rewarded.

1069
Lavrov, K. POLICY OF PEACE AND RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION. New times, no. 16, Apr. 21, 1971: 4-5. D839.N483, 1971

Lauds Brezhnev's six-point presentation at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party as a comprehensive blueprint of the major world problems that also offered realistic projects for their solution. Lavrov thinks greatest interest has been evoked by the proposal for a nuclear disarmament conference of the five nuclear powers--America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Communist China. He denies that such a conference would inhibit the bilateral Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation. Lavrov directs attention to the passage in the fourth point that calls for reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is particularly dangerous, specifically mentioning Central Europe.

1070
Lent, Ernest S. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. World affairs, v. 133, Mar. 1971: 293-303. JX1901.W7, v. 133

Examines the extent to which American foreign policy has been guided by the principle of self-determination. The three variant meanings of this term--national, colonial, and secessionist--are defined, and several cases within each category are studied. Lent concludes that the principle has been followed when it does not conflict with higher priority objectives or when it increases the possibility of attaining these objectives. The United States has not supported self-determination when the end result might be armed conflict or a weakening of American policy toward the Soviet Union, the undermining of important allies, or the establishment of new governments with anti-American orientation.

1071
Lévesque, Jacques. [THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND EASTERN EUROPE; EFFECTS ON THE SOVIET-POLISH AND SOVIET-RUMANIAN CONFLICTS] Le conflit sino-soviétique et l'Europe de l'Est; ses incidences sur les conflits soviéto-polonais et soviéto-roumain. Pref. de François Fejtö. Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1970. xx, 387 p. D847.L48

Examines the effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the relations between the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, particularly Poland and Rumania. Lévesque surveys Soviet-Polish relations from 1956 to 1959 and Soviet-Rumanian relations from 1960 to 1968, emphasizing their differences and similarities. He concludes that in view of the neo-Stalinist trends prevalent in the Soviet Union today, Rumania's independence will contribute little to the promotion of a successful European policy of détente, a policy that could bring about mutual balanced force reductions and a reduced superpower influence in Europe.

1072
Levin, N. Gordon. NIXON, THE SENATE & THE WAR. Commentary, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 69-84. DS101.C63, v. 50

Discusses the efforts of Senate liberals to limit U.S. involvement in the Indochina war in the wake of the Cambodian invasion. Levin sees Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as essentially a continuation of Johnson's war policies. The goal of a non-Communist South Vietnam remains the same; only the methods have changed. The defeat of the Hatfield-McGovern amendment and the ineffectiveness of the Cooper-Church amendment testify to the failure of Senate liberals to fundamentally alter U.S. policy in the war, but the debates on these amendments indicate that a significant number of liberals are at last beginning to question the basic assumptions of globalism that underlie U.S. foreign policy.

1073
Lowenthal, Richard. THE RETURN OF STALIN'S MUSTACHE ON A HIGHER LEVEL. New York times magazine, Mar. 28, 1971: 26-27, 109-111. AP2.N6575, 1971

On the eve of the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Union finds itself faced with serious problems of overcommitment abroad and rising consumer demands at home. The results of efforts to reduce the pressures in one or both of these areas have been scanty, but temporary compromise solutions are still possible. The real difficulty, however, is that the system of collective leadership and compromise decisions is itself under attack. The problems in this area are three: the problem of generational change; the problem of "Stalinism," in essence, a dispute

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over methods of social control; and the problem of oligarchic immobility, which suggests the need for a return to one-man rule. Failure to resolve these difficulties has created a disturbing crisis of authority. Barring an open attack by the Stalinists, the 24th Congress will see no upheaval; on the contrary, if the majority has its say, drama will be kept to a minimum. Nevertheless, the elections to the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat are all-important and could lay the political foundations for an end to collective leadership. The one man need not be Brezhnev. Nor need it be a Stalinist. A victory for the latter would be unwelcome, to say the least. Although the neo-Stalinists are conservative and defensive rather than radical and aggressive like the original model, their methods are much the same, and their rise to supreme power in the Soviet Union would be unfortunate for the Soviet people and the outside world alike.

1074
MacFarquhar, Roderick [interview] BARRIERS TO A "DEAL" BETWEEN U.S. AND RED CHINA. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, May 3, 1971: 30-32.
JK1.U65, v. 70

Responses to questions concerning Communist China's recent bid to improve relations with the United States. The impact of this development on China's admission to the United Nations, the Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet-American relations, Japan, Taiwan, and international trade is discussed. The Chinese are much impressed by the success the North Vietnamese have had in encouraging Americans to bring pressure to bear on their Government, and they hope to be able to do the same thing. Their immediate objective is to win a favorable vote on U.N. membership, perhaps as early as the fall of 1971. Intermediate aims are to erode U.S. support for the Nationalist government on Taiwan and to force both superpowers to deal with China as an equal in arms control talks. Over the long haul, China would like to achieve equality with the superpowers in world politics and a dominant position in Asia.

1075
Mackintosh, Malcolm. SOVIET AIMS AND CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 116, Mar. 1971: 22-27. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116
Speech given before the Institute Dec. 2, 1970.

Predictions about Soviet policy with regard to Europe should be based on two assumptions, first, that Russia believes Europe "as an integral part of the Eurasian land mass" should look to Russia for leadership, and, second, that in actual fact this has not been the case--attempts to dominate Europe have caused the Russians great suffering. The Russians therefore tend to regard Europe with fear and suspicion. The Soviets are not likely to attack the territory of any NATO members. Their military forces in Eastern Europe are designed for use in a large general war, and in that event they might be directed against NATO forces. In the meantime the Soviet Union is staging a "political offensive," of which one manifestation is the Soviet and Eastern European proposal to hold a European security conference. From this conference would emerge a European Commission, whose function would be the discussion of all-European problems. The result desired by the Soviets would be a weakening of Western military and political cohesiveness. They will continue their attempts to damage NATO relationships in any way they can.

1076
Magdoff, Harry. THE IMPACT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Monthly review, v. 22, Mar. 1971: 1-9.
HX1.M66, v. 22

Asserts the existence of a fundamental contradiction between U.S. foreign policy and the interests of the Third World. The prime concerns of American foreign policy are given as the promotion of counterrevolution and the maintenance of private enterprise. This policy works against the underdeveloped nations, for which revolutions that change social priorities and redesign the production structure for the general good are more urgent than imported technology and capital. Magdoff enumerates the manner in which the capital-shortage factor can be overcome by the advent of social revolution. A restructuring of the backward economies and their release from material and psychological dependence is possible only by a victory of the revolutionary impulse that the United States seeks to restrain.

1077
Matthews, R. O. THE COMMONWEALTH STILL AT STAKE. Canadian forum, v. 50, Feb. 1971: 362-364.
AP5.C125, v. 50

The Commonwealth Conference at Singapore changed nothing; it postponed rather than eliminated the danger of a Commonwealth breakup over the proposed sale of arms to South Africa. Prime Minister Heath has not let himself be persuaded by the Commonwealth leaders who warn that by committing Britain to the status quo in Southern Africa he is facilitating Soviet penetration there. If the Conservatives persist in their program, Canada should consider the establishment of a new quasi-commonwealth organization dedicated to the goals outlined in the Singapore declaration.

1078
Meissner, Boris, comp. [THE GERMAN OSTPOLITIK 1961-1970; CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: DOCUMENTATION] Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970; Kontinuität und Wandel: Dokumentation. Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [c1970] 447 p. (Göttinger Arbeitskreis. Veröffentlichung Nr. 393)
DD259.4.M37

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. The transition to a flexible Ostpolitik.--pt. 2. The "new Ostpolitik" of the government of the "Great Coalition." --pt. 3. The modification of the "new Ostpolitik" under the SPD-FDP government.

Declarations of the German Ostpolitik as expressed by Government officials and leading politicians in speeches, articles, interviews, and of-

ficial communiques. The documents constitute a survey of the development of the Ostpolitik and an analysis of the relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and the Eastern states to promote understanding of the necessity of an active German Ostpolitik. A separate volume of documents focusing on the relations between the two Germanys is to be published in the near future.

1079

Naik, J. A. SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA FROM STALIN TO BREZHNEV. Delhi, Vikas Publications [1970] 201 p. DS450.R8N3
Bibliography: p. [193]-196.

History of Soviet economic and foreign policies toward India from Stalin's regime to Brezhnev's. Naik considers the development of strong bonds between India and the Soviet Union the result of Nehru's personal relations with top Soviet leaders and India's growing role as a nonalined power. He concludes that the ability of these Soviet leaders to recognize the reality of the nonalined world helped nations like India play a significant role in world affairs.

1080

Neuberg, Howard G. WEST GERMANY OUR CAPABLE EUROPEAN ALLY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Apr. 1971: 35-45. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

A political and military portrait of West Germany. Defense capability, public attitudes toward military affairs, the general political situation, constitutional restraints, war-crime prosecutions, refugees and their problems, economic and trade policy, and relations with Eastern Europe are considered. Neuberg finds West Germany strong and healthy and well able to fulfill its political and military obligations in Europe even though these are certain to grow more burdensome as the U.S. presence on the continent is reduced.

1081

A NEW AMERICAN IMPERIALISM? Current, no. 125, Jan. 1971: 42-63. AP2.C9259, 1971

Contents.--Does the U.S. economy require it? by S. M. Miller, Roy Bennett, and Cyril Alapatt.--The logic of imperialism, by Harry Magdoff.

Two views of the determinants of U.S. foreign and military policy. Miller, Bennett, and Alapatt take issue with the contention that the American economic system necessitates an imperialist foreign policy. The roots of U.S. interventionism abroad are political and military rather than economic, from which it follows that fundamental changes in U.S. policy can be made without substantially altering the underlying economic structure. Magdoff offers a point-by-point critique of this position, arguing that it is impossible to separate economics and politics or to reform the capitalist system by political means alone. Imperialism being "the way of life of capitalism," its elimination requires the overthrow of the capitalist system.

1082

Quandt, William B. DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970. 27 p. (Rand Corporation. Paper. P-4309)
Sci RR
Microfiche AD 705 095

"Prepared for the 47th session of the Institute of World Affairs, International Politics; The Middle East in the 1970's, April 8-10, 1970, at the University of Southern California."

The prospect for the 1970's is that American policy in the Middle East will be the product of numerous competing forces, among which domestic factors will not necessarily be the primary ones. The influence of interest groups, such as the pro-Israeli organizations and the oil companies, is likely to decline over day-to-day policy. There is a growing feeling throughout the government that the Middle East is not intrinsically vital to U.S. interests, and the post-Vietnam syndrome and the concentration on domestic issues will leave few resources for heavy foreign involvements. Developments in Soviet Middle Eastern policy and in the military capabilities of the Arab states will have a greater impact on U.S. foreign policy than will domestic factors. (Abstract supplied)

1083

Radosh, Ronald. AMERICAN LABOR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Random House [1969] 463 p. HD8076.R33
Includes bibliographical references.

Discusses the role played by American labor leaders in U.S. foreign policy and the effect their activities have had on the international labor movement. Radosh examines the factors that motivated labor leaders to develop a close identification with American policy. In surveying American labor policy during the cold war the author concludes that "the total absorption of American labor leaders in the ideology of Cold War liberalism shows little signs of dissipation."

1084

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ASSESSING SOVIET POWER IN THE THIRD WORLD. In Royal Central Asian Society, London. Journal, v. 58, Feb. 1971: 3-11. DS1.R6, v. 58

"Lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society . . . November 11, 1970."

Reviews the basic assumptions concerning Soviet policy held by Western analysts in the 1950's and 1960's and offers the author's own assumptions on Soviet policy toward the Third World in the 1970's. As a key arena in the superpower struggle, the Third World in the first two decades witnessed the significant Soviet shift from a continental-based strategy to a global one and can be expected to participate in the crises of the 1970's. In the past, Western analysts erroneously wrote off the Third World to communism because of

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their underestimation of the innate strength of nationalism. They also wrongly assumed that the penetration of the Third World would be a concerted Moscow-Peking action and that increased Soviet economic aid inevitably meant increased Soviet political influence. Rubenstein points out that there has been no Third World swing to Soviet-type institutions since 1955, with the possible exception of the arguable Cuban case. Positive Soviet achievements in the period did include the effective neutralization of the Western alliance system in the Middle East and South Asia and the strengthening of the nonalined countries. Rubenstein offers these assumptions for the immediate future: the Soviets will continue to play superpower politics, their main fear will remain China, and their diplomacy will be flexible and undistorted by ideology, but they will harvest decreasing returns in power and influence for increasing efforts and expenditures. Rubenstein concludes that the Soviet policy of competitive coexistence will continue, with the circumstances of Soviet-Western rivalry varying according to the power relationships of the moment. "In this general setting it is the small nations who stand to pay the most."

1085
Schenke, Wolf. [SOME REMARKS ON THE TREATY WITH POLAND] Einiges zum Vertrag mit Polen. Neue Politik, v. 15, Nov. 28, 1970: p. 3-5. maps.
H5.N377, v. 15

The German treaty with Poland is prerequisite to peaceful, normal relations between the two countries. A valid objection against the treaty, however, is that it prevents a World War II peace treaty, which could draw a final line under the tragic events of World War II. Chancellor Brandt's courageous Ostpolitik deserves praise because it works toward East-West détente, diminishes the fear that Central Europe will be drawn into a conflict, and decreases European dependence on the superpowers. But German foreign policy should not stop with Ostpolitik or the maintenance of a good relationship with the West; it should also protect German interests in other parts of the world. If Germany were to conclude a separate World War II peace treaty with the People's Republic of China, then the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain would be prompted to seek solutions to world problems.

1086
Seabury, Paul, and Alvin Drischler. HOW TO DECOMMIT WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL SYMPTOMS. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 46-64.
N&CPR

Examines how the United States can withdraw from the Vietnam War and from the forward defense policy that got it involved in that struggle in the first place without jeopardizing important commitments elsewhere. In general terms the problem is one of "how to abandon or modify commitment in such a way as to appear prudent, rather than cowardly, feeble, or opportunistic." The authors survey earlier discussions of the commitment problem--notably, the writings of Washington, Jefferson, and Lippman. They outline six arguments by which, alone or in combination, a nation might rationalize the abandonment of a commitment, and they conclude by recommending that the United States rebalance its alliance systems to make itself more nearly an equal among equals, which would mean putting greater reliance on the local effort of regional coalitions and on the multilateral legitimization of U.S. policy.

1087
Shepherd, George W., comp. RACIAL INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Basic Books [1970] 238 p. E810.S45

Contents.--Introduction, by George W. Shepherd, Jr.--Race and color in world affairs, by Harold R. Isaacs.--The race problem and international relations, by C. Eric Lincoln.--Racial problems and American foreign policy, by Paul Seabury.--The civil-rights movement and American foreign policy, by James A. Moss.--Race relations and United States policy in Asia, by Robert A. Scalapino.--Race and national cohesion in Latin America, by Kalman H. Silvert.--Counterracism in new African politics, by George W. Shepherd.--Race in Africa: United States foreign policy, by Rupert Emerson.--Southern Africa and United States policy: a consideration of alternatives, by John Marcum.--Conclusion: the racial dimension of United States intervention in Africa and Asia, by George W. Shepherd.

Discusses the role of race in U.S. foreign policy, emphasizing the close relationship between domestic and foreign racial politics. Isaacs provides a broad survey of the role of race in international relations. Lincoln sketches the evolution of American attitudes toward blacks, while Seabury reviews the assimilation of Irish, German, Jewish, and other ethnic minorities into American society. Moss contends that U.S. foreign policy is dominated by a racist ideology. Scalapino, Silvert, Shepherd, Emerson, and Marcum examine race relations in, and U.S. racial policies toward, Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

1088
Snow, Edgar. TALKS WITH CHOU EN-LAI: THE OPEN DOOR. New republic, v. 164, Mar. 27, 1971: 20-23.
AP2.N624, v. 164

Recapitulation of conversations with Premier Chou En-lai on Chinese foreign and domestic policies and achievements. Chou thinks the major obstacle to a Sino-American dialog is the Taiwan question, whose solution must fall along the lines advanced by his government in 1960 and 1965. China's acceptance by the world community is evidenced by the vote on membership in the United Nations, (about whose efficacy and continued existence Chou is dubious) and the growing diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Recalling the Chinese proposal in the early 1960's for a summit conference on nuclear weapons, Chou declared that every Chinese atomic test in the future will be accompanied by another such proposal. Hope in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will prove illusory, since each

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superpower intends to use the occasion only to weaken its adversary. Although the danger of world war remains constant, China's world outlook continues to see social revolution as imminent, but China will not build its foreign policy on the expectation of an early American revolution. Snow concludes that China seeks the renewal and expansion of the Bandung principles of peaceful coexistence, a credible deterrent power, and an end of superpower domination in world affairs. "Relying on her own means, however, China has never been so well prepared for war, and to frustrate American military and political purposes in Asia by fulfilling her obligations to Hanoi and the Indochina people allied with Hanoi."

1089
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS: A STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 370 p. KF27.F638 1970
Hearings held Sept. 15-Oct. 6, 1970.
Bibliography: p. 355-360.

Testimony of American China scholars on U.S.-China relations, focusing on possible U.S. initiatives that might improve these relations. Most of those testifying foresee significant improvement in Sino-American relations now that the Cultural Revolution has subsided and urge the United States to reconsider its opposition to recognition of the Peking government and to admission of mainland China to the United Nations.

1090
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session, on civil operations and rural development support program. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 750 p. KF26.F6 1970k
Hearings held Feb. 17-March 19, 1970.
Includes bibliographical references.

Hearings on U.S. programs for pacification, military advisers, economic aid, and information in South Vietnam. The testimony of William E. Colby, director of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program, Brig. Gen. Wallace L. Clement, director of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam Training Directorate, Donald G. MacDonald, director of the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in South Vietnam, Edward J. Nickel, director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, and other civilian and military officials is included, along with relevant press reports.

1091
U.S. President, 1969- (Nixon) U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: BUILDING FOR PEACE. A report to the Congress by Richard Nixon. February 25, 1971. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] 235 p.
JX1417.A59
Reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Mar. 22, 1971: 341-432; also issued as House Document no. 92-53, 92nd Congress, 1st session, under the title Foreign Policy Message from the President of the United States.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The Nixon Doctrine.--pt. 2. Relating national interests: Europe. The Western hemisphere. Indochina. East Asia and the Pacific. South Asia. Africa. The Middle East. International economic policy.--pt. 3. The Soviet Union.--pt. 4. Securing national interests: Strategic policy and forces. General purpose forces. Security assistance. Arms control.--pt. 5. The world interest: The United Nations. Global challenges.--pt. 6. The National Security Council system.--Conclusion.

Second annual statement of foreign policy to Congress by President Nixon, including a review of major developments during 1970 and projected goals for the future. Nixon notes several achievements in the field of arms control: the U.S. ratification of the nonproliferation treaty, U.N. approval of a U.S.-supported treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabed, the administration's unilateral renunciation of the use of biological weapons and the first use of chemical weapons, and the submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate. He describes the U.S. negotiating positions on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and mutual balanced force reductions in Europe.

1092
Volskii, D. BEHIND THE "SUPERPOWER" SCREEN. New times, no. 7, Feb. 17, 1971: 8-9.
D839.N483, 1971

The cynical Chinese exploitation of a propaganda theme that equates the United States, "the bulwark of world imperialism," and the Soviet Union, "the first country of victorious socialism," proves again that Peking has abandoned Marxist-Leninist principles. This propaganda distortion is obviously meant to divide world revolutionary forces, as were earlier such distortions, including the "world village versus world city" doctrine. Peking's theorists ignore completely the extensive Soviet assistance given the Vietnamese and Arab peoples, and their twisted minds can see in efforts for peaceful coexistence and arms control only a "deal." Peking's far-reaching ambition is to unite the world behind it in completion of the age-old dream of Great Han hegemony.

1093
Watt, Sir Alan. AUSTRALIA'S REACTION TO GROWING JAPANESE INFLUENCE IN THE FAR EAST. Round table, no. 241, Jan. 1971: 25-31.
AP4.R6, 1971

The Australian attitude toward Japan improved only slowly in the period after World War II. Initially Australians called for a tough peace treaty that would control the possibilities of future Japanese imperialism. After the treaty with New Zealand and the United States was ratified in 1952, a more relaxed Australian attitude was possible. Trade relations improved to the point where Japan was Australia's "best customer," absorbing about 25 percent of that country's total

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exports. Can this increasingly favorable Australian attitude continue to prevail with regard to a Japan which is assuming a taller posture socially, economically, and militarily? Australia's Prime Minister Gorton has responded affirmatively and has urged Japan to take a leadership role in dealing with industrial, commercial, and security problems in Asia. Since there seems little evidence that Japan intends to become anything but "a middle-ranking military Power, with weapons primarily defensive," it is probable that Australian public opinion will support the Government's position unless future danger signs appear.

1094
Weinstein, Martin E. JAPAN AND THE CONTINENTAL GIANTS. Current history, v. 60, Apr. 1971: 193-199, 241-242. D410.C82, v. 60

Despite its impressive economic growth Japan has neither the capability nor the intention of becoming a major political and military power in the world. The Japanese economy is dependent on free access to oceans that Japan does not control and on peace and stability in areas where Japan exerts little or no influence. As a densely populated island nation Japan is highly vulnerable to missile and air attacks. Japanese leaders are well aware of these limitations and therefore recognize the necessity for continued close economic and political cooperation with the United States, Japan's leading trade partner and guarantor of Japan's security. The dispute over several islands north of Hokkaido remains an obstacle to improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, and the allure of cooperating with the Soviet Union in the development of Siberia is tempered by Japanese fear of becoming dependent on Soviet resources and good will. Relations with mainland China have followed an erratic pattern. There is less hostility toward China than toward the Soviet Union because of cultural and racial ties and a sense of guilt over Japanese aggression against China in the 1930's and 1940's. Japan has less interest than China in improving trade relations between the two countries, although domestic pressures for diplomatic relations with China appear to be growing. In conclusion, Japan is not likely to fundamentally alter its policies toward either of the continental giants unless the United States forces it to do so by withdrawing from the U.S.-Japanese security treaty or erecting protectionist trade barriers.

1095
WHAT PEKING IS UP TO. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Jan. 26, 1971: 1-2.
D839.C87, v. 22
Translated from Pravda, Dec. 31, 1970.
Slav Rm

That such media of imperialist propaganda as the New York Times and the Voice of America should exploit the events in Poland to discredit socialism was to be expected. The materials put out by the Chinese news agencies are virtually indistinguishable from the deliberate falsehoods of imperialist propaganda. Peking's reaction to the Polish incidents shows again on what side of the barricades it fights in the class war in the international arena. As in the matters of Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, Peking has alined itself with the forces of imperialism and anticommunism.

1096
Whiting, Allen S. THE CHINESE "THREAT." New republic, v. 164, Apr. 3, 1971: 18-20.
AP2.N624, v. 164
"Adapted from an address delivered recently at Purdue University as part of the Louis Martin Sears lectures on US foreign relations."

The alleged "Chinese threat" means so many different things to Southeast Asian leaders as to be meaningless, just as President Nixon's call for resistance to Chinese "hegemony" is too vague to serve as a policy guide. Chinese assistance to Southeast Asian revolutionary movements has been modest, not because of constraints imposed by SEATO, but because China insists that revolutionaries be basically self-supporting. Even if China were to forgo its present self-restraint, it lacks the means, especially the necessary air and naval strength, to extend its domination over Southeast Asia. As for the growing Chinese nuclear arsenal, the same U.S. retaliatory capabilities that have deterred the Soviet Union should more than suffice to deter China.

1097
Wolff, Lester L., and J. Herbert Burke. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO ASIA. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 30 p.
JX1428.A7W6
At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Reports observations and results of a special study mission to Japan, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Iran. The purpose of the mission was to acquire up-to-date information on the political situation in these countries and to discover some means of utilizing about $1 billion of hitherto-blocked U.S. funds not connected with Public Law 480. The mission found that the Asian power structure is undergoing rapid change, and the security position of the United States is changing with it. Changes in present agreements with Japan and the Philippines and a general overhaul of the U.S. posture in Asia will be necessary. In this situation proper use of non-Public Law 480 funds would contribute materially to the well-being and security of the United States and friendly Asian countries.

## TENSION AREAS

1098
Besson, Waldemar. [CREEPING ALIENATION: EUROPE NEEDS AMERICA MORE THAN EVER] Die schleichende Entfremdung: Europa braucht Amerika mehr denn je. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 26-32.
H5.P75, v. 16

Even the German Gaullists of the early 1960's recognized that the American alliance is the sine

qua non for the viability of the German Federal Republic. The concerns and doubts engendered by the American difficulties in Vietnam, the Mansfield resolution, and the 1968 Czech incident explain Bonn's present search for an understanding with the Soviet Union. The practicability of an American "low visibility" policy in Europe is questionable, and its failure will mean the "Finlandization" of the Western European states. A new and constructive European policy to answer the Soviet project of a European security conference should vigorously pursue NATO-Warsaw Pact balanced force reductions and support Bonn's efforts for a Soviet-German détente. Above all, it must seek to encourage American participation in the defense of Western Europe by reaching favorable economic arrangements and by educating European public opinion out of its unjustifiable anti-Americanism.

1099
Bhattacharjee, G. P. INDIA AND POLITICS OF MODERN NEPAL. Calcutta, Minerva Associates [1970] 244 p. DS450.N3B45
Bibliography: p. 237-244.

Contents.--Introduction.--India and the revolutionary politics of Nepal.--India and the post-revolutionary politics of Nepal.--China enters Nepal through India.--Indian policy after the royal coup.--Indian policy after the Chinese invasion.--Indo-Nepal commercial relations.--Appendix: A note on Indian aid to Nepal.

A historical survey of Indian-Nepalese relationships that gives the domestic background of Nepalese foreign policy and comments on Nepal's present relations with China and Pakistan. Bhattacharjee warns that India's military weakness "almost inevitably" will bring Nepal within Peking's sphere of influence.

1100
BIG POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. Indian & foreign review, v. 8, Feb. 1, 1971: 5-6. D839.I453, v. 8

A U.S.-British proposal to establish a military base in the Chagos Archipelego in the Indian Ocean has caused some concern among the countries in the region. According to Swaran Singh, India's External Affairs Minister, a military base on the island of Diego Gracia could transform the area into an arena of Great Power rivalry to the detriment of the interests of the littoral countries, which are more concerned over South Africa's growing military power than over any hypothetical Soviet threat. Besides enabling Great Britain to watch over its interests in the area, an Anglo-American naval base would allow the United States to provide better support for its naval forces operating there. Although the Soviet Union has secured limited facilities for refueling ships on Mauritius and increased its naval force to about 20 vessels, it has no bases in the area. India will have to increase its maritime strength and mobilize public opinion in the littoral states to prevent these three powers from coming into the area on the pretext that they are filling a so-called military vacuum.

1101
Binder, Gerhart. [THE GREAT PROVOCATION; CRITICAL BALANCE IN THE THIRD DECADE OF THE GERMAN DIVISION] Die grosse Provokation; kritische Bilanz im dritten Jahrzehnt der deutschen Teilung. Stuttgart, J.F. Steinkopff [1969] 232 p. illus. DD259.4.B486
Bibliography: p. 224-230.

Contents.--Introduction.--The two German states--two provisional arrangements.--The failure of the reunification policy.--Domestic policy like foreign policy.--Competition of the economic systems.--The Federal Republic before it proved itself.--Brown fools and red dreamers.--Scandals and affairs--crisis symptoms of democracy?--Hot issues--on the taboos of the West Germans.--West Germany--a developing country in the political sense?--The industrial power of the Federal Republic.--The Germans between hope and resignation.--Conclusion.--Survey of the last 3 years.

Critical analysis of the status and politics of the two Germanys during the past two decades. The division of Germany should not be viewed as an isolated phemomenon but rather as one aspect of the complex U.S.-Soviet relationship. The last three major European wars resulted mainly from Germany's maladjustment within Europe; this must not be allowed to reoccur. The foreign policies of both Germanys are greatly dominated by their domestic politics. Binder warns that the division of Germany should not lead to a complete separation, which he deems an unnatural crime against the German people and culture. He envisions an East Germany that is separate in the way that Austria is separate yet closely linked to Germany in its culture and mentality. Drastic changes in Middle Europe would create a dangerous shift in the power balance. If the young generation of West Germans can demonstrate the advantages of freedom they can build a bridge to East Germany based on policies acceptable to both East and West.

1102
Bindra, A. P. S. INDIAN OCEAN VACUUM: FACT OR FICTION? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 42-46. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

Assesses the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the significance of the politicomilitary situation that has arisen there as a result of the withdrawal of the European powers. Bindra proposes and examines three possible scenarios for the region--American dominance, Soviet penetration, and Chinese hegemony--and concludes that Communist China constitutes the principal danger. He considers but rejects the possibility of an alliance between India, Australia, and Japan and recommends instead that the superpowers recognize that India is "one of the poly-centres where power must concentrate" and the only state in the region with the will to confront China along the northern ellipse of southern Asia.

1103
Biriuzov, I. BEHIND THE LAOS INVASION. New times, no. 8, Feb. 24, 1971: 8-9. D839.N483, 1971

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The invasion of Laos was planned at least 5 years ago. Like the Cambodian intervention with which it is linked, this violation of a neutral country is part of the overall American scheme to erect a neocolonial bloc consisting of Bangkok, Saigon, Pnompenh, and Vientiane. Other and equally dangerous aggressions are being urged on the Americans by the South Vietnam regime. Although the Nixon administration can appease domestic criticism by troop withdrawals, it cannot expect to produce the same effect abroad, even in Japan. In addition to isolating the Americans internationally, the Laos venture will aggravate the existing military tensions in Indochina and Southeast Asia in general.

1104
Budhraj, Vijay Sen. THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S PAKISTAN POLICY. Australian journal of politics and history, v. 16, Dec. 1970: 343-360.
DU80.A945, v. 16

The Soviet Union's original attitude toward the newly independent countries of South Asia took its tone from the harshness of the cold war of 1947. In the later thaw Moscow discovered that Pakistan seemed to have cast its lot with the West. Though never completely rejecting Pakistan's case, Moscow supported India in the Kashmir crisis. The improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations began as a reaction to the Kennedy administration's advocacy of India for the role of leading Asian democratic power. When the Chinese crisis forced Washington to rearm India, and Pakistan moved toward Peking, Russian overtures toward Karachi were rejected because of the earlier support given India over Kashmir. Now the Soviet policy of careful neutrality practiced since the 1965 Pakistan-India clash aims at undermining both Western and Chinese influence without permitting the eruption of violence. The Soviet Union's strategic interests demand that it fill the power vacuum in South and Southeast Asia. In the future India will confront a revanchist Pakistan armed by Moscow and face the danger of being caught up in the Sino-Soviet power struggle.

1105
Cao Xuan Ve. THE WAR IN VIETNAM. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 116, Mar. 1971: 3-11. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116

A lecture given at the Royal United Service Institution on Nov. 18, 1970, by the Defense Attaché of the Vietnamese Embassy. Colonel Ve first presents a very brief review of ancient Vietnamese history and notes that the country is now partitioned for the third time. In previous instances the South prevailed over the North, and he anticipates a similar outcome today. The war in Vietnam is basically attributable to Communist intervention and attempted conquest. South Vietnam steadily resisted the intrusion but was forced to call for help because the North Vietnamese had large amounts of Communist aid and modern weapons. Now, with American assistance, a highly motivated South Vietnamese Army is striving to achieve full military mobilization and the ability to defend its country. The Communist forces meanwhile have been weakened and disrupted. Colonel Ve is optimistic that the South Vietnamese Government and military will be able to resist Communist aggression as long as necessary. A question and answer period followed the lecture.

1106
Cottrell, Alvin J. THE SOVIET UNION AS A MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE. World affairs, v. 133, Mar. 1971: 315-320.
JX1901.W7, v. 133

Reviews the recent literature to demonstrate the unanimity of informed opinion that since 1956 the balance of military, particularly naval, power in the Middle East has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The changing attitudes of Turkey and Iran toward the Soviet Union indicate their awareness of the new military equation. The concentration of public interest on the Arab-Israeli dispute obscures the Soviets' broader objective of dominating the greater Middle East, from Morocco to the Indian subcontinent. Cottrell believes that if the minimum objective of Soviet policy in the Middle East is to end Western monopoly, it is clear that the Soviets have already attained this goal. He concludes that it is probable that the Soviet Union will encounter the same difficulties as Britain and France and suffer the rebuffs given the United States. Control of the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area may be the Soviet maximum objective, and the area today is "ripe for conflict."

1107
Cottrell, Alvin J. THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Orbis, v. 14, fall 1970: 588-598.
D839.068, v. 14

The Soviet Union's massive intervention in Egypt after the 1967 Arab-Israeli dispute was in keeping with its minimum objective of bringing about the end of the historic Western influence in the Mediterranean and its maximum goal of dominating the region. In light of the opportunities that are beckoning the Russians in the area and (because of the shift of popular sentiment in the free world against Israel) the prospect of only mild opposition from the United States and the West to further Soviet intervention, the Russians may now be tempted to maximize their gains. Although much attention has been given to the Soviet penetration of the Middle East, Moscow has also made substantial strides in cultivating relations with Turkey and Iran and in diluting the psychopolitical impact of the U.S. 6th Fleet. The Soviet Union has in fact achieved its minimum objective and is now moving with considerable momentum towards its goal of domination. Some experts have suggested that the Soviet penetration be allowed to go unchallenged, on the assumption that the Russians will become entangled in their own Vietnam. However, in view of the tenacity with which the Soviet Union has held conquered territories in the past, the United States should meet this challenge. It is now clear that the Soviet drive is but one part of an overall strategy that involves Soviet objectives in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean area.

1108
Dziewanowski, M. Kamil. COMMUNIST CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. Survey, no. 77, autumn 1970: 59-74.
DK1.S549, 1970

China's intervention in the Polish and Hungarian anti-Soviet incidents of 1956 heralded the advent of a new factor in East European relations with the Soviet Union. As yet the only East European nation to have taken China's part without reservation is Albania, which fears a Moscow-Belgrade reconciliation in which Albania will be the prize. However, the mere existence of Albania exerts a profoundly demoralizing effect within the Soviet imperium: "A joyous Albanian flea cavorting on the back of the Chinese elephant is a spectacle to behold!" Five of the anti-Soviet demonstrations that have taken place in Eastern Europe have been influenced to some degree by the distant presence of Peking. Rumania has made clever use of the Chinese threat to increase its independence of action. Russian failure to crush China has had its effect on East European leaders, who also are comforted by the possibility of support from Peking. The controversy over ideology and the introduction of the specter of race war has weakened party organization and discipline in East Europe, where the roots of communism have always been shallow. Although the involvement in East Europe is probably only a strategic diversion for the Chinese, its future possibilities are interesting.

1109
Frenzke, Dietrich. [RECOGNITION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] Die Anerkennung der DDR; völkerrechtliche Möglichkeiten und Folgen. [Köln] Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [c1970] 127 p.
JX4044.F73
Bibliography: p. 113-[120].

Contents.--Introduction.--Concept and essence of recognition.--Gradations of recognition as a state.--Forms of recognition.--Consequences of recognition.--Conclusion.

Compares the implications of the concept of recognition held by the three parties most affected by the division of Germany: the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic, and East Germany. Frenzke concludes that the similarities of opinion outweigh the differences, that most significant is the agreement that recognition does not make a community into a state and consequently a subject in international law, and that recognition of a state does not imply acceptance of its internal system.

1110
Genevey, Pierre. [THE RIVALRY AND CONFRONTATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AS STATES] La rivalité et les affrontements de l'U.R.S.S. et de la Chine en tant qu'états. In La Chine en Asie et dans le monde. [Québec] Institut canadien des affaires internationales, 1970. (Études internationales, 1) p. 15-20. D849.E88 no. 1

Contends that the Sino-Soviet conflict is less a dispute between two ideologies than between two governments that were produced by the same system but have evolved in different directions. Communist doctrine is not so much the object of the conflict as the means each government employs to press its territorial claims. The Sino-Soviet dispute is a conflict of imperialisms, in the classical tradition of territorial conflicts. Genevey describes the source of the conflict, which dates back to the 17th century, noting that China's territorial claims must be taken seriously. He concludes that although the prospect of a major military conflict between the two antagonists is doubtful, it is too early to determine whether the Soviet Union will launch a preemptive nuclear attack against China.

1111
Green, Andrew W. [AN AMERICAN VIEW OF EUROPE] Un point de vue américain sur l'Europe. Politique étrangère, v. 36, no. 1, 1971: 25-52.
JX3.P6, v. 36

The author examines without indulgence the policy of European countries. In Europe he discovers a lack of unanimity and questions whether it has the power to help search for a solution to the problems of European security. According to the author, France would have difficulty in continuing to play a preponderant role; West Germany would have strengthened the Soviet Union's position, without return, and it is to be feared that Bonn may one day become neutral; Italy is almost ungovernable; and the Vatican itself is leaning toward the left. Only Great Britain has the same point of view as the United States concerning safeguarding the strategic equilibrium in Europe. The author advocates that the United States adopt a favorable attitude toward maintaining its forces in Germany and that it oppose neutralization while encouraging Great Britain's entry into the European Economic Community and the creation of a European nuclear force through technical collaboration between Germany and Italy. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1112
Gurtov, Melvin. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES. Pacific affairs, v. 43, winter 1970/71: 491-505. DU1.P13, v. 43

Reviews the effects of Sino-Soviet relations on the two countries' policies toward Southeast Asia. Gurtov sees the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia as an attempt to prevent Chinese domination of Southeast Asia, which is the primary goal of Soviet Southeast Asia policy. He concludes with an examination of the possible effects of high-tension competition, limited rapprochement, or fighting between the Soviet Union and China.

1113
Hacker, Jens. [SECURITY AFTER THE TREATIES? THE 10 THESES OF THE CHANGED POLICY TOWARD GERMANY] Sicherheit nach den Verträgen? Die 10 Thesen der gewandelten Deutschlandpolitik. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 33-52.
H5.P75, v. 16

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Defines and discusses 10 theses described as underlying the Ostpolitik and the approach to the German problem of Chancellor Brandt's administration. These postulate the existence of two states, East Germany and the Federal Republic, neither of which can speak for the other but which are in a special relationship within a Germany that continues its historic existence as a nation. Although the Brandt government denies international recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse line is accepted and the territorial boundaries of East Germany are guaranteed. Other theses uphold the continued validity of the four-power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole, the dependence of the relations of the two German states on their foreign policies, and the invalidity of the 1938 Munich concessions. Hacker concludes that Bonn's new foreign policy will achieve security and détente only when its Western allies work with it to obtain a satisfactory solution in Berlin and when they realize that détente between the two Germanys is at once cause and effect of a general European détente.

1114
Hayes, Louis D. THE IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE KASHMIR CONFLICT. Tucson, University of Arizona Press [c1971] 59 p. (Institute of Government Research, international studies, no. 2)
DS485.K2H34

Examines the dimensions of the Indo-Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir and surveys American policies toward India and Pakistan since 1947. Hayes contends that American foreign policy in South Asia has in part produced consequences that "have tended to exacerbate local problems and, accordingly, to contribute to developments which are contrary to American interests." He concludes that the U.S. containment policy was achieved at the expense of ignoring regional security considerations; that it is too early to tell whether the United States will compete with the Soviet Union in an arms race over India and Pakistan; and that the attempt by the United States to incorporate the international relations of all areas into its security policies has produced discouraging results.

1115
Heldman, Dan C. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AND PARTY LEGITIMACY. Survey, no. 77, autumn 1970: 51-58.
DK1.S549, 1970

Argues that the Soviet Union and Communist China together form a system whose structures and processes parellel in many ways those that prevail within each country. Actions and responses in either domestic system or in the bilateral relationship "will necessarily have reciprocal repercussions particularly if the action or response is couched in ideological terms." Heldman uses the Sino-Soviet arguments on the commune form and the inevitability of war with capitalism to exemplify the situations in which Soviet leadership perceives challenges to its domestic and international legitimacy in ideological justifications made for Chinese domestic policies. In the absence of mechanisms for resolving the conflicts, both parties continue to undermine each other's Socialist legitimacy, to the increasing detriment of the international Socialist movement.

1116
Hentig, Werner O. von. [TACTICS INSTEAD OF STRATEGY. "THE TREATY WITH POLAND DOES NOT REPLACE A PEACE TREATY"] Taktik statt Strategie. "Der Vertrag mit Polen ersetzt keinen Friedensvertrag." Neue Politik, v. 15, Dec. 19, 1970: 4-5.
H5.N377, v. 15

Neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic can act without their allies, and unrealistic renunciation-of-force declarations, nuclear nonproliferation treaties, and European security conferences cannot replace a peace treaty. Most present problems stem from the lack of such a treaty. Instead of strengthening NATO West Germany should press for reduction of nuclear bases on its territory in order to increase its security and political credibility. Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw are definite steps toward peace, but only a peace treaty, with both Germanys as sovereign and equal contracting parties, can ultimately solve Europe's problems and provide a firm and clear legal basis for peace.

1117
Hottinger, Arnold. FERMENT ON THE PERSIAN GULF. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Feb. 1971: 12-16. illus. D839.S9, v. 20

Now that Great Britain has decided to withdraw from the Persian Gulf area, Iran is endeavoring to serve as England's successor in keeping the peace. However some Arab nations, particularly Iraq, challenge this claim to succession. To complicate matters further, both the Soviet Union and Communist China show considerable interest in the area. Moscow is cautiously building a base on the island of Socotra and has already sent Soviet warships on several visits to the port of Umm Qasr. On the other hand, Peking is enjoying an advanced position in the area by virtue of its ties to the rebellion in Dhofar. Iran's main difficulty in enforcing a policy of hegemony to protect its vital interests in the Gulf is that most of the people in the area are pro-Arab. Iraq is ready to take advantage of any potential national movements in Kuwait, Bahrain, or Qatar to form revolutionary cells to impede Iran's drive for power. Baghdad has not had much success in cultivating national movements in the Trucial States because their social structure is firmly anchored in tribal and clan groupings, but the passage of time and the rapid economic development brought on by oil revenues are undermining these ancient structures.

1118
Hurewitz, Jacob C. CHANGING MILITARY PERSPECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1970. 51 p. (Rand Corporation. Research Memorandum RM-6355-FF)
Q180.A1R36, 6355-FF

Looks at the Arab-Israeli dispute in terms of the military diplomacy of the superpowers, with

particular attention to the Soviet penetration of the Middle East and its effects on U.S. policies in the area. Hurewitz's assessment of Soviet military capabilities in the Mediterranean shows its most serious inadequacy to be the lack of air cover. He goes on to discuss Soviet Arms transfer policy within the framework of competing national interests among the Big Four powers in the area. He contends that although the manipulation arms transfers enabled the superpowers to enhance their immediate political influence in the individual Arab States it has had a deleterious effect on regional stability and has intensified the already flammable Arab-Israeli dispute.

1119
IN SUPPORT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE [editorial] Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, Feb. 19, 1971: 59-61.
DK226.A2R37, v. 12
Translated from Pravda, Jan. 26, 1971.
Slav Rm

The alliance of all progressive patriotic forces is necessary for the victory of the antiimperialist, agrarian, and democratic revolution in the countries of Latin America. Although the Communists made an outstanding contribution, the victory in Chile was the result of the cooperation of all parties in the people's bloc. Steps have already been taken toward a united front in Argentina and Uruguay. The heterogeneity of the democratic and revolutionary elements complicates the task of the Communist parties, who are the main organizers of the unification movements. The growing coherence of the Latin American forces of freedom brings them closer to the Socialist countries despite the obstacles raised by American imperialism.

1120
Ismael, Tareq Y. THE PALESTINIAN EMERGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Middle East forum, v. 46, no. 2/3, 1970: 65-71.
DS41.M45, v. 46

Since 1967 the Palestinian liberation movement has become a major force in the Middle East. Though the factors conducive to this mobilization of the Palestinian people have been present for some time, it appears not to have happened sooner because the Palestinians believed that their problems would be taken up and resolved by the more general Arab nationalist movement. When these expectations collapsed in 1967 the Palestinians decided to take matters into their own hands, and since then developments have followed a course social theorists have recognized as typical of the struggle for modernization. The movement is conditioned by its own environment, in which action and armed struggle are necessities. A revolutionary ideology amalgamated from various sources, while it possesses a potential to mislead, seems to provide an adequately functional rationale for action. This ideology posits links between Israel, Zionism, imperialism (led by the United States), and Arab reaction. No action by the United States can overcome Palestinian hostility. Even so, it should recognize that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination and that the liberation movement is the rightful spokesman of the Palestinian people. It should promote a just solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute and, if necessary, force Israeli compliance. In this way the area could be stabilized and opportunities for Soviet penetration reduced. But this policy involves definite risks, and the United States does not seem prepared to take them.

1121
Lendvai, Paul. THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIAL TENSIONS AND UPHEAVALS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. Europe and America in the 1970s: society and power. pt. 2. London, 1970. (Adelphi papers, no. 71) p. 23-29.
U162.A3, no. 71

Views nationalism, chronic problems of economic growth and living standards, the alienation of the intelligentsia and youth, and the question of authoritative leadership and succession in Communist countries as some of the specific sources of political and social instability that can create tension between neighbors and bifurcate multinational societies in Eastern Europe. Lendvai assesses the short- and long-term prospects there, noting that Yugoslavia, by virtue of its multiethnic composition, is the pivotal area in terms of social upheavals and future European security. Although the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia cannot be discounted, Moscow is more likely to use a key group of loyal Yugoslav officers and politicians as an instrument of political change in case of an internal crisis in Yugoslavia. The author concludes that the reality of the 1970's will consist of "a Soviet military presence as far West as the Elbe and four of the six Warsaw Pact partners ranking . . . as occupied countries with a fifth--Bulgaria--subjected to total Soviet military and political domination."

1122
Lowenthal, Richard. RUSSIA AND CHINA: CONTROLLED CONFLICT. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 507-518.
D410.F6, v. 49

Reviews the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict and assesses the prospects for future relations between China and Russia. Lowenthal contends that "the continuation of limited and controlled conflict between Russia and China . . . remains a far more plausible prospect than its end by either reunion or catastrophe."

1123
Maxwell, Neville G. A. INDIA'S CHINA WAR. London, Cape [1970] 475 p. maps.
DS480.85.M38
Bibliography: p. 459-462.

Discusses the origins and conduct of the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute. Maxwell contends that the Sino-Indian dispute emerged over New Delhi's claim to Aksai Chin and not over the McMahon Line, which Peking was willing to accept de facto. The failure of the 1960 New Delhi summit conference did not close the door to a negotiated settlement

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of the boundary dispute as much as did India's border policy, which was first considered and formulated during the early years of independence. Maxwell notes that one of the saddest consequences of the war was the decline in political stature and personal bearing of Prime Minister Nehru.

1124
Mehra, P. L. SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT 1962: A LOPSIDED VIEW ANALYSED. Indian & foreign affairs, v. 8, Mar. 15, 1971: 10, 16-17.
D839.I453, v. 8

Criticizes Neville Maxwell's book India's China War (cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography) for its prejudice against India and its misinterpretations of Indian foreign and defense policies, specifically the forward policy. Mehra contends that Maxwell does not attempt to understand India's motives during the 1962 conflict with China. He concludes that in view of Maxwell's unconfessed admiration for Peking's military prowess during the conflict, he might have been more favorably disposed toward New Delhi had India won.

1125
THE MIDDLE EAST, 1971. Current history, v. 60, Jan. 1971: 1-52. maps. D410.C82, v. 60

Partial contents.--United States policy in the Middle East, by Bernard Reich.--The United Nations in the Middle East, by Harry N. Howard.--The Soviet role in the Middle East crisis, by Benjamin Shwadran.--Israeli politics since the 1967 war, by Nadav Safran.--The Palestinian resistance movement, by John B. Wolf.--Arab radicalism: problems and prospects, by George Lenczowski.--The Persian Gulf region, by Roy E. Thoman.--Book reviews.

Articles on the past and present roles of the United States, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israeli conflict; the impact of the 1967 war on Israeli domestic politics; the origin, growth, and strategy of the Palestine resistance movement; the nature and causes of Arab radicalism; and the political and economic disputes among the Persian Gulf states.

1126
Millar, Thomas B. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1970. 22 p. map. (Canberra papers on strategy and defence, no. 7)
DK274.3 1970.M5

"A publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre."
Includes bibliographical references.
"Earlier versions of this paper were read to the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and the Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney."

Examines the implications of Russian penetration of the Indian Ocean area within the framework of Soviet national interests. Millar argues that the region will be the principal maritime thoroughfare between the eastern and western parts of the Soviet Union, partly for reasons of geography and partly because Moscow's policies in this area cannot be separated from its overall strategy. He concludes that the Soviet Union is seeking to exercise effective influence over both ends of the Suez-Red Sea passage, to replace Great Britain as the area's dominant power, to encourage India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia to develop a cooperative self-defense movement against Communist China, and to obtain positions of political and military strength throughout the whole region by providing arms to local governments.

1127
Niu, Sien-chong. THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 34-39. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Examines some geographical, historical, political, and military aspects of security in the Indian Ocean and southern Asia. The strategic significance of the Indian subcontinent and the Suez Canal and the responsibilities of the United States are considered. There are good indications that the Soviet Union plans to fill the power vacuum created by British withdrawal East of Suez. Since no state within the region is sufficiently strong to stand up to the Russians on its own, the United States has little choice but to maintain a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with or without British participation.

1128
[PEKING'S NEAR EAST POLICY SEEKS TO UNDERCUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION] Peking's Nahostpolitik will die USA and USSR unterlaufen. China-Analysen, v. 9, Oct. 1970: 35-38.
DS701.C356, v. 9

The present Chinese press reaction to the course of developments in the Near East is surprising for its quietness of tone and its failure to attack Moscow and Nasser by name for their consideration of American proposals. Whether this moderation is due to fears for the delicate Sino-Soviet dialog or the wish not to jolt the Arab States into a premature break with Moscow is problematic. At the same time, Peking continues quietly to build up its diplomatic relations with South Yemen, Sudan, and Somali, to expand the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, and to encourage the Palestinian guerrillas as part of its long-range effort to nullify the Soviet naval penetration into the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. The political geography of the Chinese diplomatic effort in Africa and the Arab States demonstrates the Chinese intention to keep the Great Powers bogged down in dispute. Every month of the Near East crisis brings China nearer to its strategic goal, the long-desired atomic parity.

1129
Phoumi Vongvichit. LAOS AND THE VICTORIOUS STRUGGLE OF THE LAO PEOPLE AGAINST U.S. NEO-COLONIALISM. [Hanoi?] Neo Lao Haksat Publications, 1969. 228 p. illus. DS557.L25P56

Contents.--Foreword.--A general outline on Laos dealing with the implantation of neo-colonialism

in this country and the revolutionary struggle of the Lao people.--The victory of the Lao people over the French colonialists and American interventionists opens a new period in the history of the Lao revolution.--United States neo-colonialism and "special war" in Laos.--Neo-colonialist war of aggression and the Lao people's struggle.--Achievements of the Lao revolution in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and their tremendous significance.

A history of Laos focusing on the role of the Neo Lao Haksat (Lao Patriotic Front) in post-World War II independence and revolutionary movements. The author contends that although Laotian independence was formally recognized in 1954, Laos has since been transformed into a neocolony and military base by U.S. imperialism. He reviews the increasing U.S. involvement in Laos and its attempts to suppress the Neo Lao Haksat through "special war" tactics. He attributes the survival of the Laotian revolutionary forces to the world trend favoring Socialist movements and to the concerted attacks on U.S. imperialism by the people of Indochina.

1130
Rahmatullah Khan. KASHMIR AND THE UNITED NATIONS. [Delhi] Vikas Publications [1969] 199 p.
DS485.K2K56
Bibliography: p. [181]-190.

Uses Security Council documents and official Indian and Pakistani publications to discuss and criticize the role of the United Nations in the Kashmir dispute. Khan contends that although the United Nations has successfully brought about a cease-fire on two occasions in the area, it was unable to resolve the underlying causes of the dispute. He concludes that the "international engagement, that India is alleged to have made on the question of plebiscite, was, firstly, never a binding one and, secondly, that the 1965 war released India from any legal 'commitment' in this regard." Security Council resolutions concerning the Kashmir problem dating from 1948 are appended.

1131
Roucek, Joseph S. SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS. Il Politico, v. 35, Sept. 1970: 472-495.
JX18.P65, v. 35
Abstract in Italian.

Not Southeast Asia's economic potential but its geopolitical position in control of the water passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans explains its present importance and long history of invasions, cultural and economic as well as military. The debacle of the Japanese coprosperity sphere has given free play to the workings of a fully developed nationalism. The American presence in the area originates in the need to fill the vacuum left by England's retreat from world power. The military incursion of the present American administration leaves unanswered the question of whether Cambodia is viable without a continued American military presence. Surprisingly it is possible that America's venture into Cambodia has deepened Sino-Soviet enmity.

1132
Rubinstein, Amnon. WHY THE ISRAELIS ARE BEING DIFFICULT. New York times magazine, Apr. 18, 1971: 32-33, 111-112, 114, 116, 118-119.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Analyzes current Israeli reactions to peace initiatives in the Middle East. Israeli attitudes on security matters are conditioned by a historically rooted distrust of the foreign world in general, the Arab world in particular, and any and every system of international security guarantees. Given Israeli suspicion on the one hand and Egyptian insistence on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory on the other, the range of possibilities in the present situation are at worst a new war, which the Israelis probably would win, and at best a redefinition of policy on both sides, including an agreement to reopen the canal and new approaches to territorial and security issues. Israel almost certainly will insist on retaining Jerusalem, the Gaza strip, the Golan heights, and Sharm el Sheik (with access thereto), plus some measure of military control along the Jordan river. It will not claim the Sinai Peninsula or the West Bank of the Jordan.

1133
Salisbury, Harrison E. WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA. New York, W. W. Norton [1969] 224 p. illus.
DS740.5.R8S26 1969

Contents.--The hinge of the earth.--The view from Russia's side.--The view from China's side.--The river of the black dragon.--Is Mao a Communist?--The secret history of the Korean War.--Image and reality.--The tension deepens.--The land and the need.--"To teach them a lesson."--Long live the victory of the people's war.--Hitler versus Hitler.--Is war inevitable?--Index.

Assesses the probability of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Salisbury describes the widespread popular hostility of Russians for Chinese and Chinese for Russians and traces the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute from pre-Communist times to the present. He argues that population pressures may eventually compel China to choose between starvation and a fight for additional land. Many Soviet political and military leaders, believing that war with China is inevitable, have urged a preventive strike before China acquires a major nuclear capability, but Chinese leaders appear confident that China could absorb even a Soviet nuclear attack and still defeat the Russians in a protracted war. Quite apart from moral considerations, the United States has a vital interest in preventing war between the two Communist powers and should seek better relations with Peking as one means of diminishing the probability of war.

1134
Samuels, Michael A. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STRATEGIES OF CHANGE. Interplay, v. 3, Dec. 1970: 11-15.
N&CPR

Reviews the tension between black Africa and white Africa, focusing on the need for more diplo-

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macy and less reliance upon confrontation to resolve the differences that exist between these blocs. Leaders of African liberation movements assume that the black African masses support them and that the present governments in southern Africa lack the capacity to withstand them, but they ignore the possibility that a confrontation with the south may engender hostilities among the black nations and political instability within them. Samuels describes Zambia's vulnerabilities: tribal animosities and the increasing number of crimes by Congolese in Zambia; Zambian dependence on Tanzania for access to the sea and Tanzania's economic reliance on Zambian exports; and Zambia's willingness to allow its territory to be used as a staging area by the liberation movements. Any of these factors may be a source of potential tension. The author concludes that black Africans must begin to challenge the basic assumptions of confrontation with southern Africa. "It is time . . . to initiate diplomatic contacts with southern African governments and to discuss a policy of co-optation in African councils."

1135
SarDesai, D. R. [THE ROLE OF THE THAIS AND THE VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA] Die Rolle der Thais und der Vietnamesen in Kambodscha. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Jan. 10, 1971: 30-38.
DS39.E86, v. 26

Traces the history of Cambodia's relationships with its neighbors and suggests that in view of age-old ideological and territorial feuds between these countries their recent "friendship" will not last. The current relationships are based solely on the drastic shifts in defense requirements that occurred in the spring of 1970.

1136
Sharabi, Hisham. PALESTINE GUERRILLAS; THEIR CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS. Middle East forum, v. 46, no. 2/3, 1970: 19-64.
DS41.M45, v. 46

Assesses the effectiveness of the Palestinian liberation movement--its strength; its credibility to the guerrillas themselves and to their allies, enemies, and world opinion; the causes of its fragmentation; and its problems and prospects. The movement already has made certain that there will be no settlement of Middle East issues without the participation of the Palestinians. But the movement has also released powerful new social forces in the Arab world, and for that reason its significance cannot be measured exclusively "in terms of the narrow struggle over territory and rights." Rather it must be judged "against the regional and Third World context of national liberation," with respect to which it may occupy in the 1970's the position that the Vietnam struggle has held in the 1960's. Appendixes give the structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization; Israeli casualties during June 1969; the "Fateh doctrine"; the doctrine of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; and an interview with a guerrilla leader.

1137
Solomon, Robert L. BOUNDARY CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1969. 72 p. (Rand Corporation. Research memorandum. RM-5936-1-ARPA) Sci RR
Microfiche AD 704 566
"Prepared for: Advanced Research Projects Agency."

Borders in Southeast Asia are largely insecure boundaries that were established by colonial administrations to stabilize spheres of influence or mark internal administrative divisions. They were not designed to withstand international pressures. Sovereignty was not defined in a strict territorial sense. And local rulers used marginal territorial concessions as policy instruments. Thus no boundaries in Southeast Asia are 'hard' in the Western sense. General mobility across them continues largely unimpeded. Consequently, the process of eliminating enemy sanctuaries requires an effective administrative presence, not just military action. In Vietnam, border policymakers must also consider international repercussions arising from boundary policy options. Concludes this examination of SEA border problems: the manner in which boundary surveillance is exercised and control technology applied will be critical to the stability of the region.(Abstract supplied)

1138
Summers, Harry G. POWER: THE CRUCIBLE OF CONFLICT IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 56-66.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Examines the origin and course of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The influence on the course of the dispute of Soviet and Chinese history and attitudes based thereon, geographic, ethnographic, and economic factors, ideology, and comparative military strengths and doctrines is discussed. Behind the ideological facade the dispute, in essence, is a struggle for power between the two giants of the Communist bloc to determine which of them will lead the world Communist movement. The United States, which believes that little would be gained from an intensification of the conflict or from taking sides, would like to improve relations with both powers.

1139
Tarasov, V. ANTI-SOVIET SABRE-RATTLING IN JAPAN. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, Feb. 19, 1971: 62-63. DK266.A2R37, v. 12
Translated from Izvestiia, Jan. 25, 1971.
Slav Rm

The previously secret participation of high Japanese officials in the blatant propaganda campaign for the return of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands is now out in the open. The program for 1971 adopted at the 25th congress of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party incorporates the revanchist slogan "struggle for the islands." The wires from Japan's military-industrial complex extend to the forces of internal reaction and "across the ocean." Japanese efforts to revise

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the results of the Second World War are seriously undermining Soviet goodwill toward the Japanese people.

1140
Tatu, Michel. THE EAST: DÉTENTE AND CONFRONTATION. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. Europe and America in the 1970s: between détente and confrontation. pt. 1. London, 1970. (Adelphi papers, no. 70) p. 17-23.
U162.A3, no. 70

Examines the political, economic, and social situation in the East European countries and its implications for the West and identifies the prospects and difficulties associated with a détente policy. Economically, the East European countries are far behind their Western counterparts, due largely to the distortions imposed by Moscow's economic needs and the penalties engendered by centralization and bureaucratization. The obstacle to liberty for these countries is not so much the local Communist machine as the Soviet occupying power, which was employed in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Tatu explores the advantages and disadvantages for the Soviet Union, noting that Moscow has established a virtual powder keg on its flank in the form of a virulent anti-Russian nationalism reminiscent of the colonial nationalisms of the Third World. The growing technological gap between the East and the West, the domestic pressures inside the Soviet Union, the ideological poverty of the regime, and the Chinese problem spell changes in the status of the Soviet Union and its satellites and lay the foundation for serious future conflict. Tatu outlines a Western policy that would encourage the peaceful emancipation of Eastern Europe from Moscow, but he considers peace unlikely in view of the nationalism pervading the East.

1141
Vernant, Jacques. [A HOPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST] Un espoir au Proche-Orient. Revue de défense nationale, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 454-459.
D410.R45, v. 27

Reviews the events before and after the Middle East cease-fire, focusing on the impact of Nasser's death, the preconditions for a peaceful settlement, and a proposed compromise that would be "arranged according to a timetable, which, at each stage, would take into account the interests of all parties." Vernant contends that Nasser's death will cause Egypt to become more easily controlled by the Soviet Union. He asserts that this will reduce the risk of war. Moscow would prefer to avoid a fourth round, since another war would force it to choose between accepting another defeat of its protege or intervening directly and risking a confrontation with the United States. The order of events in the author's timetable for a compromise include the evacuation by Israel of all territories occupied before 1967; an international guarantee of Israel's borders; the reopening of the Suez Canal; and the assurance of free navigation for Israel in the Strait of Tiran and in the Suez Canal.

1142
Völker, Eberhard, and Christian T. Stoll. [GERMANY'S RIGHT TO ITS EASTERN TERRITORY] Deutschlands Recht auf seine Ostegebiete. Seeheim a. d. B., Buchkreis für Besinnung und Aufbau, 1968. 267 p. (Zur Erarbeitung, 5)
DD120.P7V6

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Historical foundations of the German-Polish relationship, by Eberhard Völker.--Germany's right to its eastern territory, by Christian T. Stoll.

Studies the historical and legal bases of German-Polish territorial problems. Völker concludes that the postwar expulsion of the Germans from the Oder-Neisse lands was a "frightening expression of the fact that Germany had lost a war the Western powers could never win." Stoll argues that the Potsdam agreement implied an occupation only until the formulation of a final peace treaty to which a legitimate German government would assent. Consequently the territories now occupied by Poland and the Soviet Union remain in international law integral parts of Germany.

1143
WHAT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT HAS NOT. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Feb. 2, 1971: 6.
D839.C87, v. 23

Translated from Pravda, Jan. 6, 1971.
Slav Rm

Comments on an article published in the Hungarian press pointing to China's reestablishment of normal international relations and to the stabilization of the Sino-Soviet border controversy. The editorial writer reports that Chinese leadership continues the practice of treating the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries as "revisionist" and "socialist imperialist." While any improvement in Chinese trade and diplomatic relations with the other Socialist countries and any evidence of Peking's desire to cooperate in the battle against imperialism will be welcomed, no fundamental concessions can be made in the ideological debate.

1144
WORLD POWERS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, July 15, 1970: 5-6.
D839.I453, v. 7

Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have stepped up their naval activity in the Indian Ocean area despite the wishes of countries in the area. The British are reportedly going ahead with their decision to set up a new colony in the western part of the Indian Ocean, while the United States is setting up radio stations in the Seychelles and on the island of Diego Garcia. The Soviet fleet has made a number of visits to major ports in the area and is laying mooring buoys that will serve as the nucleus for a refueling base. Communist China is beginning to show some interest in the area, but because of the preponderance of Soviet and U.S. power Peking will have to wait to acquire an effective operational role.

XUM

1145
Wrangel, Wolf, Freiherr von. [GERMANY IN A DIVIDED EUROPE] Deutschland im gespaltenen Europa. Leer (Ostfriesl) Verlag Gerhard Rautenberg [c1969] 117 p. maps. DD257.4.W73
Bibliography: p. 114-117.

Contents.--Preparations by the allies for the postwar treatment of Germany.--Violations of national and international law.--Poland's justification of its territorial claims in East Germany.--On the German question.--Concluding remarks.--Appendices.

Argues that Germany was divided because the allies could not agree on how to impose their will on Germany as a whole, creating the tense conditions in Europe that are contradictory to human rights, international law, and the German constitution. According to Wrangel Europe will remain divided as long as Germany is divided, and he urges that every effort be made to unite Germany and return its severed territories by giving all Germans the right of self-determination, holding elections, and concluding a peace treaty of nonaggression and nonintervention with a government representing Germany as a whole. Recognizing a status that violates international law cannot benefit a European peace order.

XUM

# II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

## MODERN WAR

1146
Barber, James A. WAR: LIMITATIONS AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES. Naval War College review, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 4-16. N&CPR
Lecture given at the Naval War College.

Premises the extension of the practice of limited war in view of the probability of continuing international tension and the unacceptability of total war. The kinds of limited war are defined, following Schelling, as battlefield, pain and decision, and risk. Analysis of the concept of escalation relates the processes of explosion and expansion to the wars of risk and pain and decision respectively. In indicating the limits of limited war the point is made that wars remain limited only when both sides consider it in their interest to do so. This situation is most probable when the battlefield objectives of both sides are modest. The question as to the role of nuclear weapons in limited war--that is, whether a war remains limited once nuclear weapons are used--is complicated by our total ignorance of the stability and dynamics of nuclear war. Similarly, the techniques of ending limited conflicts are little understood, although it seems probable that the war that "fades away" may be more frequent in the future. Barber thinks that the Vietnam experience demonstrates that democracies can best fight a low-visibility conflict or a short, cheap war with a clear-cut purpose.

1147
Bopp, Alfred. [MODERN SMALL WAR AND THE LAW OF PRISONERS OF WAR] Moderner Kleinkrieg und Kriegsgefangenenrecht. Würzburg, 1970. 251 p. JX5123.B65
Inaug.-Diss.--Würzburg.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. 235-251.

Contents--Introduction.--The modern small war.--The law of prisoners of war.--The legal position of the prisoner in the modern small war.--Conclusions.--Appendices.--Documents.

Looks at small wars, taking the view that nuclear deterrence may well render this type of warfare the only one possible in the future. In this context, Bopp examines the possibility of student and worker unrest leading to small wars in Europe. He believes that current unrest stems mainly from political and social dissatisfaction but does not exclude the possibility of these groups being receptive to outside Communist leadership. He examines the present world political and military situation, defines the small war, and gives a historical survey of the various forms of small warfare, focusing on guerrilla warfare in Indochina. He states that Germany does not offer good opportunities for small war, but he points to the possibilities of city guerrillas there. He warns rebellious students of the dangers inherent in doing away with the establishment without an alternative; this, he asserts, was what Hitler did. Bopp then studies the legal status of prisoners of war and its implications.

1148
Chomsky, Noam. THE EXECUTIVE WAR IN LAOS. Liberation, v. 15, winter 1971: 12-15. E838.L5, v. 15

Ascribes the public-opinion success of the "executive war" in Laos to its lack of publicity and its comparative cheapness. The low-profile formula of intensive air bombardment coupled with minimum commitment of ground forces has achieved results not possible in Vietnam. This technique may become a powerful tool of counterrevolutionary intervention. Chomsky finds unconvincing the allegations that the Pathet Lao is controlled by North Vietnam, and he sees the Pathet Lao as the only indigenous force in Laos with a realistic, comprehensive socioeconomic program.

1149
Debray, Régis. STRATEGY FOR REVOLUTION: [essays translated from the French]. Edited & with an introduction by Robin Blackburn. London, Cape [1970] 255 p. HX110.5.A6D43
Bibliography: p. 247-248.

Contents.--Introduction.--Castroism: the Long March in Latin America.--Report from the Venezuelan guerrilla.--Problems of revolutionary strategy in Latin America.--The role of the intellectual.--Interview with Havana students.--Letter to my friends.--"I regret that I am innocent."--Reply to my critics.--Index.

Selections from Debray's writings outlining his theory of revolution in Latin America. In the introduction Blackburn emphasizes Debray's belief in the urgency of creating revolution, his insistence on the inevitability of violence in the achievement of revolutionary goals, and his subordination of guerrilla warfare strategy and tactics to political ends.

1150
Etzioni, Amitai, and Martin Wenglinsky, comps. WAR AND ITS PREVENTION. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 308 p. illus. (Readers in social problems) JX1395.E89
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. The problem of survival: War, aftermath, and recovery, by Robert A. Dentler and Phillips Cutright. An international public opinion poll on disarmament and "inspection by the people": a study of attitudes toward supranationalism, by William M. Evan.--pt. 2. The problem of the state: The territorial state in international relations, by John H. Herz. To intervene or not to intervene, by Hans J. Morgenthau. The growth of transnational participation, by Robert C. Angell.--pt. 3. The problem of economy: Alternatives to defense production, by Emile Benoit. Noneconomic factors in the institutionalization of the cold war, by Irving Louis Horowitz.--pt. 4. The problem of confrontation: Studies of interpersonal bargaining, by Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss. The analysis of social conflict--toward an overview and synthesis, by Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder. The Kennedy experiment, by Amitai Etzioni.--pt. 5. The problem of the public: Behavioral study of obedience, by Stanley Milgram. Children and foreigners, by Henri Tajfel. Boundaries of public tolerance: the public opinion polls, by A. T. Steele. Overlapping and conflict of territorial self-images, by Ralph K. White.--Notes.--Index.

A compilation of social-science studies on the causes and nature of war and methods of preventing it. The studies, which are reprinted from various sources, date from the work of the past 15 years.

1151
Higham, Robin. OFFICIAL HISTORIES; ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD. Manhattan, Kansas State University Library, 1970. 644 p. (Kansas. State University of Agriculture and Applied Science, Manhattan. Library. Bibliography series, no. 8) Z6724.H6H5

A bibliography of official military histories, arranged by country, with introductory historiographical essays for the major powers and some minor powers.

1152
Kelly, George A., and Clifford W. Brown, comps. STRUGGLES IN THE STATE: SOURCES AND PATTERNS OF WORLD REVOLUTION. New York, Wiley [1970] 511 p. JC491.K44
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Social conflict and the theory of social change, by Lewis A. Coser.--Revolution and the social system, by Chalmers Johnson. --The concept of a political revolution, by Eugene Kamenka.--Internal war as an international event, by James N. Rosenau.--Internal war and international systems: perspectives on method, by George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller.--Revolution from above and fascism, by Barrington Moore.

A collection of essays examining the impact of internal war and revolution on political systems. The selections represent the behavioral approaches to the study of political violence and include a philosophical investigation of revolution as well as general social theories that utilize structural-functional and power-theory analyses. Each section is preceded by an introduction discussing methodological issues and the distinctions between schools of thought.

1153
Kondratkov, T. THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF WAR. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, Feb. 5, 1971: 5-12. DK266.A2R7, v. 12
Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, Dec. 16, 1970.
Slav Rm

To determine whether or not a war can be characterized as just, its political context and social character must be ascertained. The latter is the generalization of its social, class, political, and moral characteristics. Since the interests of the working class are the interests of all humanity, they alone constitute the basis for determining the justness of a war. World War II is a historical example of how the character of a war can be transmuted once the interests of the working class are involved. Beginning as an unjust war among imperialist powers, it became a just war of liberation after the attack on the Soviet Union. Bourgeois theorists today dismiss as irrelevant the objective basis for determining the just or unjust character of war, or they argue that new weapons of warfare make obsolete the Leninist concept that war is the continuation of politics. However new weapons do not disrupt the connection of war with politics nor abrogate its social character. An imperialist war against socialism would simply continue the social and class characteristics of reactionary imperialism; consequently war opposing imperialism would be just in the highest degree. The small scale of the limited wars unleashed today by imperialism does not mitigate the unjustness of their character. Two extremist groups fail utterly to understand Lenin's teachings on the social character of war: the bourgeois pacifist ideologists, who blur the class essence of war, and the left-wing deviationists, who see world conflict as a positive and necessary historical inevitability.

1154
Powell, Elwin H. THE DESIGN OF DISCORD; STUDIES OF ANOMIE. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. xvi, 247 p. illus.
HM291.P68

Partial contents.--pt. 3. War: Anomie and arms: toward a sociology of war. The bitter harvest of deterrence: anomie, revolution, and war in Europe, 1848-1918. War as suicide: anomie and secular sacrifice in World War I. War as suicide: Nazism, the death-wish institutionalized. War, social cohesion, and anomie: reflections on the power of danger.--Notes.--Index.

Examines the relationship between war and anomie. Powell sees war as simultaneously a cohesive and divisive social force. World War I, in his view, was a form of collective suicide that led directly to the growth of the Nazi movement, a nihilistic and suicidal war cult.

XUM

1155
Scott, Andrew M., Donald P. Clark, and others. INSURGENCY. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press [1970] 139 p. illus.
JC328.5.S33
Bibliography: p. [133]-136.

Contents.--Introduction.--A typology of insurgency and counterinsurgency: a model.--Inputs, outputs, and substitutibility.--The context of insurgency.--Insurgent strategy and tactics.--The counterinsurgent.

A study of insurgency from perspectives afforded by economic theory and systems analysis. The authors criticize earlier work in this field for its lack of analytic rigor. Here insurgency is defined, its chief variants classified, and its evolutionary aspects examined. A dynamic model of an insurgency and the interaction of insurgency and counterinsurgency is constructed. The inputs and context of the insurgent movement and the strategy and tactics of both insurgent and counterinsurgent are studied. Though lessons for the practitioner are implicit in this volume, the aim is strictly analytical, and policy preoccupations are avoided.

1156
Soderlund, Walter C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GUERRILLA INSURGENCY AND COUP D'ÉTAT AS TECHNIQUES OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Dec. 1970: 335-360.
D839.B2, v. 14

Suggests the coexistence of domestic and international components of political violence to explain the "curious blending of domestic and international political violence which has been characteristic of the developing nations since World War II." The addition of international to domestic political strife makes separation of the two factors virtually impossible. When political methods are superseded by violence in effecting the shift from one major ideological subsystem to the other, the defenders of the status quo usually react too late with too little. Largely on the basis of Latin American experiences, Soderlund discusses guerrilla insurgency and the coup d'etat as the major forms of political violence employed in international relations. He concludes that as a weapon of political warfare guerrilla insurgency is not particularly effective, since its success depends on the absence of intelligent response. The coup d'etat provides more opportunities for the intervention of international politics into domestic processes and, theoretically, is at least as effective as guerrilla insurgency. Surprisingly there is no clear case of the transfer of a state with a Western or neutral orientation into the Communist camp because of a coup. Since the military elite provides the best ground from which to launch a coup, penetration of the military can either abort a coup or give it the international orientation desired.

1157
Stillman, Edmund O. CIVILIAN SANCTUARY AND TARGET AVOIDANCE POLICY IN THERMONUCLEAR WAR. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 116-132.
H1.A4, v. 392

Examining traditional concepts of civilian warfare, the author finds that civilians have not normally been considered appropriate targets of violence and that civilian productivity and homefront morale are largely irrelevant in conditions of thermonuclear war, in which only forces in being are likely to be used and command and control are separate from the population at large. Under the circumstances, there are thus important moral and practical reasons for adopting "open cities" and sanctuary policies to spare civilians and reduce over-all deaths. Three cases are examined in detail: open cities and sanctuary policies to be enunciated now and at the time of a hypothetical war with the USSR; with respect to the Soviet Union's presumably reluctant Warsaw Pact allies; and finally in the event of a future war, again hypothetical, with mainland China. (Abstract supplied)

1158
Ten Eyck, John C. THE LAW OF DIMINISHING WAR POWER, FROM TROY TO VIETNAM. New York, Pageant Press International Corp. [1970] 273 p.
U21.2.T43
Includes bibliographies.

Partial contents.--The law of diminishing war power.--French home morale is shattered by defeat at Dienbienphu (1954).--The influence of distance on the Cuban missile crisis (1962).--History repeats itself in Vietnam (1962- ).

Offers evidence for the proposition that "the amount of war power per unit of cost, the speed with which it can be applied, the damage it can do the enemy, and the contribution it can make to the national security; all diminish as the length of the line of communication, operation, and supply, the obstacles to transportation and the vulnerability to enemy interdiction; increase." The evidence consists of a survey of historically significant overextended military campaigns, beginning with the siege of Troy and ending with the present struggle in Indochina. The Vietnam War offers excellent examples of both the logistic and the psychological difficulties of overextension. The United States has had to commit such a large proportion of its resources to the war that its interests elsewhere are endangered.

1159
Vo Nguyen Giap. THE MILITARY ART OF PEOPLE'S WAR; SELECTED WRITINGS OF GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP. Edited and with an introd. by Russell Stetler. New York [Monthly Review Press, 1970] 332 p. illus.
DS557.A6V59 1970

Selections from Giap's writings on people's war, covering events since the outbreak of World War II. In the introduction Stetler sketches Giap's role in the development of Vietnamese Communist political and military strategy.

XUM

1160
Yoder, John H. KARL BARTH AND THE PROBLEM OF WAR. Nashville, Abingdon Press [1970] 141 p. (Studies in Christian ethics series)
BX4827.B3Y6 1970

Attempts a new interpretation of Karl Barth's theological views, particularly with regard to his ideas on war and Christianity. According to Yoder, Barth speaks as a "chastened non-pacifist," who was very close in many ways to the Christian pacifists. Unfortunately Barth has been often misunderstood with regard to his concept of Grenzfall, "the extreme case in which killing may be willed by God," and therefore has been treated as one willing to consider war an acceptable choice. Of particular interest are chapter 4, "Barth's Revision of the Traditional View of War," chapter 5, "Individual Responsibility and Military Service," and chapter 12, "The Search for Norms for the State."

## MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1161
Breyer, Siegfried. GUIDE TO THE SOVIET NAVY. Translated by M. W. Henley. Annapolis, Md., U.S. Naval Institute, 1970. xiv, 353 p. illus.
VA573.B713

Contents.--Organization of the Soviet Navy.--Training and personnel.--Warship construction.--Weapons and equipment.--Ships of the Soviet Navy.--Naval air forces.--Naval land forces.--Bases and ports.--Shipbuilding industry.--Satellite navies.--Appendix 1: Details and profiles of Soviet warships.--Appendix 2: Types of Soviet naval aircraft.--Notes.--Bibliography.

A survey of Soviet naval capabilities. An updated version of a book originally published in Germany in 1964 under the title Die Seerüstung der Sowjetunion, the present edition includes tables of organization, photographs and line drawings (plan and profile) of Soviet ships, aircraft, and other weapons systems, and charts of important Soviet naval areas, bases, and port facilities, together with an extensive text. The capabilities described herein are the fruition of a Soviet program to acquire the instruments of a genuine global maritime strategy, and they reflect a Soviet decision to adopt a "hit and run" style of naval warfare vis-a-vis the West rather than direct confrontation. This posture cannot give the Soviets superiority at sea, but it can deprive the West of its long-standing predominance and force it to commit more resources to the defense than the Soviet Union has devoted to the attack.

1162
Hartcup, Guy. THE CHALLENGE OF WAR: SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING CONTRIBUTIONS TO WORLD WAR TWO. Newton Abbot, David & Charles [1970] 295 p. illus.
UF535.G7H36 1970b

Contents.--pt. 1. Introductory.--pt. 2. The war at sea.--pt. 3. The war in the air.--pt. 4. The war on land.--pt. 5. Amphibious war.--pt. 6. New weapons.--pt. 7. The failures.--pt. 8. Conclusions.--Bibliography.--Index.

Examines the role of science and technology in the development of 41 major new weapons, excluding the atomic bomb, introduced during World War II. Hartcup distinguishes four basic factors that stimulated the development of new weaponry: the pressure of events, enemy technical innovations, foresight, and organizational strength. He concludes that the integration of scientific and military disciplines, not technical ingenuity, was the crucial factor in the superiority of Allied weaponry development.

1163
McMahon, William. ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 41, Sept. 1970: 453-461. JX1162.A33, v. 41

Speech given before the 25th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 23, 1970.

Reviews the history of the United Nations during its first quarter century, focusing on the problems of peacekeeping, arms control and disarmament, dependent territories, Communist Chinese admission, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Middle East, science and technology, and the Second Development Decade, all from the Australian point of view. While the United Nations has not prevented a number of limited wars nor answered new techniques of infiltration and insurgency, its peacekeeping record does show some practical successes. Australia feels encouraged by the arms limitation progress made in the areas of chemical and biological warfare, the seabed, and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The "indications of progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union also offer some hope."

1164
Rathjens, George W. THE ABCS OF ABMS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 14-16.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Paper presented at the 19th Pugwash Conference at Sochi, U.S.S.R., fall 1969.

The concept of an ABM system that would protect population centers and industries against a heavy enemy nuclear strike has been rejected as essentially hopeless by every president since Eisenhower. In an attempt to protect cities against a sophisticated, heavy enemy attack either Sentinel or Safeguard should wait until incoming missiles reenter the atmosphere to take advantage of the atmospheric sorting out of decoys. Under these conditions Safeguard's short-range interceptors may be inadequate, because a city cannot withstand a large nuclear blast near it as an underground silo can, while the Sentinel, which has longer range but slower interceptors and which was originally designed for exoatmospheric interdiction, would be ineffective once the incoming enemy missiles reentered the earth's atmosphere. The multiple inde-

pendently targetable reentry vehicle places an added burden on the defense system and on efforts to curb the arms race. In principle a specialized defense that would be used against a light enemy attack or one to protect a few hardened missile sites would not be objectionable as far as the arms race is concerned. Whether it is possible to build specialized defenses that are so clearly limited in their capability that there is no possibility of their foreshadowing a large-scale defense may be the crucial question facing the superpowers in their deliberations about future ABM systems.

1165
Raven, Wolfram von. [STRATEGY IN SPACE. THE COSMIC STRUGGLE OF THE GIANTS] Strategie im Weltraum. Der kosmische Kampf der Giganten. [Stuttgart] Seewald Verlag [1969] 173 p. (Militärpolitische Schriftenreihe, 3) UG630.R37 1969
Bibliography: p. 157-167.
Originally published under title Die zwei Gesichter des Mondes.

Contents.--Foreword.--The vision of Archimedes.--The great horror.--Applied fear.--Deterrence without terror?--Peace through reason?--Path to confrontation.--The disturbed balance.--Is the count right?--The Soviet sword of Damocles.--Rockets from the moon?--Index of names.--Subject index.

Studies the effects of technology on politics and vice versa, discussing political goals and doctrines as well as military potential. Von Raven hopes that in the struggle for power currently taking place in space the United States will emerge the winner, thereby gaining political distinction. America's defense policy cannot be based on the vague hope that its adversary will act rationally, but it must show the will of the Nation to maintain its position as a world power capable of protecting more than its own territory.

1166
RESEARCH ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, May 15, 1970: 7-8.
D839.I453, v. 7

Summarizes the activities of India's peaceful nuclear energy program as reported in the annual report of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy for 1969-70. The country's first nuclear power station, at Tarapur, was inaugurated on January 19, 1970. Under construction are the power stations at Rana Pratap Sagar in Rajasthan and the Kalpakkam station in Tamil Nadu. Among the more important activities of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which is the hub of nuclear research in India, are the preparation of radioisotopes; the development of several new radiopharmaceuticals, food irradiation procedures, and techniques for inspecting Boeing 707 jet engines; and the production of nuclear-pure uranium metal for a research reactor.

1167
Symposium on the Handling of Nuclear Information, Vienna, 1970. HANDLING OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION; PROCEEDINGS. Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1970. 674 p. illus. (Proceedings series) QC772.4.S95
"STI/PUB/254."
English, French, or Russian. Abstracts in English.
Includes bibliographical references.

Provides "a comprehensive review of the facilities and services available in the world for providing information to nuclear scientists and engineers." The symposium brought together for the first time nuclear librarians and documentalists to give accounts of the centers they had created and the services they are providing in developing and advanced countries. The meeting was held in anticipation of a projected international nuclear information system, which under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will provide participating nations with magnetic-tape records of newly published information and in some cases full texts on microfiche.

1168
Tomilov, N. FOREIGN TANKS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Apr. 1971: 86-93. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51
"Translated and condensed from . . . Voyennyy Vyestuik (USSR) December 1969."
U4.V87

A Soviet analysis of recent trends in tank design in France, Great Britain, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany. The armor, armament, manueverability, speed, fuel economy, and fire-control systems of the latest in Western armor are discussed. Western solutions to the problems of height reduction and protection against radiation and other effects of mass-destruction weapons are examined. In progress now are priority efforts to develop improved missile-guidance systems and the means to cross radioactive terrain.

## DEFENSE POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF NATIONS AND ALLIANCES

1169
Abt, John J. WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR? THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS. New York, International Publishers [1970] 64 p.
KF5060.Z9A2

Contents.--The issue.--Drafting the constitution.--The early republic.--A court decision.--Rise of imperialism.--Korea and Indochina.--Official rationalizations.--Conclusion.--Reference notes.--Appendix: The Cooper-Church amendment. The Formosa resolution. The SEATO treaty. The Middle East resolution. The Tonkin Gulf resolution. The national commitments resolution. Laos-Thailand rider. Repeal of Tonkin Gulf resolution. The McGovern-Hatfield amendment.

Maintains that the President of the United States has usurped war powers the Constitution

grants to Congress. A restoration of the powers of Congress will not prevent imperialist wars; only replacement of the present system of production for profit with a system of production to meet real human needs can do that. Nevertheless, efforts along the lines of the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield amendments to limit presidential powers and restore the prerogatives of Congress are "part and parcel of the overall struggle against U.S. imperialist adventures" and can do much to "strengthen the peace movement, help check the drift toward the concentration of governmental power in the hands of the President and begin to pave the way for a more basic attack on the source of war and repression in the United States."

1170

Ashworth, George W. DEFENSE LEADERS FORCED TO SHIFT VIEWS; NOW SEE NEED TO MAINTAIN CARRIER STRENGTH. Navy, v. 13, Dec. 1970: 7-12. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 13

Reports that as a result of lessons it learned during the outbreak of violence between Palestinian guerrillas and the forces of King Hussein in 1970, the Department of Defense has reevaluated the usefulness of the U.S. attack carrier force. The Department is abandoning plans to reduce that force to 12 vessels and may now request, at worst, that it be reduced to 13 ships or, at best, that its strength be kept at 15, only one less than the number maintained throughout the Vietnam War. Ashworth outlines the case for the attack carrier, citing the opinion of some Navy men that it provides the U.S. fleet with its only margin of superiority over Soviet naval forces. He concludes that the United States is taking great risks in permitting its carrier fleet to decline.

1171

Ballagh, Robert S. THE JCS CHALLENGE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Apr. 1971: 25-34. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Identifies some of the more persistent internal problems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system, reviews various proposals that have been advanced to resolve these difficulties, and recommends some new steps that might be taken to that end. Organizational defects have always hampered the JCS, and the Fitzhugh Panel recommendations, if adopted, will do little to eliminate the most persistent and irksome of these problems. Steps must be taken to put an end to divided loyalties among the Chiefs, to increase JCS authority over the services and the separate service staffs, and to effect better lateral communication between the Joint Staff, the service staffs, and the civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

1172

Barnett, Correlli. BRITAIN AND HER ARMY, 1509-1970; A MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SURVEY. New York, W. Morrow, 1970. xx, 529 p. illus.
DA65.B283 1970
Bibliography: p. 501-[505].

An institutional history of the British Army and its role in British history since the reign of Henry VIII. Barnett contrasts the Continental tradition of permanent standing armies, made necessary by common land frontiers with potential or actual enemies, and the expeditionary character of the British Army, made possible by a water barrier and a strong Navy. He nevertheless argues that British intervention on the Continent has been decisive only when Britain has been willing to commit large field armies against major European opponents for the duration of a war.

1173

Beecher, William. MILITARY REAWAKENING IN JAPAN. Army, v. 21, Mar. 1971: 10-17. illus.
U1.A893, v. 21

Japan's amazing economic recovery from its defeat by the Allies now seems to foreshadow a military revival. This buildup of armed strength has the blessing of the United States, which would like to reduce its responsibility for Asian defense. While Japan's constitution restricts the use of military force to self-defense, the potential for extended military development exists. However both Japanese and American diplomats are quick to muster evidence that Japanese forces will be used only for peacekeeping duties. With regard to nuclear armament there is less agreement. Publicly, officials have little to say. Privately, they seem to have some interest in developing a nuclear retaliation capability. Work continues on early-warning devices and a nuclear-free antiballistic missile system.

1174

Benson, Charles. DETERRENCE THROUGH DEFENSE. National review, v. 23, Mar. 9, 1971: 251-259. illus. AP2.N3545, v. 23

The number of Soviet ICBM's deployed tripled between 1968 and 1970, and Russian accumulation of destructive power can be expected to continue until it achieves a first-strike capability. At that time, by wiping out U.S. airbases and destroying Minutemen in their silos, the Kremlin could hold American cities hostage and force the President to concede a limited form of surrender. An extensive program of antimissile defense is essential to forestall such an outcome. The proposed two-stage Safeguard system is limited and inadequate. As one step toward improvement, the Spartan ABM might be equipped with multiple warheads. Beyond that the development of four- and five-stage systems would greatly improve defense effectiveness. A five-stage system would require a space-orbiting mechanism that would destroy enemy missiles soon after launch. Ultimately the United States needs to develop a spaceborne defensive system before the Russians do.

1175

Blum, Albert A. COMPARATIVE RECRUITING SYSTEMS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 10-29. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51
"Originally prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society."

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A comparative study of recruiting and selective-service systems in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, West Germany, France, and the Soviet Union. The politicomilitary context, administrative machinery, incentive structure, deferment and exemption provisions, and policy with respect to conscientious objectors are considered, the focus throughout being on matters thought to be most relevant to the current debate in the United States over the relative merits of forced and voluntary recruiting systems. Data on the size of these national forces, eligible draft and enlistment ages, minimum lengths of service, minimum monthly pays, and other matters are given in tabular form.

1176
Brooks, Leon P. VITAL INTERESTS AND VOLUNTEER FORCES. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Jan. 1971: 18-23. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Containment of communism, which has become a crusading political religion, must be abandoned as the basis of U.S. foreign policy. It has led to the militarization of American society and has failed to promote the Nation's true interests. Present foreign military commitments make it difficult for the United States to adjust its security policies to changes in military technology and Armed Forces employment. The Armed Forces should be completely reorganized into "line" and "technical" branches as a step toward creating professional elite units capable of attracting and keeping volunteers. Reorganization of the Ready Reserves would permit abolition of the draft except in times of national emergency. The role of the military has changed as war has declined as a legitimate tool of foreign policy; a stable domestic environment has become the first prerequisite of national security. Paradoxically, the prestige of the military would probably increase as a consequence of the demilitarization of U.S. foreign policy and the establishment of professional Armed Forces.

1177
Carl, Walter L. THE LESSON OF THE VIETNAM WAR. Journal of human relations, v. 18, no. 3, 1970: 1030-1039. H1.J55, v. 18

Lays the responsibility for U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War on the ignorance of U.S. citizens on matters of foreign policy. Carl also offers a critique of the policy of Vietnamization and gradual withdrawal and concludes that the United States should get out of Southeast Asia immediately. To avoid any more entanglements of this kind the American people must be enlightened. This might be achieved by a more vigorous use of mass media to bring the insights of political scientists to the attention of the public.

1178
Chapman, George, pseud. HOW TO MODERNIZE THE U.S. FLEET DESPITE INFLATION AND 'COST GROWTHS.' Navy, v. 14, Feb. 1971: 7-12. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Outlines a 10-point U.S. Navy program to hold down the cost of its extensive fleet-modernization program through reforming procurement practices. Important changes in procurement planning, contracting, cost estimation, higher echelon personnel management, and decisionmaking procedures have been made. Some overrun of initial cost estimates is inevitable. But it would be a great boon if the heretofore discouraged practice of rewarding those who will identify serious cost problems and take corrective action were introduced. The pseudonymous author is "a military correspondent for a major Eastern newspaper."

1179
CIVIL DEFENCE IN SWEDEN. International civil defence, v. 17, July/Aug. 1970: 3-6.
UA926.I488, v. 17

Describes Sweden's civil defense program, which emphasizes the individual's role of protecting himself and others during disasters and wartime, and assesses Sweden's civil defense medical services and its Civil Defence Staff College and Training Center at Roserberg Castle. The question of gas masks for the general public in peacetime is discussed, with the recommendation that, as the National Civil Defence Directorate has suggested, Sweden not postpone the production of gas masks until they are needed.

1180
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. THE INDOCHINA STORY: A FULLY DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT. New York, Pantheon Books [1970] xxxv, 347 p. map.
DS557.A63C64

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Who is the United States fighting in Indochina?--pt. 2. How is the United States fighting in Indochina?--pt. 3. Why is the United States fighting in Indochina?--pt. 4. What can the future hold for Indochina?--Notes.--Chronologies.--Glossary.--Bibliography.

A history and critique of U.S. involvement in Indochina since World War II. The authors contend that U.S. military strategy and tactics have led to the devastation of huge areas of the Indochinese countryside, producing high civilian casualty rates and a massive refugee problem. They argue that the United States bears primary responsibility for the bloodshed in Indochina because of its futile attempt to prevent the spread of communism regardless of cost. They conclude that only an immediate, total, unilateral withdrawal of American troops can bring peace to Indochina and create the basis for a new political consciousness in the United States.

1181
Dahm, Helmut. [SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE] Die sowjetische Militärdoktrin. Osteuropa, v. 20, June 1970: 384-398. DR1.08, v. 20

Studies the recent development of Soviet military doctrine, describing the period after 1968 as

dominated by the effect of Chinese nuclear armament on the strategy of deterrence. This account of the development of doctrine in the period from Stalin's death to the convocation of the 23d Party Congress is focused on Stalin's theory of permanent and temporary factors, the consequences of atomic warfare, the surprise factor, the strategy of the initiative, the primacy of nuclear missiles, the kinds of warfare and their possible duration, and deterrence and flexible response. The cast given to Soviet military doctrine by Khrushchev is described as unchanged today except in detail. The Soviets continue officially to renounce the propagation of ideology by war and to deny the possibility of a limited nonnuclear conflict between the two superpowers. Dahm disputes those Western students who think that Soviet military leaders have rejected the primacy of politics and now accept the inevitability of nuclear warfare. He points out that the advent of China as a world power has opened a new frontier for Soviet military doctrine. The American reasons for an antiballistic missile system directed against China are equally valid for the Soviet Union, which additionally is imperiled by its long eastern frontiers. In the event of some internal Chinese crisis a Russian expedition to set up a puppet regime in Peking would very likely be successful. However Soviet military doctrine realistically recognizes that the prerequisite for free action in the east is the security of the western borders.

1182

Debré, Michel. FRANCE'S GLOBAL STRATEGY. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 395-406.
D410.F6, v. 49

In the absence of European political unity, which is the prerequisite for a European nuclear strategy, France has no alternative but to maintain its nuclear capability if it is to retain its freedom of decision. Deterrence does not require nuclear parity, merely the ability to threaten destruction proportionate to the importance a would-be aggressor attaches to a desired conquest. France will therefore continue to develop its nuclear capability in addition to maintaining land, sea, and air forces adequate to protect France's vital interests and fulfill its limited commitments. This does not exclude cooperation with other nations; it simply recognizes that strategic nuclear cooperation is not possible at present. In the meantime France's independent nuclear force constitutes a vital element in the European security system.

1183

[DECLARATIONS ON THE INTENDED REORGANIZATION OF ARMAMENTS] Die Absichtserklärungen für die Rüstungsreorganisation. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 15, Jan. 1970: p. 16-17.
U3.W38, v. 15

The commission appointed by the Minister of Defense in order to revise the defense procurement organization, has now after five months of secluded studies submitted its report, on December 1, 1970. In this report a great deal of knowledge acquired here and abroad as well as from the German industry has been turned to account. The analysis deduced from this knowledge and the evaluation of the prevailing defense procurement organization and the process of material establishment have now led to suggestions to develop a modern and economical management of defense procurement. This article for the first time includes certain details of the planned reorganization of the whole sector of armaments--beginning with a consolidated department of armaments in the ministry up to the transformation of the Federal Procurement Office (BWB) into a future office of armaments. The temporary interchange of employer's and supplier's personnel should be taken into consideration in connection with the intended reorganization as well. By and large the report of the commission contains important proposals which certainly could bring about a number of discussions in the industry, the economic system, the administration, and, last but not least, the Parliament. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1184

Deutsch, Eberhard P. THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF. American Bar Association journal, v. 57, Jan. 1971: 27-32. LL

Ample historical precedent exists for the President to commit U.S. forces to combat without a formal declaration of war by Congress. The courts have found that congressional appropriations and other acts amount to authorization of executive action, that the President has an obligation to resist an attack without waiting for congressional approval, and that the President has the power as Commander in Chief to deploy troops as he sees fit. The warmaking powers of the President and Congress are clearly delineated; the Congress raises and maintains armies, but the President decides and directs how they are to be used. "Whenever a state of war exists--whether declared or undeclared--the President of the United States has, under the Constitution, as commander in chief, full and plenary power to conduct military operations in prosecution of the war, unhampered by anything in the nature of strategic legislative restrictions."

1185

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE WAR IN INDOCHINA. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 252 p.
KF4650.A25 1970

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Selected statements, testimony, articles, and excerpts from books on congressional and presidential war powers, with particular reference to the Vietnam War.

1186

Dupuy, René J., and Mario Bettati. [THE WARSAW PACT] Le pacte de Varsovie. Paris, A. Colin [1969] 96 p. (Dossiers U2, 82. Problèmes internationaux) JX1393.W2D8

Bibliography: p. [95]-96.

Describes the objectives, structure, and functions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Documents relating to the alliance's activities and goals are reprinted.

1187

Ellis, Gerald. CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Apr. 1971: 71-76. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Gages the strength of Communist China's military force, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The numerical strength, organization, tactics, and mission of each of the major branches are described. Ellis also examines China's nuclear weapons capability, including facilities for the production of fissile materials. The PLA is largely a defensive force, lacking the long-range mobility for offensive operations. It also plays an important political role and performs valuable economic and social functions. This political role, in particular, was greatly strengthened during the course of the Cultural Revolution.

1188

Estep, Raymond. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PERUVIAN POLITICS. [Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.] Documentary Research Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1970. 66 p. map. (Air University documentary research study. AU-206-69-ASI) F3448.E87

Bibliography: p. 63-66.

Examines the role of the military in Peruvian politics, traces the development of new trends in Peruvian military thinking, and assesses Peru's military strength.

1189

THE FY 72 DEFENSE BUDGET. Armed Forces journal, v. 108, Feb. 15, 1971: 24-30, 32-40, 44-45. U1.A66, v. 108

Contents.--Nixon doctrine budget faces major hurdle in Congress, by James D. Hessman.--Personnel cuts continue, new pay hikes proposed, by James D. Hessman.--Strategic deterrence still top priority, by Brooke Nihart.--RDT&E programs up 10% to $7.87-billion, by Brooke Nihart.--Airlift/sealift programs down 20%, but: by Brooke Nihart.--General purpose forces down in size and buys, by George Weiss.--Funding increased for engineers, VA, Coast Guard, and MarAd.--Behind the budget decisions: five years of constant change, by James D. Hessman.

Analyses of the U.S. defense and military assistance budget request for fiscal year 1972. This, the "first authentic 'Nixon Doctrine' budget," looks forward to less U.S. involvement in conflicts outside the NATO area; greater reliance on military assistance; smaller but higher quality and more mobile active-duty forces; better training and equipment for the Reserve and National Guard; increased funding for research, development, training, and education; and balanced improvements to strategic and general-purpose forces. This budget request is up $6 billion over 1971, but this increase is "more apparent than real." The budget accepts substantial military risks; it is vulnerable to both hawkish and dovish criticism and is certain to face heavy going in Congress.

1190

First, Ruth. POWER IN AFRICA. New York, Pantheon Books [c1970] 513 p. map. DT30.F54 1970b

"Originally published in Great Britain as The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'État."

Includes bibliographical references.

Develops a general theory of political power in newly independent African states through an examination of the role and significance of military coups d'etat. The author reviews Africa's colonial heritage in search of the origins of the present widespread political instability and describes the process of decolonization and the emergence of native African military organizations. She focuses on coups and counter-coups in the Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana, and identifies four main conditions that tend to produce coups: the cumulative economic crisis of postindependence Africa, endemic political crisis, foreign encouragement or hostility toward a possible coup, and the condition of the army of the country involved.

1191

Forward, Roy. MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA. Australian quarterly, v. 42, Dec. 1970: 55-62. DU80.A95, v. 42

Traces the development of the arguments of Australian economists advocating an all-volunteer army over a mixed conscript-volunteer force. Despite official failure to attempt serious cost-analysis studies of variant national service proposals, Australian economists have had the advantage of being able to transfer the highly sophisticated mode of analysis developed by Americans to a situation where the countervailing factors encountered in the United States do not exist. Because of these studies, the bureaucrats will no longer be able to claim that the present national service scheme is fair, efficient, or necessary, and the Government "will therefore suddenly 'discover' that funds are available for the improvements in army pay and conditions that will attract sufficient volunteers."

1192

Frisbee, John L. "REALISTIC DETERRENCE" [editorial] Air Force and space digest, v. 54, Apr. 1971: 4, 6. UG633.A65, v. 54

Comments on the stature of U.S. military forces indicated by the President's Foreign Policy Message of Feb. 25, 1971, and the Defense Secretary's Posture Statement of Mar. 9, 1971. Frisbee interprets the President's rejection of strategic superiority as equating "sufficiency" with strategic parity, but he welcomes the announced intentions to build up general-purpose weapons and maintain

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the balance of land- and sea-based missiles. The President's call for flexibility is related to the possibility of carefully controlled strategic operations selected as alternatives to indiscriminate nuclear warfare. This flexibility of response requires the assignment of all strategic forces to the operational control of the Strategic Air Command. Frisbee doubts that the Defense Department's current program will continue to satisfy the criterion of sufficiency unless the strategic defensive area is reinforced. He thinks particularly interesting the comments on the technical options open in the event of the failure of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and on the decreasing budgetary allocations for defense. The defense program is characterized as not optimum but better than hoped for.

1193
Fulbright, James William. THE LEGISLATOR: CONGRESS AND THE WAR. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, Mar. 1, 1971: 290-294.
PN6121.V52, v. 37
Delivered at South Florida University, Tampa, Feb. 4, 1971.

"Out of a well-intentioned but misconceived notion of what patriotism and responsibility require in a time of world crisis, Congress has permitted the President to take over the two vital foreign policy powers which the Constitution vested in Congress: the power to initiate war and the Senate's power to consent or withhold consent from significant foreign commitments." With respect to foreign policy, especially the making of war, the United States has become a presidential dictatorship. Even most critics of presidential war policies accept the notion that the President has the residual power to use the Armed Forces in any way he sees fit unless specifically prohibited by Congress, whereas the Constitution prohibits any use not specifically authorized by Congress. This view of the relationship between the President and Congress has enabled the Nixon administration to effectively surmount congressional restrictions on its war policies by disguising its intentions with various semantic subterfuges and doubletalk. Not only must Congress reestablish its authority over foreign policy, but the Presidency itself, not just the policies of particular Presidents, must be reformed if America is to reverse the trend toward dictatorship.

1194
Garnett, John C. DEFENCE AGAINST WHAT? In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 115, Dec. 1970: 24-26.
U1.R8, v. 115

Because today's defense costs are so high, the major powers will have to base their defense requirements on an enemy's intentions rather than on estimates of its military capability. Defense requirements based solely on capability "may be so economically crippling that they threaten to destroy the very society they are designed to protect." As the cold war enters into what Marshal Shulman calls a "limited adversary relationship" there should be an increasing reluctance on the part of Western statesmen to plan defense requirements on the basis of pessimistic assumptions. Statesmen who overestimate the enemy's threat may provoke it into a state of hostility the enemy had no intention of reaching. As a sign of maturity, nations must accept that no conceivable defense policy can eliminate insecurity. Given limited budgets and the heavy demands on them, governments must resist having their defense policies determined solely by internal political and economic pressures.

1195
Gellner, John. CANADA IN NATO. Toronto, Ryerson Press [1970] 117 p. (Ryerson paperbacks, 35)
UA646.5.C2G4

Discusses Canada's role in NATO, and the events that led to its entry into the alliance. Gellner supplies what he considers the most important documents relating to Canada's association with NATO and adds a narrative text for continuity. "No attempt is made to analyze what has happened, and even less to pass judgment. The aim is to present the evidence and let it speak for itself."

1196
Goodpaster, Andrew J. THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 116, Mar. 1971: 31-38.
U1.R8, v. 116

Reviews NATO's status and discusses four objectives it seeks to serve--deterrence, defense, solidarity, and détente. The NATO alliance may be said to suffer from the "problem of success." Its effectiveness in keeping the peace tends to induce complacency about the need for maintaining defensive strength. General Goodpaster points to the threat and notes progressive Soviet offensive capability and the steady improvement of Warsaw Pact forces. At the same time he observes a tendency to neglect input to the NATO military instrument in terms of personnel, modern equipment, training, and level of support funds. The NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels acknowledged and publicized areas of NATO need; this recognition could lead to action.

1197
Groenewegen, P. D. THE PUBLIC FINANCE OF AUSTRALIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR. Australian quarterly, v. 42, Dec. 1970: 63-73.
DU80.A95, v. 42

Discusses the constitutional background of the Australian Government's appropriations for the purpose of participating in the Vietnam conflict, the officially announced costs of this participation, and other possible estimates. While a generally acceptable method of accounting is not available, Groenewegen thinks the official figures are serious underestimates. He ascribes to the Government's uncertainty of the legality of its actions its refusal to test them before the courts or to disclose their full costs to the Parliament.

1198
Haas, Arlin. SOVIET STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS: AN ANALYSIS. Studies on the Soviet Union,

428-500 O - 71 - 4

n.s., v. 10, no. 1, 1970: 1-18.
DK1.S75, n.s., v. 10

Isolates key strategic and political concepts as phrased in Soviet publications, with the assumption that they can be used as a source of quasi-official thinking. Concepts relating to the maintenance and development of the Armed Forces, including preemption, war as a legitimate means of achieving policy goals, the advantages of flexible response, disarmament, coexistence, and détente are examined first. In the ensuing discussion of the military conceptual framework, terms used in Soviet strategic discourse, such as military doctrine, military art, military science, military strategy, operational art, and tactics, are explained, and selected definitions are given of other terms encountered in the Soviet literature. Haas concludes that while the Soviet Union realistically appreciates the use of force in the international arena, it would like to take on the peacemaker image. It must also consider the desires of its people for an improved standard of living. Correct understanding of Soviet discussion of these goals requires continued study of Soviet concepts and terminologies.

1199
Hinterhoff, Eugène. N.A.T.O.'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND ITS DANGERS. Cosantóir, v. 30, Oct. 1970: 315-317. U1.C8, v. 30

Criticizes the new guidelines approved by the NATO defense ministers for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack against Western Europe. Hinterhoff inveighs against the restrictions imposed by the alliance on the use of these weapons. Under these restrictions, a NATO nuclear warning salvo could be directed against Poland or Czechoslovakia but not against East Germany or the Soviet Union. These restrictions reduce the scope of the aggressor's uncertainty; the enemy could deploy troops in East Germany knowing they would be immune from attack. The author disagrees with the view that those Soviet satellites under the threat of complete destruction by NATO would rise against the Soviet Union in case of a major Soviet aggression. He concludes that once tactical weapons are used against Poland or Czechoslovakia they will cause great bitterness "with the result that the soldiers of satellite armed forces . . . will be driven into the Soviet arms, seething with revenge."

1200
Hinterhoff, Eugène. [RUMBLING IN THE WARSAW PACT] Es rumort im Warschauer Pakt. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Nov. 1970: 355-359. U3.W396, v. 19

Discusses the origin and development of the Warsaw Pact in four phases: 1943-45, 1945-49, 1949-55, and from 1955, the year of its founding, to the present. The Warsaw Pact afforded the Soviet Union political advantages insofar as it legitimizes the presence of Soviet troops in the satellite countries and allows for a longer warning period in case of a nuclear war. The strategic value of the Pact as a defense against possible German aggression has been superseded by the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement, and therefore its offensive potential must be considered as threatening NATO. Hinterhoff states that structurally the Pact cannot be regarded as an alliance in the classical sense, since it lacks a command structure and logistics separate from those of the Soviet Armed Forces. The satellite states resent the Soviets' taking political and economic advantage of the Pact without granting them equal rights or sufficient nuclear protection. They would like to voice their dissatisfaction freely at the proposed European security conference. They hope to see both military blocs disappear, although they realize that the Soviet Union has enough bilateral agreements with Eastern states to keep a finger in the pot, even if NATO dissolves and American troops withdraw from Europe. The author urges that the West European participants at the security conference be well aware of rumbling within the Warsaw Pact.

1201
Hoag, Malcolm W. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RELATIONS (AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND-UNITED STATES): THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970. 32 p. (Rand Corporation. Paper. P-4281) Sci RR
Microfiche AD 701 364
Bibliographical footnotes.

An assessment of ANZUS relations presented to a conference on this theme at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, February 1970. Current relations are unusually good, but will be subjected to new strains in determining a revised counter-balance in Asia to a nuclear China. From a strategic assessment of this threat, idealized criteria for a counterbalance in the Pacific are determined. These criteria stress discriminating capabilities for controlled 'city-sparing' nuclear responses. Conflicting proposals for national nuclear forces in Asia (H. Bull, A. Buchan) are opposed. (Abstract supplied)

1202
HOLDING THE LINE AND HEDGING AGAINST THE FUTURE. Army, v. 21, Mar. 1971: 6-9. U1.A893, v. 21

An analysis of the 1972 Department of Defense budget, with tables that break down defense spending figures in several ways. Even with the $6 billion increase recommended by President Nixon, the 1972 budget will have less buying power than the current one. The new budget returns almost to fiscal 1964 (pre-Vietnam) levels and suggests peacetime spending. Increased allocations for research, development, testing, and evaluation indicate expected investment in defense systems and new weaponry including a new manned bomber, an airborne early-warning system, a new class of ICBM-carrying submarines, and the Safeguard ballistic missile defense system. Some cuts in military manpower are expected, with the Army receiving the largest blow. At the same time, however, more money will be diverted to backup forces, such as the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

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1203
Hsieh, Alice Langley. CHINA'S NUCLEAR-MISSILE PROGRAMME: REGIONAL OR INTERCONTINENTAL? China quarterly, no. 45, Jan./Mar. 1971: 85-99.
DS701.C472, 1971

A review of intelligence reports presented during testimony before Congress permits increasingly sophisticated speculation about Chinese defense progress. For one thing it seems clear that China's missile testing has not kept pace with its nuclear program. Although China has launched an earth-orbiting satellite, this does not demonstrate that the Chinese can now launch an ICBM. It is assumed, however, that in time they can do so if their research and development are oriented in that direction. Their ability to develop penetration capacity to go along with an ICBM is disputed by Western experts. With regard to Chinese nuclear progress, some observers suppose that the Chinese are intent on developing the 3-megaton thermonuclear warhead. Their more probable goal is the development of tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use. Supporting this hypothesis are indications in Chinese military literature of interest in such weapons and a logical appraisal of China's geographical situation. While China may at some future date test an ICBM, it seems likely that the nuclear mix currently favored would be composed of medium-range bombers, medium-range missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons. In pursuing this course China is not seeking confrontation with the superpowers, but rather emphasizing the advantages of a regional capability and strategy.

1204
Hunt, Kenneth. JAPAN'S MILITARY POLICY: A NEW ERA BEGINS? Interplay, v. 4, Mar. 1971: 44-48. illus.
D849.I56, v. 4

Despite Japan's economic growth and the increases in its defense expenditures, Tokyo's foreign and defense policies are likely to remain low keyed. Japanese military forces will continue to increase, "but it is difficult at the moment to see any alarming use to which they could be rationally put in Japan's own interests." The limitations on an independent military role for Japan stem not only from constitutional and domestic political impediments, but from the nuclear and political environment in which Japan lives as well. Because of Japan's geographical asymmetries with China and the Soviet Union and the unfavorable U.S. reaction that would result from nuclear weapons acquisition, Japan is likely to be confronted with difficult military problems in relation to nuclear weapons. Its moves will be cautious and largely reactive, especially where Peking, whose actions may affect Tokyo most, is concerned. "Japan has some way to go before it is likely to play a part in international affairs fully consonant with its economic strength."

1205
Internationales Kolloquium zu Fragen der Entwicklung der Politik der NATO, Berlin, 1969. [NATO AGAINST EUROPEAN SECURITY] NATO gegen europäische Sicherheit. [Materialen] Als Manuskript gedruckt. [Berlin] Deutscher Militärverlag [1969] 308 p.
UA646.3.I57 1969
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Function and tendencies of NATO now, by Stefan Doernberg.--NATO as the main military instrument of the imperialist global strategy in Europe, by Reinhard Brühl.--Discussion: Developmental tendencies within the NATO war pact. NATO's policy and strategy of aggression against the Socialist states of Europe. The role of the German Federal Republic in NATO. Questions of European security and the policy of the Socialist states against the NATO war-pact system.

Reports on various aspects of the themes of the colloquium: NATO as an instrument of anticommunism in the imperialist campaign to alter the territorial status quo in Europe; NATO's threat to European and world peace; the rivalry between the United States and West Germany for European hegemony; and NATO's influence in repressing internal domestic reforms within its member states. Doernberg thinks that NATO has not achieved its goals, nor has the U.S. reached its hoped-for dominance within NATO. In his view, West Germany is exploiting its increasing influence within the Atlantic Alliance to further its revanchist ambitions. Despite the growing clash of national interests, the common bond of capitalistic imperialism is enough to keep the Atlantic Alliance intact in the future. Brühl forecasts that in the 1970's NATO will emphasize indirect strategy, use military force as an instrument of political blackmail, and threaten a lowering of the atomic threshold. The West German regime will use the Nixon administration to strengthen NATO and the German position within NATO. Both Doernberg and Brühl call for strengthening the Warsaw Pact and for the convocation of an all-European security conference as the necessary antidotes to NATO's machinations.

1206
Kahn, Herman [interview] WHY U.S. MUST STAY IN ASIA. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, Feb. 8, 1971: 60-64.
JK1.U65, v. 70

Argues that a strong U.S. presence is necessary to the stability of Asia although it cannot be based on the narrow grounds of U.S. economic and strategic interests; rather, such a policy would be in the world's interest, and in the U.S. interest as a part of the world. Should the United States withdraw from Asia, the principal beneficiary would be neither Communist China nor the Soviet Union, but Japan, an economic giant for whom this is the natural region of expansion. The Japanese have no deep-seated inhibitions against nuclear weapons, but Japan's defense establishment has decided to postpone acquiring them until the late 1970's or early 1980's. The Vietnam War has already been won militarily and can be expected to wind down slowly, though there may be as many as 50,000 U.S. servicemen in the country for the next 5 to 10 years.

1207
Kim, Kwan Ho, Susan Farrell, and Ewan Clague. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY; AN ANALYSIS OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY. New York, Praeger [1971] xx, 208 p. (Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development) UB323.K55
Bibliography: p. 207-208.

Contents.--Introduction and summary of methodology.--The inventory models.--The civilian manpower pool model.--The supply of enlisted volunteers.--The cost and relative effectiveness model for enlisted personnel.--Cost estimate models for officers and warrant officers.--Appendixes: Sample computer printouts from civilian manpower pool model. Definitions and data used in chapter 4.

Analyzes the monetary costs of maintaining the U.S. Army at given levels of strength through higher compensation. The authors do not attempt to consider the social costs of an all-volunteer Army, the substitution of civilian for military personnel, or the possibility of an expanded role for women or the reserves, and they touch only briefly on the savings that might result from higher retention rates and the effects of an all-volunteer program on the mental and racial composition of the Army. They conclude that increased compensation would attract sufficient volunteers only up to a point, beyond which an all-volunteer force would be virtually impossible.

1208
Kirsch, Botho. [STORM OVER EURASIA: MOSCOW AND PEKING IN THE BATTLE FOR WORLD DOMINATION] Sturm über Eurasien: Moskau und Peking im Kampf um die Weltherrschaft. Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag [c1970] 286 p. DK68.7.C5K5

Contents.--Foreword: the red schism.--Mao Tse-tung or the tradition of disobedience.--War and peace.--Moscow's restless border.--Mao's world as will and idea.--Who buries whom?--The monolith disintegrates.--How dead is Stalin?--The struggle for Bonn.--Index of persons.

The Soviet Union is spending much of its political energy to subjugate West Germany. Because the Kremlin has never underestimated the relationship between its German and China policies, it seeks détente in the West in order to concentrate on the situation in the Far East. China feels militarily threatened by the Soviet Union, and Mao can accept the Soviet challenge only by negotiating and fighting simultaneously. He is prolonging the border talks in Peking while resuming diplomatic relations with Moscow and making known his willingness to talk to Washington, all in order to protect his country from a Soviet surprise attack. The Soviets are using the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and proposals for a European security conference and negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions as "diplomatic maneuvers to create a belt of neutral Eurasian border states, to weaken NATO and the Common Market, and to force the withdrawal of U.S. divisions from Europe under pressure of the détente-happy American public." The Federal Republic of Germany has misjudged Moscow's apparent indulgence of liberalism, as the events in Prague have shown. That the Soviets are engaged in power politics can be seen clearly in their intensification of the international class struggle, their engagement in the Near East, their "cleansing" of Dubcek supporters in Prague, and their preparations for war and aggression at the Balkan and Chinese borders. They want détente within the military blocs, not between them, and therefore Germany would have been much better off if it had not been willing to recognize East Germany and conclude the Moscow treaty. Ratification of the treaty could lead to Soviet intervention and a Communist takeover in Bonn, which would in turn cause the countries behind the Iron Curtain to give up all hopes for liberalization. The treaty will cure the economic ills of the Eastern countries and kill their desire for liberalization, thus giving Moscow time to deal with dissenters. The people of China, Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia may well be the victims of the renunciation-of-force agreement. The author concludes that the West German Ostpolitik endangers peace and the balance of power. He suggests that Germany strengthen its security policy by supporting NATO and do everything possible to speed up European unification.

1209
Klieman, Aaron S. SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1970] 107 p. (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Studies in international affairs, no. 14) DS63.2.R9K55
Bibliography: p. 107.

Discusses the role of the Middle East in world politics; traces the Soviet Union's interest in the Mediterranean from 1770, when it first gained entry to that sea, to 1955, when it signed an arms pact with Egypt; describes the Soviet penetration of the Near East during the 1960's; speculates on the impact of this penetration vis-a-vis the United States and its relations with the countries of the area; and assesses America's preparedness to meet the Soviet challenge in the Near East during the coming decade. Klieman asserts that because of the bitter experience of the Vietnam War and pressures to assign priorities to domestic problems, the United States is unprepared to meet this challenge. He examines several proposals to fill the vacuum East of Suez and a plan aimed at disengaging the Arab States from the Soviet Union and halting the current Soviet drive.

1210
Kolko, Gabriel. AN ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FOR WINNING THE WAR? OILING THE ESCALATOR. New republic, v. 164, Mar. 13, 1971: 18-20. AP2.N624, v. 164

Foresees the emergence of an influential "economic constituency"--the international oil interests, interested in a protracted Vietnam War, a puppet Saigon regime, and a continued American military presence in Southeast Asia--as the result of recent oil discoveries in the area. Kolko warns that the new economic incentive could add "a powerful new domestic constituency to Nixon's present fragile, emotional following."

XUM

1211
LAOS: WAR AND REVOLUTION. Edited by Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy. New York, Harper & Row [1970] xxiii, 482 p. maps. (Harper Colophon books, CN221) (A publication of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars)
DS557.L25L3 1970
Selected bibliography: p. 463-466.

Selected articles on the war in Laos by scholars, journalists, present and former Government officials, and others, focusing on, and generally critical of, U.S. involvement. The cultural and historical background of the present conflict are examined in parts 1 and 2, U.S. involvement in parts 3 and 4, and the origin and purposes of the Pathet Lao in part 5.

1212
LETTER FROM LONDON, from our London correspondent. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 13-16. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

Outlines the Conservative government's newly submitted British defense plan. Under the new plan, Great Britain will continue to station some air, sea, and land forces East of Suez, extend the active duty life of the carrier Ark Royal into the late 1970's, and retain the Gurkha regiments that were due to be disbanded. It will add four new squadrons of strike aircraft to the Royal Air Force, purchase new antiship missiles from France, strengthen the territorial army, and make "a valuable overall improvement" in its contribution to NATO. The plan gives priority to the defense of Europe but foresees a substantial British effort in other parts of the world to protect overseas territories and treaty partners and support international organizations and disarmament.

1213
Lowe, George E. THE ONLY OPTION? In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Apr. 1971: 18-26. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

In view of the Soviet naval penetration of the Middle East, its implications for American politicomilitary strategy around the globe, and the fact that the powerful and accurate Soviet offensive ballistic missiles have rendered the U.S. land-based ICBM missile force clearly obsolete, the United States must take immediate steps to ensure its assured-destruction capability by deploying 300-400 mobile Minuteman III missiles at sea and increasing the strategic delivery capability of its carrier force. Later, such a system as the Underwater Long-Range Missile System would take over the deterrence burden. Only this blue-water option can preserve the strategic balance, carry out the Nixon doctrine, and simultaneously meet the pressing needs of American society. This option is immensely cheaper than the combination Minuteman III, B-1, and ABM option, and it is compatible with one objective of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: the phased elimination by the superpowers of all land-based missiles. It could be the first phase of a larger arms control scheme, reducing the temptation for the first strike and preventing a new arms race. Moving the Minuteman III to sea would eliminate the need to build such follow-on systems as the multi-billion-dollar B-1 strategic bomber.

1214
Mackintosh, Malcolm. RUSSIA'S DEFENSE: A QUESTION OF QUALITY. Interplay, v. 4, Feb. 1971: 14-17.
N&CPR

Examines the future of Soviet defense, especially in regard to strategic planning, European policy, and relations with Communist China. The Soviet Union will continue to try to maintain its strategic power, relying on numerical superiority to offset American technological advances. It will press conclusion of a strategic arms limitation agreement, the essence of which will be to ensure mutual deterrence and allow the superpowers to adjust their defenses to meet the potential Chinese nuclear threat. Moscow will attempt to perpetuate the political status quo in Eastern Europe by relying on a military presence in force for defensive (and potentially offensive) purposes. Two changes in the European scene are likely to require the Soviets to reexamine their defense policy: the situation in Yugoslavia and Albania following Tito's inevitable departure, and the increase in Soviet politicomilitary activities in the Middle East. For the first time Western Europe may have to contend with a threat of Soviet military power from the Mediterrean area as well as from Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's China policy will be predicated on attempts to ensure Soviet military superiority and the defense of the homeland against a Chinese nuclear attack. The most important development in Soviet strategic policy during the next decade will be "the principle of using military forces in support of overseas policy in peacetime." The Soviet Union has overcome the ideological barrier to overseas military commitments, and overseas bases may play a leading role in Moscow's use of military power in support of its foreign policy.

1215
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. Military Spending Committee. REPORT ON MILITARY SPENDING. [Washington, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law] 1970. 1 v. (various pagings)
UA23.3.M45
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Table of suggested reductions.--Economics and defense spending.--Intelligence and policy.--Strategic forces.--Tactical air.--Tactical-land.--Naval forces.--Manpower.--Funding charts.

Proposes reductions in the U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 1971 on the basis of analyses of U.S. foreign policy objectives, national security policies, and individual weapons programs. The immediate cutbacks recommended, excluding manpower cuts, would save from $4.4 to $5.4 billion in fiscal 1971, with long-term savings of up to $100 billion.

1216
Mettler, Eric. THE RENAISSANCE OF NATO. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Jan. 1971: 9.
D839.S9, v. 20

Not long ago a British survey revealed that many Europeans were unaware of NATO's function and purpose and regarded any mention of threats to their freedom as alarmist chatter. Détente had become a facade behind which the organization's strength was being reduced, and while Europeans were doing little for their own defense neo-isolationist elements in America were coming to the fore. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the increasing penetration of the Middle East brought a change in mood. Some European leaders were also becoming wary of Bonn's Ostpolitik, believing that it could "permit Moscow's shadow to lengthen over Germany and Western Europe as well." Against the background of the Soviet Union's expansionist policies in the Middle East, its nuclear armaments buildup, and the unequivocal superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, the two sessions of the Atlantic Council held last year indicate a change of attitude toward the Soviet Union. Whether the current renaissance within NATO can endure depends on the resolution of important problems: the need for a militarily stronger alliance; the question of rising nationalism in Western Europe; the issue of Great Britain's relations with the Europeean Economic Community; and the future role of France in West European defense and security arrangements.

1217
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. A staff report. Prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress, second session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 31 p.
DLC
At head of title: Committee print.

Report containing data gathered by Dr. John H. Sullivan on a factfinding mission to eight East and Southeast Asian countries, together with analysis and findings on the operation of U.S. military-assistance training programs in these countries. Special emphasis is placed on the Nixon doctrine and its implications for military-assistance training. This study, subcommittee hearings, and a Latin American study mission report will provide the basis for the subcommittee's final report on military-assistance programs.

1218
Miller, Martin J. ISRAEL'S QUEST FOR MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 67-73.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

A survey of Israel's defense industry. Miller describes the organization, administration, and strong and weak points of the Israeli armaments industry, paying special attention to the effort to achieve self-sufficiency. He notes that this industry grows larger and more sophisticated with every temporary interruption of arms supplies from abroad; the Government coordinating agency, Military Industries, already is the nation's largest employer. Self-sufficiency will enhance security and provide the country with a diversified peacetime industrial base, but it may be difficult to achieve under the serious financial limitations imposed by a wartime economy.

1219
Monks, Alfred L. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY THINKING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 78-93. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Examines the origin, course, and outcome of military factionalism in the Soviet Union. Monks distinguishes political, traditionalist, centrist, and modernist factions in the Soviet Armed Forces and outlines the views of each of them on the questions at issue--the nature of future war, the organizational structure of the military, the concept of military power, and the preconditions for military victory. Interservice competition for scarce military resources is the real cause of the dispute. Precipitated in 1960 by Nikita Khrushchev's announced intention to make extensive changes in Soviet military policy, the struggle declined in virulence after 1966, largely because increases in the military budget in that year were large enough to give some satisfaction to all parties.

1220
Moorer, Thomas A. [interview] WHAT NEXT IN INDOCHINA. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, Apr. 5, 1971: 44-48. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 70

Replies to questions on the Vietnam War, the situation in Southeast Asia generally, Communist China, U.S. strategic doctrine, European defense, the selective service system, press coverage of the Vietnam War, popular attitudes toward the defense establishment, discipline in the Armed Forces, and the U.S.-Soviet arms race. Moorer asserts that if the Soviet arms buildup is allowed to continue at its present pace and no steps are taken to offset it, in 5 or 6 years the United States will find itself in a position of hopeless inferiority. With this in mind the administration has submitted a defense budget that provides for the hedges and options that may be needed "to build up [U.S.] forces in various areas in the event that [the United States] cannot make any progress with respect to [its] earnest negotiating effort to get the Soviets to limit arms--the SALT talks."

1221
Murphy, Frank B. OCEAN SURVEILLANCE: NEW WEAPONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Feb. 1971: 38-41. illus. V1.U8, v. 97

Discusses the U.S. Navy's need for a ocean surveillance system that would provide credible intelligence almost as soon as events take place.

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Murphy warns that if the Navy fails to obtain this system "it will surely find itself foundering in the wake of any foreign navy which has done so." He notes that there is a strong demand throughout the Government for an ocean surveillance system and that the Navy, which has the greatest need, should manage such a system. He emphasizes the crucial nature of ocean surveillance within the context of the recent Soviet naval buildup in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area.

1222

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD AT BRUSSELS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Jan. 4, 1971: 1-7.
JX232.A33, v. 64

Final communique, with annex, of the regular ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held at Brussels, Dec. 3-4, 1970, together with texts of a statement read by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers on his arrival in Brussels on Dec. 2 and a message from President Nixon to the Council, read by the Secretary on Dec. 3. The communique records ministerial views on U.S. forces in Europe; East-West negotiations on various matters, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Soviet-West German discussions; the status of Berlin; the situation in the Mediterranean; the proposed European security conference; ecological cooperation; mutual and balanced force reductions; other arms control and disarmament matters; alliance strategy and force levels; command and control systems for crisis management; and the control of nuclear weapons. The annex deals with NATO defense policy in the 1970's and announces the adoption of a special European Defense Improvement Programme, which is intended to increase alliance capabilities in conventional forces and communications.

1223

Oehman, Gunnar. DOES THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR RENDER CIVIL DEFENCE USELESS? International civil defence, v. 17, Dec. 1970: 1-4.
UA926.I488, v. 17

Translated from the Finnish journal Väestönsuojelulehti.

Finnish opponents of civil defense argue that conventional warfare in Europe is unlikely and that a nuclear war will make it impossible to protect civilian populations. But the threat of a nuclear war does not minimize the importance of civil defense. Most Finns agree that they need a sound civil defense system and, in view of the possibility of a Soviet antimissile defense system near Finland, better protection against radiation. Those who distrust civil defense are forgetting the tremendous scientific progress that has been and can be accomplished in protective systems. In the future, civil defense systems will have to be more flexible to cope with both nuclear attack and chemical and biological warfare.

1224

Oka, Takashi. JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE WINS A SKIRMISH WITH THE PAST. New York times magazine, Feb. 28, 1971: 12-13, 30, 32-35.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Sounds out the mood of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and, indirectly, the Japanese populace at large through a sampling of individual reactions to novelist Yukio Mishima's appeal to members of the Force to overthrow the civilian leadership and restore the Japan of ancient imperial tradition. Assuming Japan's continued economic prosperity, Mishima's appeal and suicide, which provoked dismay rather than rebellion among the Japanese military, will fade quickly from the national consciousness. However if the economy collapses, if the dream of achieving economic greatness in lieu of military greatness proves to be unrealizable, or if the Japanese awake one day to a crisis of identity, then the ordinary citizen "may at that moment hear the clangor surrounding Mishima's suicide reverberating in his inner ear, like the echo of a gong dimly remembered."

1225

Palmer, Joseph. THE BOUNDS OF NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 20-25. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Calls attention to the essentially maritime character of the Atlantic Alliance and argues that the interests of NATO are not confined to the European continent and contiguous waters but rather, as with the interests of the member states taken separately, extend worldwide. The Soviet Union, exploiting the multiple advantages of its newly acquired strength at sea, is challenging the Western powers on a global scale, and this challenge must be met, primarily with a reinvigorated Western seapower. The NATO powers must face up to this Soviet threat with a united front if they hope to secure the blessing of continued prosperity without resort to war.

1226

Parrish, Michael. THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: BOOKS IN ENGLISH, 1950-1967. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press [1970] 128 p. (Hoover Institution bibliographical series, 48) Z6725.R9P35

A bibliography of books, documents, pamphlets, and other material on the Soviet Armed Forces published in English between 1950 and 1967. English translations of items that originally appeared in Russian are also cited. The bibliography contains 2,146 entries and is arranged by subject and indexed by author.

1227

Quester, George H. MISSILES IN CUBA, 1970. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 493-506.
D410.F6, v. 49

Explores the implications of the U.S. reaction to the alleged Soviet move to establish a submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Quester discusses possible Soviet motives for wanting to establish a submarine or submarine-tender base in the Western hemisphere and questions whether such a base would violate the U.S.-Soviet understanding reached during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He notes changes in the strategic situation since 1962 and

suggests that, American public reaction aside, a Soviet submarine base in Cuba might even be desirable as a means of reinforcing the present strategic equilibrium.

1228
Raven, Wolfram von. [MOSCOW'S SEA POWER: AN INSTRUMENT OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY OF EXPANSION] Moskaus Macht auf den Meeren: Instrument expansiver Globalstrategie. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 79-88.
H5.P75, v. 16

Reviews the development of the Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov and outlines its place in the Soviets' present overall politicomilitary strategy. The author reports the Soviet Navy now has effective parity with the Americans in total tonnage, although some qualitative deficiencies can be distinguished. Comments on the Soviet-American competition in atomic submarines and in conventional areas (aircraft carriers, amphibious operations, and merchant fleet) are followed by a sketch of the pressures exerted by the four Soviet naval commands on NATO's north and south flanks. The author concludes that Moscow's growing seapower must be seen in conjunction with its effort to reach atomic superiority over America while its continental forces retain air and land superiority in Europe.

1229
Reeves, Thomas, and Karl Hess. THE END OF THE DRAFT; A PROPOSAL FOR ABOLISHING CONSCRIPTION AND FOR A VOLUNTEER ARMY, FOR POPULAR RESISTANCE TO MILITARISM AND THE RESTORATION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. Prefaces by Mark O. Hatfield & George McGovern. New York, Random House [1970] xvi, 200 p.
UB343.R43
Includes bibliographical references.

Contends that compulsory military service is incompatible with a free society, contributing to a militaristic foreign policy and domestic repression. Reeves and Hess argue that a document on the "channeling of manpower" published by the National Office of the Selective Service System in July 1965 is indicative of the thinking of militarists who seek to control American society. The authors find a volunteer army not only essential to insure personal freedom but also more economical than a conscripted army. They see war as the inevitable outcome of the present nation-state system of government. Various proposals are advanced to increase popular control over the military and local police forces, to restrict the war-making powers of the President and executive agencies, and to revamp U.S. foreign policy.

1230
Schlott, Gerhart. [NATO--DISSOLUTION OR REFORM?] Die NATO--Auflösung oder Reform? Mit einem Beitrag des Herausgebers Hans-Joachim Winkler. Opladen, Leske Verlag, 1970. 114 p. (Analysen, 5)
JX1393.N67S35
Bibliography: p. 113-[115].

Contents.--Introduction: Does NATO still make sense?--Analysis.--Supplements and materials.--Peace research and peace pedagogy, by Hans-Joachim Winkler.

Discusses political and military changes since NATO was founded in 1949, focusing on NATO's problems and the German question. Schlott asks whether NATO has a right to exist under present conditions: Portugal and Greece are military dictatorships, the United States is involved in a "dirty war" in Indochina, France has disassociated itself, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada are reducing their forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, and NATO has failed to reunite Germany. The author suggests a gradual dissolution of the military blocs in East and West in favor of an overlapping collective security system in Europe, through which the two superpowers could vouch for security. Other possible developments for NATO are a European alliance headed by France and Great Britain under reduced American influence and protection, or an altered status quo brought about by arms control agreements like the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. However all these reforms can be effective only if the German question is solved. In the concluding chapter, Hans-Joachim Winkler explains that peace research can make valuable contributions to adapt individual and collective thinking and behavior to the changed technical and political conditions. He concludes that the arms race will soon be replaced by a competition to study and achieve peace. Until then, it is NATO's task to secure détente and cooperation while working toward self-destruction.

1231
Sherman, Edward F. ARMY BLUES: BUREAUCRACY ADRIFT. Nation, v. 212, Mar. 1, 1971: 265-275. illus.
AP2.N2, v. 212

The U.S. military is in a state of crisis as a result of adverse publicity about military graft, a breakdown of troop morale, and war crimes. Although the Vietnam War has aggravated the military's problems, the root causes of the present crisis are much deeper. Increased AWOL and desertion rates, racial unrest, GI and veterans anti-war movements, widespread use of drugs among younger servicemen and alcohol among older ones, and the condoning of numerous and systematic violations of the laws of war support this contention. The arbitrariness of the My Lai courts-martial, the surveillance of civilians by military intelligence organizations, and the use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam have further tarnished the public's image of the military. Recent efforts by the military to institute reforms have been encouraging but have thus far had only limited effect. The most pressing needs are reforms in discipline and training principles and practices, which should be made more consistent with the prevailing social and democratic ethic by abolishing the requirement for blind obedience to authority and the inculcation of a "kill" mentality; in the military caste system, which should be replaced by a system in which distinctions of rank are based solely on jobs; in services available to enlisted men; and in the system of military justice.

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1232
THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST: HER CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS; a report of a seminar sponsored jointly by Southampton University and the Royal United Service Institution and held at Milford-on-Sea between Monday 23rd March and Wednesday 25th March, 1970. London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970. 108 p. illus.
UA770.S68 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by S. W. B. Menaul.--The role of the military in Soviet politics, by D. Holloway.--The Army, the party and the people, by J. Erickson.--The Soviet concept of the land battle, by J. Erickson.--Soviet naval capabilities and intentions, by Michael McGwire.--Political applications of limited naval force, by James Cable.--Soviet concepts of air-power, by D. M. Clause.--The economic background to Soviet defense capabilities, by Philip Hanson.--New ideas in Soviet defense decision-making, by D. Holloway.--Soviet naval procurement, by Michael McGwire.--The military aircraft procurement process in the USSR, by John Simpson.--Soviet army procurement, by F. E. C. Gregory.--The Soviet attitude to arms control and disarmament, by P. H. Vigor.--The problems of liberalization in the Soviet Union, by David W. Benn.--Conclusion, by E. J. Feuchtwanger.

Papers presented to a seminar on Soviet military policy, which focused on the implications of Soviet military capabilities and intentions for the security of Europe and the Near East, excluding from consideration the Sino-Soviet dispute and related matters. A major concern of the participants was to measure the extent of military influence on Soviet foreign policymaking and to determine in what direction this influence is usually exerted. From his analysis of Soviet arms control policy, Vigor concludes that although the Soviet Union is entering the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in a constructive spirit, the verification question, about which the Soviet Union is particularly sensitive, is certain to make meaningful agreement difficult.

1233
Srivastava, R. K. CHINA'S NUCLEAR THREAT AND INDIA'S DEFENCE IN THE 70S: FIVE SCENARIOS. China report, v. 6, Nov./Dec. 1970: 21-29.
DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

Five courses of defense strategy seem available to India in the face of China's threat. It could adopt a subservient policy, retaining a nonalined position somewhere between small and middle power status. India could seek the aid of the major powers in attempting to build up defensive forces while still claiming nonalined status. A third strategy would be to actively seek an alliance with the United States or Russia, although it is doubtful that either superpower is eager to assume such a relationship. India might assume an independent stance, developing nuclear capability and expanding its leadership role in Asia. The fifth action, an extension of the fourth, would be for India to develop a nuclear defense capability, assert its power in the Indian Ocean area, and achieve membership in the Great Power club.

1234
Subrahmanyam, K. THE PROBLEM OF INDIA'S SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES. United Asia, v. 22, Sept./Oct. 1970: 246-256. DS1.U55, v. 22

During the next decade India's defense policies and programs will be determined largely by the conventional and nuclear threats emanating from Communist China, by Pakistan's military and foreign policies, and by the future policies of those powers involved in maintaining the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The degree of the Chinese conventional threat will depend upon Peking's relations with Moscow and Washington. Improved relations with either power would set China free to step up its pressure on the Indian border. The Chinese nuclear threat may develop in the long run, and it may be necessary for India to develop a nuclear capability. Unfortunately little has been done to understand the ramifications of this threat and of nuclear acquisition, and it appears that practical long-term study is needed. In Southeast Asia a direct Chinese military threat in the next decade is improbable. The nature and extent of any political threat will depend upon China's internal situation and its military capability vis-a-vis the other powers in the area, especially the superpowers and Japan.

1235
Šveics, V. V. SMALL NATION SURVIVAL; POLITICAL DEFENSE IN UNEQUAL CONFLICTS. New York, Exposition Press [c1970] 271 p. (An Exposition-University Book)
UA11.S95
Bibliography: p. [267]-271.

Argues that small states can successfully defend themselves against the overwhelming military might of the superpowers by employing political rather than military weapons. To illustrate his argument, Šveics cites the Russo-Finnish conflict, the failures of the Soviet Union to control Yugoslavia and Rumania, the defeats of France in Indochina and Algeria, and the present difficulties of the United States in Vietnam. In each instance political power has proved more potent than military force.

1236
Tammen, Ronald L. WOLF AT THE PENTAGON DOOR. New republic, v. 164, Mar. 20, 1971: 13-14.
AP2.N624, v. 164

During the 1950's and most of the next decade, the Pentagon wrung the money it wanted out of the Executive and the Congress by exaggerating the foreign threat. While this exaggeration was not always deliberate, interservice rivalry often resulted in specific threat evaluations tailored to fit a desired level of funding. With the advent of Soviet strategic parity the Pentagon faced a credibility gap. Stories of impending aggressive Soviet moves, such as the SS-9 or the Cuban submarine-base rumor, are timed to appear just prior to the military authorization votes. Now Senator Jackson has warned of a follow-on to the SS-9, though intelligence analysts have reached no firm conclusions. If meaningful agreements are reached

in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Congress and the Pentagon must take care that internal competition does not replace the foreign threat as the cause of inflated defense spending. The Pentagon must clarify how the foreign threat is computed, and it must not hesitate to make the hard allocative decisions between the three services. "It is not hard to forecast a real showdown between the Navy and the Air Force over the spoils of strategic systems."

1237
Turner, Russell A., and Hamid Mowlana. FACTORS IN MILITARY DECISION-MAKING. Air University review, v. 22, Mar./Apr. 1971: 24-33.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

Military decisionmakers should learn as much as possible about an opponent's cultural norms before deciding on policies based on unsubstantiated assumptions. For example, American deterrent policy has been based on threat--assuring the Russians of dire consequences if they start nuclear trouble. Yet little is known about Russian (or American) responses to threat. Similarly, successful interpretation of any communication with the enemy requires much knowledge and awareness of his cultural standards. Negotiations with North Vietnam are difficult because each side has a different interpretation of the nature of war. The United States is fighting a technological engagement whose progress is measured in statistics. The North Vietnamese are fighting a total war of strategy and deception. When one opponent "attacks the enemy's body" while the other practices "the black art of attacking the enemy's mind," communication between the two becomes nearly impossible.

1238
Uhlig, Frank. THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE FACING THE NAVY. Naval War College review, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 21-24. N&CPR

Changes in the strength and weaponry of the Navy, along with changes in the public attitude toward power and foreign policy, require a rethinking of the present meaning of the Navy for the people of the United States. Functions the Navy is now qualified to perform should be identified, and the strategic studies necessary to determine what it should be able to do in the future should be undertaken. These studies may contribute to obviating the nuclear dilemma. The validity of individual aspects of the overall Navy mission in relation to the other Armed Forces should be examined in detail. Whether the reshaping of the Navy and its future direction will be assumed by the officers who serve in it will depend upon the quality of their thinking. For these men this is "the biggest challenge of the immediate future and the greatest opportunity."

1239
Ulbricht, Walter. [THE MILITARY POLICY OF SOCIALISM] Sozialistische Militärpolitik. Einheit, v. 25, no. 11, 1970: 1379-1389.
HX6.E4, v. 25
Speech given at reception of 1970 military academy graduates.

The military strength revealed by the Warsaw Pact exercise "Waffenbruderschaft" should impel West Germany to accept existing boundaries and peaceful coexistence. By such acts as negotiating the renunciation-of-force agreement West Germany has, in fact, made possible its participation in the proposed European security conference. However, as long as influential West German interests cling to the diplomatic status quo and Bundeswehr generals who were once Hitler's officers laud the examples of Israel and the Americans in Vietnam, East Germany must maintain its military guard. Strengthening his own understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology and that of his troops should be the first concern of the East German officer.

1240
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. CAMBODIA: DECEMBER 1970; A STAFF REPORT. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 9 p.
DS557.A64C3
At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

An unclassified report on developments in Cambodia between May and December 1970, prepared by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The authors review the military and economic situation in Cambodia and the nature and extent of U.S. and South Vietnamese support for the Lon Nol government. They conclude that a de facto program of U.S. military assistance to Cambodia is already underway, so that the question before the committee is whether or not to continue or expand it. They report that Cambodian officials generally assume that the United States will provide the military and economic assistance without which the Lon Nol government would almost certainly be overthrown by the Communists and pro-Sihanouk forces.

1241
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs. STRATEGIC AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ABM SYSTEMS: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE; MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV). Hearings. Part III. Ninety-first Congress, first session. May 16 and July 16, 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. UG632.U5495 pt. 3

Testimony on the vulnerability of U.S. and Soviet submarine forces to various kinds of attack, and on two proposed Senate resolutions that would call on the President to suspend, or seek agreement with the Soviet Union to suspend, testing of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). Implications for U.S. plans to deploy an ABM system are explored, along with other related matters--the technology of submarine and antisubmarine warfare, including the proposed Underwater Long-Range Missile System and various detection and communication systems; U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy; the arms race; the technology and strategic uses of MIRV; ABM technology and effectiveness; and, in light of the above, the desirability and possibility of arms limitations.

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1242
U.S. 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970. Senate. THE SENATE'S WAR POWERS; DEBATE ON CAMBODIA FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Edited by Eugene P. Dvorin. Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. [1971] 244 p. illus. (Markham political science series)
JX1573.U5

Extracts from the May 13 to June 30, 1970, debate on the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act and on the war powers of the executive and Congress. Dvorin finds the Cooper-Church amendment significant primarily because it revealed the determination of Congress to play a more active role in national security and foreign policy decisionmaking.

1243
Weckmann, Kurt. [DEFENSE POLICY OF THE SMALL POWERS] Verteidigungspolitik der kleinen Mächte. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Nov. 1970: 353-355.
U3.W396, v. 19

Surveys speeches presented on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the Belgian military academy. The main concept advanced was that since only the superpowers possess nuclear potential, small powers must either ally themselves with one of the superpowers or isolate themselves in neutrality in the hope of avoiding conflict. The latter hope has often proved vain, and neutrality requires a credible defense on all fronts, even from guerrilla warfare at home. Belonging to a military alliance also presents problems, such as apportioning expenditures, putting shared interests above national ones, and controlling nuclear weapons. The dilemma some countries face because of their responsibilities outside NATO tends to endanger the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Small countries are often tempted to rely upon their allies to the neglect of their own defense efforts; this also weakens an alliance. To strengthen Europe, Belgium's defense policy must be clearly interwoven with that of the European Community. Europe's future security depends on an integrated Europe (with Great Britain as a full member of the community). NATO's deterrence of Soviet expansionism remains important within the European defense effort. In order to convince the United States not to withdraw its troops, Europe should demonstrate greater willingness to help carry the financial burden.

1244
Yiu, Myung-kun. THE PROSPECT OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT. Current history, v. 60, Apr. 1971: 231-236, 245. D410.C82, v. 60

Predicts that Japan will revise Article 9 of its "Peace Constitution" and rearm during the 1970's. The author notes the increasing support for rearmament reflected in public opinion polls, the growing rivalry with China and the Soviet Union, and the anticipated withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia, and argues that Japan will be compelled to rearm to defend its legitimate interests in Asia.

1245
Yochelson, John N. [THE U.S. DEBATE ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE AND ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE] Le débat aux États-Unis sur la présence et l'engagement militaire en Europe. Politique étrangère, v. 36, no. 1, 1971: 5-23.
JX3.P6, v. 36

The author restricts his analysis to the debate within the United States on the importance and duration of the American military presence in Europe. He stresses that the problems raised in this connection interest only an elite, a minority of specialists. It is impossible to predict whether, in a different context, these problems would be able to excite public opinion. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1246
Zorn, Hans. [THE "1970 WHITE PAPER ON THE SECURITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE STATE OF THE MILITARY." CRITICAL THOUGHTS] Das "Weissbuch 1970 zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr." Kritische Gedanken. Neue Politik, v. 15, Dec. 19, 1970: 5-7.
H5N377, v. 15

History proves that the West German Department of Defense has misjudged "threats" in the past, for example, Stalin's policy, the Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, and the alleged Communist aggression in South Korea. The present White Paper sees new threats from potential adversaries against Western Europe. These allegations contradict Bonn's Ostpolitik, endangering rapprochement and cooperation. The East can just as easily regard NATO as a threat, and likewise, the Warsaw Pact can claim as much of the credit as NATO for maintaining peace, although the fact that war has has not broken out in Europe does not prove that military pacts or the arms race are requisites of peace. Without the pressure of military alliances the European people would probably have been more free and independent in safeguarding peace, and Germany would have remained united. The authors of the 1971 White Paper should be able to understand the consequences of Bonn's Ostpolitik, since of late the Federal Government, by recognizing present realities, has brought West Germany more security and respect than previous administrations were able to do during the past two decades.

## CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1247
BIRTH DEFECTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES. Medical world news, v. 12, Jan. 22, 1971: 47-51, 54-55, 57. R11.M864, v. 12

An advance report on a symposium sponsored by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine and the National Foundation-March of Dimes to discuss environmental causes of birth defects. The discussions will focus on recent work in mutagens, teratogens, and prenatal monitoring of environmental agents.

This work has produced important new data on the effects on the fetus of various chemical agents in the environment. Evidence will be offered to show that purified forms of the well-known herbicide 2, 4,5-triclorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), which has been used in Vietnam, is fetocidal and teratogenic in several animal strains. Earlier, defenders of the herbicide had suggested that its effects resulted from its contaminants, such as dioxin.

1248
Candlin, A. H. S. NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 116, Mar. 1971: 45-47, 49. illus. U1.R8, v. 116

Indicative of the ever-present threat of war between Russia and China are large collections of troops and military equipment on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese have been making the warlike preparations of arming their merchant ships and attempting to disperse industrial centers. A nuclear exchange between these two "estranged powers" would have serious consequences for much of the rest of the world. Fallout from Soviet and Chinese bombs could be expected over the United States and Canada. While the Chinese are pushing ahead the construction of complex and well equipped bomb shelters, the United States seems unimpressed by civil defense needs and is unlikely to become equally prepared.

1249
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE MILITARY BURDEN IN THE SOVIET UNION. A compendium of papers, submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 295 p. illus.
HC336.23.E25

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Joint Committee Print.
Bibliography: p. 161-165.

Partial contents.--Recent trends in the Soviet economy, by Terence E. Byrne.--General growth performance of the Soviet economy, by Stanley H. Cohn.--Developments in Soviet industry, by Robert A. Dockstader.--The state budget for 1970, by Rodney E. Steele.--Structure and organization of defense-related industries, by Andrew Sheren.--Soviet defense-associated activities outside the Ministry of Defense, by J. T. Reitz.--The economic burden of Soviet defense outlays, by Stanley H. Cohn.--The technological base of Soviet military power, by Michael Boretsky.--Industrial location policy in the U.S.S.R. during the postwar period, by I. S. Koropeckyj.

Papers on the economic performance of the Soviet Union as compared to other industrial nations, with special attention to the economic aspects of national security programs. These studies detail agricultural failures and a pronounced industrial slowdown during the Soviet Union's eighth 5-year plan. The crux of the matter is that although the output of the productive sector can be increased only through large infusions of capital investment, the defense establishment (to call it a military-industrial complex would be gross understatement) siphons off an ever-larger share of the national product, and this in a period when defense spending in the United States is declining as a percentage of national product. Some relief might be had through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or through a relaxation of tensions in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere, but these the Soviet leadership cannot count upon. The Soviet Union is now in the process of formulating its next (ninth) 5-year plan, and critical decisions with respect to the allocation of resources to the military and civil sectors are just ahead.

1250
Einaudi, Luigi R. THE MILITARY AND PROGRESS IN THE THIRD WORLD. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Jan. 1971: 33, 45. JX1.A53, v. 48

Questions whether or not the military services in the less industrialized countries are capable of effecting socioeconomic progress. Einaudi thinks the consequences of military participation in government are determined by the civil-military coalition in power. "It is to the identification of that coalition and its characteristics, rather than to consideration of 'military' or 'civilian' dominance in themselves, that political-military reporting and analysis should be directed."

1251
Falk, Richard A. THE AMERICAN POWS: PAWNS IN POWER POLITICS. Progressive, v. 35, Mar. 1971: 13-21. illus. AP2.P8655, v. 35

Contends that the prisoner-of-war (POW) issue is "being used to divert attention from the Administration's failure to negotiate an end to the war; that the Government's own Vietnam strategy is prolonging the prisoners' period of captivity, perhaps into the indefinite future; and that official professions of concern for the welfare of the POWs are totally at odds with the treatment being accorded North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) prisoners, and even with the neglect of America's war wounded in veterans' hospitals here at home." Falk distinguishes three basic levels of the POW problem. First, North Vietnam may well be justified in regarding downed American pilots as war criminals, whether or not it ever intended to prosecute them as such. Second, the available evidence indicates that North Vietnam has treated American POW's relatively well, notwithstanding the concerted effort of the Government and private groups to persuade the American public of their mistreatment. Third, the Nixon administration is using the POW's as hostages to justify its pursuit of military victory by attempting to separate the issue of the POW's from settlement of the war. The Son Tay raid appears to have been purely a gesture to demonstrate the administration's ostensible concern for the POW's, when in fact it subjected them to serious risks. The cynicism of the administration is apparent not only in the revelations of mistreatment and torture of enemy POW's, but even more so in President

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Nixon's veto of increased funds for Veteran's Administration hospitals and the failure to provide adequately for American wounded who are not politically useful to the President's war aims.

1252
Falk, Richard A. WHAT WE SHOULD LEARN FROM VIETNAM. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 98-114. N&CPR

Argues that none of the interpretations of the Vietnam War being discussed by officials in Washington grasps the real significance of the struggle, and consequently none can teach policymakers the lessons about Asian politics they so desperately need to learn or serve as the basis for a new and enlightened U.S. foreign policy. Falk distinguishes three official views on the war, that it is "a qualified success," "a failure of proportion," or "a qualified failure of tactics." The problem with all three is that they continue to assume the legitimacy of two U.S. objectives--to contain alleged Chinese expansionism, and to defend non-Communist regimes against overthrow by revolutionary violence. A rejection of these two goals, which are untenable on both political and moral grounds, will lead to a more accurate perception of the real meaning of the war and provide the foundation for a new U.S. foreign policy with the immediate aims of reducing the U.S. presence in Asia, putting an end to U.S. military involvement and counterrevolutionary activity, and promoting accommodation with China.

1253
Flint, Roy K. ARMY PROFESSIONALISM FOR THE FUTURE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Apr. 1971: 3-11. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Examines some aspects of civil-military relationships at the Department of Defense level and some problems of the military professional in his dealings with subordinates as these issues present themselves in a time of unrest, rapid and often puzzling social transformations, and changing evaluations of military needs. Flint warns military men against the temptation to adopt a "stab-in-the-back" attitude toward public opposition to the Vietnam War or more general criticisms of U.S. military policy and argues that in historical perspective current trends toward a smaller, more professional military establishment mark a return to normality. He recommends that military men take a closer look at their organizational attitudes, their perceptions of foreign threat, and current military strategy, and he offers some suggestions for dealing with the new breed of young American produced by recent changes in American culture.

1254
Gutteridge, William. WHY DOES AN AFRICAN ARMY TAKE POWER? Africa report, v. 15, Oct. 1970: 18-21. illus. DT1.A217, v. 15

Attempts to distinguish the common characteristics of military intervention in politics in the African states during the past decade. Gutteridge sees the behavior of African armed forces as significantly determined by their colonial origins. The motivation for intervention originates with the elite, but its success depends on popular support stemming from generalized grievances. A possible clue to understanding the political role of the Afican armies may be the overseas training and subsequent political orientation of the officer corps. As long as the prevailing climate favors military opportunism, intervention can be expected, although the armed forces are unsuited for the rapid restructuring of a socioeconomic order.

1255
Halsted, Thomas A. LOBBYING AGAINST THE ABM, 1967-1970. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 23-28. TK9145.A84, v. 27
Article based on a paper presented to the American Political Science Association meeting, Los Angeles, Sept. 1970.

Investigates "some of the more significant lobbying efforts by the few professionals and the army of effective amateurs that worked to arouse the Congress and the public against the Administration's plans to deploy the ABM." Halsted divides the ABM debates into three phases: that of increasing congressional concern, beginning with the September 1970 announcement that ABM's would be deployed against a limited Chinese nuclear attack; the widespread lobbying effort stimulated by the appearance of survey teams at prospective Sentinel missile sites; and the return to public apathy after the defeat of the Hart-Cooper amendment in 1970. He contends that Congressmen are denied adequate time to prepare and analyze defense-related budget appropriations and that the time per dollar permitted for evaluation of the ABM program was outrageously insufficient. The author concludes that the ABM debates have produced some positive changes. As a result of the debates, the public has become involved in national security matters, and the days of congressional rubber-stamping of Pentagon requests may be over.

1256
Herman, Edward S. ATROCITIES IN VIETNAM: MYTHS AND REALITIES. Philadelphia, Pilgrim Press [1970] 104 p. illus. DS557.A67H45
Includes bibliographical references.

Defines atrocities and discusses their relationship to the concept of war crimes. Herman presents documented evidence to support his contention that American atrocities outnumber those committed by the Communists. He maintains that the hypothesis of a postwar bloodbath in case of a National Liberation Front victory ignores the at least equal likelihood of a massacre carried out by the Saigon government and the history of reprisals conducted by the Diem regime during the late 1950's and early 1960's. An analysis and a refutation of six principal myths that dominate discussions on atrocities are explored.

1257
Hersh, Seymour M. MY LAI 4; A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH. New York, Random House [1970] 210 p. DS557.A67H47

An account of the My Lai massacre based primarily on interviews with participants. Hersh relates the events preceding the massacre, the details of the massacre itself, and the efforts to bring the massacre to public attention.

1258
THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE WAR SYSTEM. Intercom, v. 13, Jan./Feb. 1971: 20-72. Z7164.I8I48, v. 13

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction, by Betty Reardon.--The Nuremberg tradition, by Richard A. Falk.--The Nuremberg trials: considerations and suggestions, by Gerald L. Thorpe.--Mylai: some American high school students' views, by Robert Low.--Teaching about dissent and the draft, by Jack R. Fraenkel.--The battle of Algiers: a war of liberation, by Margaret Carter.--Twenty-five years from Hiroshima, by Jonathan Weil.--Michael Scott: an individual and the international system, by Betty Reardon.

Articles on the citizen's rights and responsibilities in time of war and on the impact of war on individuals, selected with the aim of assisting teachers and adult study groups to deal with the issues raised by the My Lai case. Each article is followed by suggestions from the editor for further reading and study. Falk argues that war crimes issues cannot "be separated from the larger issues of world order and the unrestricted behavior of nation states." Thorpe offers teaching strategies for dealing with the moral questions raised by the My Lai trials; Low describes his own experience with these issues in the classroom; and Fraenkel argues for their inclusion in every high school social studies curriculum. Carter and Weil examine these questions as posed in the film Battle of Algiers and by the Shimoda case, and Reardon concludes with a case study of the activities of one man who has taken an active international role in this area of concern.

1259
Jacobs, Paul. "PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN BY THOSE WHO KNOW": AN INQUIRY INTO THE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AEC. Atlantic monthly, v. 227, Feb. 1971: 45-56. illus. AP2.A8, v. 227

Charges that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has suppressed information that indicates that nuclear weapons tests during the 1950's caused disease and deaths not acknowledged by the AEC and that the rapid increase in the number of nuclear power plants poses a serious threat to public health. Jacobs finds an abnormally high rate of leukemia and other diseases that may have been induced by radiation among the test pilots and residents of towns adjacent to the testing sites. The AEC has not only discouraged the publication of reports critical of its safety procedures, but also has dismissed its critics as cranks. The author urges that the AEC be deprived of its dual role as proprietor and regulator of nuclear energy so that the risks and benefits of nuclear power can be opened to thorough public debate.

1260
Kirchmann, R., and E. Cantillon. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED $^{90}Sr$ AND $^{137}Cs$ LEVELS IN MILK. Nature (London) v. 230, Apr. 30, 1971: 595. Q1.N2, v. 230

Reports the results of a Belgian test of several formulas for predicting the radioactive contamination of milk from the known rate of fallout and deposit on soil. The results arrived at using formulas suggested by Euratom, the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and two independent investigators in the United Kingdom were compared with data collected in Belgium during 1964-69 on the contamination of milk with Cesium-137 and Strontium-90. The Euratom and U.K. formulas produced figures in good agreement with the data for Strontium-90; for Cesium-137, however, the figures were too high or too low in every case. From the evidence it appears that variations in the climatic and soil conditions, which influence the yield and level of contamination of the pasturage, complicate the problem of correlating contamination levels with fallout rates.

1261
Koburger, Charles W. THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Jan. 1971: 9, 49. JX.A53, v. 48

Those societies in which the military have assumed control share the characteristic of experiencing the stresses innate in the transition to the 20th century. In this situation the armed forces are uniquely qualified to symbolize the nation, infuse a feeling of nationhood, and ward off external threats, real or imaginary, to national existence. The specific features of the training and organization of the armed forces guarantee initial successes, but in the long run military power is limited by its lack of political skill and inability to motivate mass support. However even when it avoids political action the military is probably the most important single modernizing force in the developing countries.

1262
Langner, Herman P. THE MAKING OF A MURDERER. American journal of psychiatry, v. 127, Jan. 1971: 950-953. RC321.A52, v. 127

The author believes that inadequately expressed anger and aggression are largely responsible for atrocities committed by our soldiers in Viet Nam. He describes the case of a young man in late adolescence who attempted suicide after being involved in an incident like the My Lai massacre. The author concludes that immaturity, basic personality problems, and the frustrating circumstances of combat in Viet Nam all contribute to

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willful killing and the subsequent reactions to it. (Abstract supplied)

1263
Leventhal, J. S., and Willard F. Libby. TRITIUM FALLOUT IN THE PACIFIC UNITED STATES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Dec. 20, 1970: 7628-7633. QC811.J6, v. 75

Tritium has been measured since the 1961-1962 nuclear tests to determine fallout patterns. Crater Lake tritium data are used for a model of mixing and fallout. Ocean-atmosphere-continent effects of stratosphere fallout and dilution by ocean water show continental and latitudinal variation. (Abstract supplied)

1264
Lieberson, Stanley. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL LINKAGES. American journal of sociology, v. 76, Jan. 1971: 562-584. HM1.A7, v. 76
"References": p. 583-584.

Military-industrial relations are examined from both the elitist and pluralist perspectives on power. Neither theory readily accounts for all of the empirical data. On the one hand, elitist theory explains the relatively high level of military spending after World War II as well as the deep dependence on military expenditures among some large corporations. However, both the regression and input-output analyses indicate that the economy does not require extensive military outlays. Indeed, there is some evidence that most corporations would be more prosperous if the government shifted to nonmilitary expenditures. These discrepancies suggest that a third interpretation may be in order. Based on the assumption that a growing division of labor leads to increasingly specialized needs and vested interests, the hypothesis of compensating strategies is presented. Under this notion, political decisions that run counter to the interests of the majority will occur even if the government is not dominated by a small number of elite interest groups. Rather, such a pattern may result from a process in which the diverse interest groups seek to maximize their net gains. This alternative perspective is illustrated by the composition of Senate committees. (Abstract supplied)

1265
Melman, Seymour. AFTER THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 7-9. TK9145.A84, v. 27
Adapted from the author's "remarks to a 1969 conference at Yale University."

After President Eisenhower warned the American people of the dangers of a burgeoning military-industrial complex, the Kennedy administration brought into being a new institution that, in contrast to the complex, has an executive committee, makes production decisions, plans, and operates a centralized network of controls over subsidiary enterprises. The growth and the health of this "state management"--composed of such units as the Defense Supply Agency and Defense Contract Administration Services--rests upon the growth of military budgets, organizations, operations, and production. Its rise can be traced back to such crucial military decisions formulated by the Kennedy administration as the limited-war doctrine, in which an elaborate schedule of prospective locations for military operations like Vietnam were laid out. Today the output this organization controls surpasses the combined industrial activity of General Electric, General Motors, U.S. Steel, and DuPont. In order to undo these crucial decisions, which go far in explaining America's present plight, Americans must begin to realize that their country's wealth is not infinite and that they cannot have unlimited amounts of guns and butter. They must understand technology as a man-made instrument subject to man's requirements.

1266
Nordlinger, Eric A. SOLDIERS IN MUFTI: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY RULE UPON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE NON-WESTERN STATES. American political science review, v. 64, Dec. 1970: 1131-1148. JA1.A6, v. 64

Examines the motivation of the military-officer class after its assumption of political power, from the point of view of current trends in comparative-politics methodology. Nordlinger reviews the literature to demonstrate that the prevailing notion of the military in politics as agents of social change is unsupported by evidence or not specifically related to the period after acquiring political power. He describes the officer-politician as unalterably conservative because of his identification with corporate interests in combination with the military values that stress stability and the middle-class way of life. The relatively larger military expenditure by countries with a politicized officer corps demonstrates the military's pursuit of its own corporate interest. A correlation of the cross-national data generated by Adelman and Morris on the political strength of the military in 74 non-Western, non-Communist countries with seven factors commonly accepted as indicators of economic and social change proves the conservative military orientation toward economic and social change. Nordlinger concludes that as "members of the middle class by birth and/or achievement, soldiers in mufti act in accordance with their class' interests and identify with its civilian members."

1267
Noyce, J. R., and others. TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIOACTIVITY AND $^{89}SR/^{90}SR$ RATIOS DURING RAINSTORMS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Jan. 20, 1971: 646-656. QC811.J6, v. 76

Radionuclide concentrations for $^{89}Sr$, $^{90}Sr$, $^{144}Ce$, and $^{137}Cs$ were sequentially sampled from two rainstorms to study fallout behavior as a function of rainfall rate and type of storm approximately 7 months after the eighth Chinese nuclear explosion of December 27, 1968. Great time variability in the $^{89}Sr/^{90}Sr$ ratio was found in

conjunction with a well-developed storm on July 21, but a nearly steady ratio was observed in a stratified stable-type storm on August 14. Tapping of stratospheric air appeared to be the cause of the ratio changes. For both storms, a strong trend was found for concentrations of radioisotopes to decrease with increase in rainfall rate. Detailed discussions on meteorological factors, including a dilution effect, are given to interpret the experimental data. (Abstract supplied)

1268

Ollendorff, Robert H., and Paul L. Adams. PSYCHIATRY AND THE DRAFT. American journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 41, Jan. 1971: 85-90.
RA790.A1A5, v. 41

The military draft in the United States has influenced the middle class deeply in recent years. Old and young exhibit a draft-centered disaffection with established values, and the young are further corroded by draft-related psychopathology. This predicament of the middle class is shared by the psychiatrist, whose counseling and diagnoses can be contradicted artitrarily by the needs of an implacable system. (Abstract supplied)

1269

Perkins, Dexter. DISSENT IN TIME OF WAR. Virginia quarterly review, v. 47, spring 1971: 161-174.
AP2.V76, v. 47

Compares 10 past American wars in terms of the public dissent associated with each. Three of the wars--Jefferson's war with the Barbary Pirates, the Spanish-American War, and World War II--were essentially unopposed. Others, including the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and World War I, aroused protest. In seeking common characteristics of dissent Perkins identifies a tendency toward pacifism, marked partisanship in politics, and the lack of serious threat to the U.S. homeland as elements that accompany dissent. In further analysis he is unable to show that opposition had any serious effect on the outcome of any war. Nor has dissent "jeopardized the security of the republic, or distorted in a damaging way the foreign policy of the nation." Those who would suppress wartime opposition cannot justify their actions by an appeal to American history but must themselves "bear the burden of proof in whatever measures they propose."

1270

Regling, Horst. [MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT--WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONDITIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SINCE 1955] Militärausgaben und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung; dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1955. Hamburg, Verlag Weltarchiv, 1970. 265 p. illus. (Veröffentlichungen des HWWA-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg)
HD9743.G48R44
Bibliography: p. 193-208.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Level and composition of military expenditures and their influence on the economic structure: Amount and development of military expenditures of different countries. The relation between military expenditures and important economic indicators. Effects of military expenditures on the economic structure. The situation of the Federal Republic of Germany. --pt. 2. The influence of military expenditures on the decisive factors of economic development: Points of departure of the growth theory for the evaluation of military expenditures. The influence of military expenditures on capital. The influence of military expenses on technical progress. Comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the growth rate of military expenditures.--Final remarks.--Appendix.

Examines the influence of military expenditures on a competitive "defense economy" integrated in a "peace economy," using statistical data drawn mainly from the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The author evaluates the effects of military expenses on a growing economy in general and in the Federal Republic of Germany specifically, beginning with a theoretical point of departure followed by empirical evidence. Regling concludes that the economic productivity of military expenditures is underrated; he demonstrates that in many ways military expenditures influence German economic development and technical progress positively. He stresses that this purely economic study contains no political justification for a war economy. Disarmament efforts deserve priority even if they slowed economic growth, an unproven assumption. The author recommends that politicians use the information gained in this study to effect militarily and economically sound conversion to a peacetime economy.

1271

Ritchie-Calder, Peter Ritchie, Baron Ritchie-Calder. SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF MANKIND--AND KEEP IT THAT WAY. Advancement of science, v. 27, Dec. 1970: 105-111. Q41.B812, v. 27

It is not at all surprising that young people are disenchanted with the material achievements of science, which were long oversold in any case and which in too many instances have become ends rather than means. The crux of the matter is that as a result of developments during and shortly after World War II in nuclear energy, in electronics, and in aeronautics, scientific applications have outpaced social controls. The current revolutions in biology and computer technology promise to bring not solutions but new difficulties. It almost seems as though man cannot have the good of science without the bad. The problems are not insoluble, however. Foresight and an interdisciplinary approach are required, and this is where the British Association for the Advancement of Science comes in. Its present duty is clear: "to stimulate the oncoming generation with a new sense of wonder and a new vision in which science will be applied for the benefit of mankind and in which science, in its interdisciplinary sense, will redress the damage to the environment and to the living space within which mankind has to survive."

1272

Rose, Hilary. PANGLOSS AND JEREMIAH IN SCIENCE. Nature (London) v. 229, Feb. 12, 1971: 459-462.
Q1.N2, v. 229

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Disputes over the real value of science are endemic to modern society. The opposing attitudes can best be represented by ideal types--on one side, the Jeremiahs, prophets of doom, on the other, the associates of Dr. Pangloss, optimists all. Not surprisingly, scientists are the most prone to come to the defense of science, but an interesting feature of the current critical literature is the indications it contains that scientists too are beginning to have some doubts. Before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists could still expect basic science to cure all ills. Now many scientists, including some of the most creative, are turning away from basic research to become involved in the struggle for human survival. Everywhere societies to promote the social responsibility of science are springing up within the scientific community. Appeals to the "neutrality" of science or to its "cultural autonomy" are no longer acceptable modes of defense. Science is not so much morally neutral as morally meaningless, and these efforts might best be viewed as attempts to give it a moral meaning and to place it firmly in a social context. Fortunately modern-day Luddism is a passing phase. Today "there is something like a new science developing which attempts to preserve the creative delight of science yet couple it to ends which can less easily be distorted."

1273
Schemmer, Benjamin F., James J. Greeves, and Bernadine M. Kopec. WHAT DID THE ASSAULT ON THE 'MIC' REALLY COST? Armed Forces Journal, v. 108, Mar. 1, 1971: 24-27, 43-44. illus.
U1.A66, v. 108

Maintains that the assault on the military-industrial complex (or "military community") by the press and by an antimilitary bloc in Congress has seriously undermined the economic strength of the defense industry. The authors seek to demonstrate by means of charts and graphs compiled from Forbes magazine and other economic journals that the number of defense industries among U.S. firms with the highest profits and earnings growth rates has sharply declined, that their percentage of profit of total capital investment has been consistently less than that of nondefense industries, and that the market value of defense industry stocks has decreased during the same period that nondefense stocks have increased. Defense industries have responded to these trends by greater diversification, which threatens to dissipate technical skills and eliminate meaningful competition on major defense contracts. The myth of war profiteering must be combated if America is to remain "the arsenal of democracy."

1274
Stanford Biology Study Group. THE DESTRUCTION OF INDOCHINA. Humanist, v. 31, Jan./Feb. 1971: 14-17.
B821.A1H8, v. 31

Surveys the long-term ecological effects of U.S. war policies in Indochina. The authors describe the nature and extent of damage caused by various defoliants and herbicides, question the legality and morality of starvation as a weapon of war, examine the possibility that certain chemicals now in use in Indochina may cause birth defects, and note the consequences of widespread B-52 bombing. They predict that the peoples of Indochina will suffer the effects of U.S. war policies long after the war is ended, and they urge the immediate and permanent cessation of warfare as the most effective aid the United States can now give.

1275
Tyrrell, C. Merton. PENTAGON PARTNERS, THE NEW NOBILITY. New York, Grossman Publishers, 1970. xvi, 233 p. illus.
UA23.T96 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by A. E. Fitzgerald.--Introduction.--Air Force management of the Minuteman program and the Mark II avionics.--The Sheridan tank, the Cheyenne helicopter, the manned orbiting laboratory and several mini-cases.--Pentagon partners, the new nobility.--The changing role of the military.--Effects of the new nobility: cost, growth, inflation, and inefficiency.--The role of Congress and Senate debate on the C-5A.--Senate debate on the military authorization bill subsequent to the C-5A amendment.--House of Representatives debate on the military authorization bill for fiscal year 1970.--Conclusion.--Index.

Contends that "the Department of Defense and its industrial partners, operating outside of constraints and public scrutiny that one would normally expect to see in any publicly funded endeavor, have adapted themselves to mirror each other in a hierarchical structure not unlike a medieval kingdom with its dukes, barons, knights, and other compartmentalized segments of society." The new nobility reflects the breakdown of the traditional adversary relationship between contracting parties and its replacement by a team concept. Tyrrell describes the gross mismanagement and extravagant waste in a series of weapons programs and the futile efforts of economy-minded Members of Congress to exercise fiscal control over the Department of Defense. He concludes that the new nobility threatens to undermine representative government in the United States by establishing itself as an independent force exempt from public control.

1276
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA; a staff report. September 28, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 107 p. maps.
DS557.A68U557
At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Contends that civilian casualties in the Vietnam War remain high despite Nixon administration claims that the war is winding down. The report finds that "over a third of South Vietnam's estimated population of 18 million have become refugees since 1964, with the vast majority still crowded into urban areas or into refugee centers near provincial and district towns." Notwithstanding attempts by the U.S. and South Vietnamese



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Governments to reclassify the refugee problem out of existence, the number of refugees continues to grow, with 500,000 added in the first half of 1970. Civilian war casualties in South Vietnam since early 1965 total over a million, including over 300,000 deaths. The U.S. Government conservatively estimates the number of Laotian refugees at nearly 300,000, and an estimated 50 percent of the 400,000 Meos in northern Laos have died as a result of aerial bombardment and ground fighting. The U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and subsequent fighting generated a million refugees in less than 6 months, not counting the displacement of an estimated 400,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Although responsibility for refugees and war casualties cannot be fixed precisely, aerial bombardment and massive ground fire by U.S. and South Vietnamese Government forces account for a substantial share of civilian suffering. The report's appendices include a State Department response to the subcommittee's questions on civilian war victims in Laos, a Defense Department report on bombing accidents in Laos, and selected articles and press reports on the "bloodbath" argument and on recent events in Laos and South Vietnam.

1277
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. Hearing, ninety-first Congress, second session. May 7, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 107 p. DLC

Testimony of James Norris, Father Mathias L. Menger, and Geraldine Hickey, all of the Catholic Relief Services; Ronald J. Rickenbach, former Refugee Relief Officer of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in Laos; Walter Johnson, former Chief of Party, International Voluntary Services in Laos; Roderic L. O'Connor, Assistant Administrator for East Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development; Dennis Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and William H. Sullivan, former ambassador to Laos. Estimates on the number of refugees and civilian casualties vary according to different criteria and data used. An exchange of letters between Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the subcommittee, and representatives of the State Department is appended, along with selected press articles on U.S. activities in Laos and Cambodia.

1278
U.S. General Accounting Office. REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM. Prepared for Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. December 14, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 49 p. DLC
At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Contents.--Preface, by Senator Edward M. Kennedy.--Summary of reports.--Text of reports: Continuing difficulties in assisting war victims in Vietnam. Civilian health and war-related casualty programs in Vietnam.

Charges the U.S. and South Vietnamese Government agencies responsible for refugees and civilian war casualties with failure to establish priorities for refugee relief and social welfare programs, poor management of U.S. commodity-import programs, and misrepresentation of data relating to refugees and war casualties.

1279
Vlasievich, IU. ON THE LAWS GOVERNING THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY-ECONOMIC COSTS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Dec. 1, 1970: 6-7.
D839.C87, v. 22
Condensed from Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, no. 16, Aug. 1970. Slav Rm

The growing costs of war and the arms race stem from imperialism's efforts to resolve the internal contradictions of a dying capitalism. The monopoly bourgeoisie exploit the arms race not only as a mechanism of aggressive foreign policy but as a way to self-enrichment. Attempts to prove the cheapness of future arms are frequently made, although they are refuted in fact by the steady rise in cost of all basic arms and of scientific research and development. The contradictions between the rising costs of armaments and the limited economic possibilities of capitalist economies have made themselves strongly felt, but the arms race is too vital for the monopoly bourgeoisie to renounce it. Because of the constant threat from the imperialist powers, the Soviet Union has been forced to increase its military expenditures at the cost of satisfying other needs. The ensuing problem of increasing the effectiveness of a Socialist society's military-economic resources must be resolved by the fullest possible utilization of the advantages of the Socialist economic system. However these advantages are not realized automatically and by themselves. Soviet Armed Forces personnel must struggle for the fullest possible incorporation of the principles of the last economic reform and the most rational utilization of material resources.

1280
Warnke, Paul C., and Leslie H. Gelb. SECURITY OR CONFRONTATION: THE CASE FOR A DEFENSE POLICY. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 6-30.
N&CPR

At one time, hopes were widespread that the defense budget would become a major source of revenue to deal with America's pressing social problems. Expectations were that the winding down of the Vietnam War would produce a surplus of some $30 billion. Unfortunately, this is not going to happen. Inflation, cost overrruns, pay increases, modernization, and the purchase of new weapons systems are consuming the dividend. Reliance on a windfall of this kind was unrealistic from the very beginning. If genuine economies are to be achieved, a new and sound defense policy must be formulated. The following observations provide the outline for such a policy: First, U.S. commitments must be reexamined in light of the na-

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tional interest, not primarily with the object of saving money, but in order to "face up to the issue of where and when to use military force." Second, Americans must recognize that current approaches to the problem of budget restrictions ignore the need for a sound defense policy and thus cannot provide the necessary rationale for a national defense program. Third, the safest defense posture--and one that will open the way to substantial budget reductions--would be an updated version of the policy of flexible response. Fourth, putting greater reliance on nuclear weapons and on sea and air power at the expense of conventional ground strength, which seems to be the direction in which the Nixon administration is moving, besides being dangerous would not lead to sizable economies. Neither China nor the Soviet Union is likely to launch a nuclear strike against the United States, but a conventional attack cannot be dismissed so easily. The willingness of the Nixon administration to view U.S. commitments "somewhat less expansively" is welcome, but the capacity to deal with conventional threats must not be sacrificed. Once it is recognized that the need for sophisticated strategic hardware is diminished, the United States should be able to maintain its conventional strength at a desirable level while still effecting substantial economies.

1281
Welch, Claude E. THE ROOTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Jan. 1971: 17-21, 48. illus.
JX1.A53, v. 48

Ascribes the military displacement of African parties and bureaucracies in the nation and state building functions to a series of factors whose importance varies from one country to another. The directions, causes, and implications of political change are indicated, the possible contribution of military rule to political development is discussed, and the manner in which the need for political legitimacy complicates the task of nation and state building is illustrated. Welch concludes that such organizational characteristics of the armed forces as discipline, centralization, and excellent communications break down on the assumption of political power. Consequently a military government has no greater chance of developing effective instruments of governance that will be accepted as legitimate than its civilian predecessors.

1282
Whiteside, Thomas. DEFOLIATION. Foreword by George Wald. New York, Ballantine Books [1970] xvii, 168 p. (A Ballantine/Friends of the Earth book)
QH545.P4W48
Bibliography: p. 133-135.

Investigates the effects of herbicides used in the Vietnam War. Whiteside reports the results of various studies that indicate that defoliants and other herbicides may cause long-term ecological damage and birth defects. The appendixes include statements by U.S. Government officials as well as criticisms of herbicide programs.

1283
Wolf, Charles. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXITIES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Feb. 1971: 19-22. TK9145.A84, v. 27

Does the United States buy more defense than it needs? The answer depends upon whether it is true that U.S. decisionmakers are biased in their estimates of foreign threats and of the utility of nondefense resource claims and that they acquiesce in inflated defense procurement costs. Misjudgments of this kind most generally are blamed on the influence of the military-industrial complex. The secrecy and scale of its operations, the complexity of its product, the efficacy of appeals to patriotic sentiment, the presence of conflicts of interest and institutional rigidities, and the absence of countervailing power are cited as the characteristics that have enabled it to get such a hold on the public mind and purse. But if each of these characteristics are considered in turn, their presence can be demonstrated to an equal or greater degree in other complexes as well, especially those dealing with health care and education. The defense establishment is huge and deserves close public scrutiny and control. It is not the only offender, however, and probably not the worst. Indications are that defense spending is controlled relatively tightly, has already been reduced substantially, and will be reduced even further in the near future.

1284
Yarmolinsky, Adam. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (OR HOW POLITICAL PROBLEMS BECOME MILITARY PROBLEMS). Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 78-97.
N&CPR

The military emphasis in U.S. foreign policy, far from being the outcome of a military conspiracy, is largely a reflection of the preoccupations of civilian policymakers and the American people. Nevertheless it is true that the massive participation of military men in the policymaking process has accentuated this military bias with some unfortunate results, among which are the coupling of foreign policy to defense expenditures, a preference for the use of force over negotiation, an overemphasis on "worst contingency" planning, and an excessive proliferation of military options. Public attitudes are changing, however, and as concern with military threats from abroad has declined while concern with domestic problems has grown, respect for the military and for military logic and authority has been eroded. It now seems unlikely that the military will ever again attain the position of influence it once occupied. By the same token, the experience and organizing talents of military men, together with the force of habit and of unpleasant realities, makes it certain that their voices will continue to be heard. But the danger, after all, is not that military men will attempt to usurp power. Rather it is that civilians will forget their proper role and, beginning once again to think like military men, bring into operation the law that "political problems, if thought about primarily in military terms, become military problems."

1285
Yarmolinsky, Adam. THE MILITARY INFLUENCE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Jan. 1971: 34-38, 44.
JX1.A53, v. 48

"Based on Chapter 3 in the forthcoming book 'The Military Establishment.'"

Reviews the history of the growth of military influence within the executive branch from the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt to Richard Nixon. Yarmolinsky thinks the militarization of foreign-policy making the almost inevitable result of the effort of civilian policymakers. Under the conditions prevailing after World War II, civilian policymakers felt required to seek support from the public, Congress, and the military. The disparity in the relative influence of the State Department and the Pentagon today can be ascribed in part to the latter's size, higher order of expertise, better communications, pervasive domestic presence and responsiveness to domestic pressures, and superior management.

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# III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

## INTERNATIONAL LAW

1286
Bozeman, Adda B. THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971. xvii, 229 p.
JX3110.B6F85

"Attempts to clarify the meanings carried by references to law in the political systems of certain selected culture zones; to estimate the durability of these meanings in times to come; to compare the locally and regionally valid references, and to see them in the global context of culture-transcendent schemes of law and organization." Bozeman discusses the systems of law and organization in different areas of the world, including the Middle East, China, and Africa south of the Sahara. He concludes that the world will continue to be multicultural under a surface of unifying technological arrangements.

1287
Bretton, Philippe. [THE LAW OF WAR] Le droit de la guerre. Paris, A. Colin [1970] 95 p. (Dossiers U2, 145. Série problèmes internationaux)
JX4521.B74

Contents.--The problems of the law of war.--The concept of war.--The sources of the law of war.--Documents.--Guidance for research studies.

Limited to the study of the international law governing the relationships between belligerents. The concept of war is derived from an examination of the cases of Algeria and Vietnam. The history of the development of international law is complemented briefly by notes on its national, particularly French, sources. Bretton concludes by indicating themes for research in the areas of the general effect of war, the conduct of hostilities, and the sanctions of the law of war.

1288
Farer, Tom. HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS: TOWARD THE DEFINITION OF "INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT." Columbia law review, v. 71, Jan. 1971: 37-72.
LL

"Based on a paper . . . presented at the Conference on Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts [in Brussels] . . . Jan. 28, 1970, and . . . as revised, . . . published in the January 1971 issue of Revûe belge de droit internationale."

Discusses the interpretations of the Fourth Hague Convention and the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions that justify the attribution of an international character to civil war. Although the preliminary documents and texts of these conventions are ambiguous, they do not specifically ascribe international character to civil war only in the cases of foreign intervention or the rebels' attainment of the status of belligerency. Farer suggests as considerations inducing states to accept the limitations imposed by these conventions the wish of bloc leaders to justify intervention and the interest of the victors in maximizing the possibilities of post-civil-war reconciliation. He asks for a finding of "international character" whenever foreign troops are engaged, a U.N. Force has been inserted, or, within limits, when foreign states supply the rebels with military material.

1289
Goldie, Louis F. E. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY—THE MEANING OF WORDS, THE NATURE OF THINGS, AND THE FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. Naval War College review, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 8-20.
N&CPR

Lecture delivered at the Naval War College.

The prevalent misunderstandings of the nature of international law originate in the unreasonable demand to find duplicated there such institutions of the domestic legal order as the legislature, judiciary, and executive. If this institutionalization is dismissed from consideration, international law demonstrably falls within the scope of any definition of law as a program of determination, process, and communication. The national sovereignty concept does not negate the international legal order and is in fact derived from it. Similarly the argument that no state is absolutely committed to the vindication of international law misunderstands the relationship of law and morals. The obligatory nature of international law is implicitly recognized because each state knows that its interests are best served when other states comply with international law. The present questioning of some of its traditional rules is not a rejection of the international legal order but rather a demand that it be strengthened to confront current politicoeconomic realities. It can reasonably be hoped that international organizations like the U.N. will augment and reinforce customary international law and traditionally drafted treaties by their practice and by their formulation of generally accepted basic views.

1290
Johanny, Karl. [EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF WAR CRIMES AND OF SMALL WARS, TAKING INTO CONSIDERA-

TION THE LEGITIMACY OF SMALL-WAR PARTICIPANTS] Der Tatbestand des Kriegsverbrechens und moderner Kleinkrieg unter Berücksichtigung der Legitimität seiner Teilnehmer. [Würzburg] 1966. 214 p.
JX6731.W3J63

Inaug.-Diss.-Würzburg.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. ix-xxix.

Contents.--pt. 1. The place of modern small war and its participants in international law: The concept of modern small war. The participants in modern small war. Traditional principles of international law and modern small war. The subject of international law and his culpability.--pt. 2. War crimes in modern small wars: The facts of Nuremberg. War crimes. Criteria.

Distinguishes between legal and illegal behavior in various kinds of modern small wars, using international law as a criterion. Despite the tremendous changes in war wrought by modern techniques of waging it, despite the lack of consensus concerning the concept of war crimes, and despite the questionability of the legality of foreign assistance in many cases, the fact that war crimes are actually committed can be proven through international law. Unfortunately, international law contains no penal sanctions and therefore should be complemented by international treaties and domestic criminal law. Johanny concludes that groups as well as individuals can be culpable of war crimes, using active participation in the war, not merely sympathizing with the partisans, as the criterion. Modern guerrilla warfare represents the only alternative to nuclear war, and the enormous gaps in international law concerning it must be filled, taking politics and ideology into account. The author urges that political interest be set aside and that the United Nations create an international court of justice to rule on war crimes, basing its decisions on an objective special code of laws. He further urges that civilian populations receive protection under international law. Codifying objectively what constitutes a state of insurrection or conflict would be a first step in eliminating war crimes.

1291
Nordic Conference on Sanction Research, Sigtuna, Sweden, 1968. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE; PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORDIC CONFERENCE ON SANCTION RESEARCH, Sigtuna, Sweden, April 27-28, 1968. Edited by Peter Wallensteen. Uppsala, Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1969. 123 p. (Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Report, no. 1) JX1246.N65 1968

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by Peter Wallensteen.--Some remarks on the study of sanctions, by Anders Forsman.--Notes on the efficiency of economic sanctions, by Håkan Wiberg.--Some general features of economic sanctions, by Peter Wallensteen.--A case of sanctions: Finland--the Soviet Union in 1958-1959, by Raimo Väyrynen.

Contains four studies, two dealing with economic sanctions from the theoretical viewpoint and two with empirical investigations. Forsman summarizes some of the criticism that has been leveled against international research, while Wiber supplies several propositions concerning influence and sanctions. Väyrynen employs different theories on the effects of sanctions on Finland, and Wallensteen investigates 10 cases of sanctions through application of 50 different variables.

1292
Reisman, William Michael. NULLITY AND REVISION; THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971. xvi, 900 p.
JX1952.R38

"Developed from a doctoral dissertation presented to the Yale Law School in 1965."
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. The anatomy of authority: Review in social process. Policy in perspective. The compromissary process. The arbitral process. The process of claim. The process of review. Repudiation of authority and forms of review. Goals and policies: institutionalized decision processes and world public order.--pt. 2. Claims of nullity: Selected compromissary claims. Selected arbitral claims.--pt. 3. The process of enforcement: The general problem of enforcement. International organizations as enforcers: organizations with minimum control--the League of Nations. International organizations as enforcers: organizations with minimum control--the United Nations. International organizations as enforcers: specialized agencies with maximum control. International organizations as enforcers: regional organizations. Nation-states as enforcers: judicial action. Self-help: the relativity of lawful coercion.--Conclusion.--Table of cases.--Name index.--Subject index.

Analyzes the process of review in international arbitration. Reisman stresses the importance of considering review as an integral aspect of the social decisionmaking process.

1293
Rigg, Robert B. WHERE DOES KILLING END AND MURDER BEGIN IN WAR? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 3-9. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Where in a combat situation does justifiable homicide end and murder begin? In Vietnam, the United States applies a double standard--one for the artilleryman and bomber pilot, another for the infantryman and marine. Steps must be taken to reconcile these two standards, as well as to clarify other important issues relating to individual and command responsibilities. Some steps have been taken in this direction already, but it still remains to be seen whether these complex matters will be resolved by legislative action or in the courts. Law and precedent from sources as diverse

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as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Nuremberg trials, and decisions of the Supreme Court are involved. The matter is further complicated by the special conditions of the war in Southeast Asia. In World War II the United States accepted the mass bombing of civilian targets in Germany and Japan on the ground that it was justified by military exigencies, but atrocity and wanton killing were never held to be acceptable. Even so, then as now, more civilians by far were killed by shells and bombs than by the fire of infantrymen. Perhaps no ultimate reconciliation is possible, but the benefit of any doubt should go to the foot soldier, who serves under the most brutal conditions imaginable. In any case, no decision should be made that will undermine discipline or the discretion of command or that "will inhibit commanders from conducting combat in terms of the conflict at hand, and in accordance with the American code."

1294
SYMPOSIUM ON THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN CAMBODIA, 1970, IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. American journal of international law, v. 65, Jan. 1971: 1-83.
JX1.A6, v. 65

Contents.--The Cambodian operation and international law, by Richard A. Falk.--The constitutionality of the Cambodian incursion, by William D. Rogers.--Legal dimensions of the decision to intercede in Cambodia, by John Norton Moore.--Comments on the articles on the legality of the United States action in Cambodia, by George H. Aldrich, Wolfgang Friedmann, Robert H. Bork, and John Lawrence Hargrove.

Legal analyses of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. Falk argues that "the Cambodian operation is, perhaps, the most blatant violation of international law by the United States Government since World War II, but it represents only the most recent instance in a series of illegal uses of force to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign society." Rogers questions whether the invasion can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the President's powers as Commander in Chief and calls for a greater sharing of responsibility for such decisions by the President and Congress. Moore contends that the invasion was both constitutional and in accord with international law, but recommends that greater attention be paid to the legal dimensions of national security decisions. Aldrich defends the administration against criticisms by all three articles. Friedmann charges that the invasion was not essentially defensive in nature, that it perpetuated an ill-conceived but long-standing policy of containing communism by force, that the decision to invade was made without regard for the suffering and devastation it entailed for Cambodia, and that it showed disdain for international law. Bork affirms that President Nixon had full constitutional authority for the invasion. He questions the constitutional propriety of congressional attempts to control the details of the invasion. Hargrove finds that the invasion undermined the status of international law since it was justified by what most people consider a legal technicality.

1295
Wright, Quincy. HOW HOSTILITIES HAVE ENDED: PEACE TREATIES AND ALTERNATIVES. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia. 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 51-61.
H1.A4, v. 392

On the basis of tables in the author's A Study of War (cited as item 400 in vol. 1, no. 2, of this bibliography), the number of wars terminated by treaties of peace, unconditional surrender, unilateral declaration, or general recognition is indicated. The formalities of traditional international law for beginning, waging, and ending war were observed to occur increasingly after the seventeenth century, and to reach a high point in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The radical change in conditions, owing to modern technology, convinced statesmen during World War I that changes in international law and organization were necessary. But neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Charter of the United Nations has been successful in preventing or terminating hostilities. No peace treaties have been made since World War II, and the thirty-four hostilities of sufficient magnitude to be called war since 1945 have been ended temporarily by armistice or cease-fire, and more permanently by a recognition of independence or political change, in some cases with assistance by the United Nations. Two, however, remain active, and others dormant. Abandonment of the system of power politics and strengthening of international organization is necessary if peace is to be established. (Abstract supplied)

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1296
Arosalo, Uolevi. A MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1970: 247-258.
AS9.J6, 1970

Some features of international interaction patterns in Western Europe are examined both theoretically and empirically. Firstly some essential differences between sociological theories and their implications in the study of interaction are considered. The theory selected presupposes a structure made up of two classes opposing the interests of the poor and the rich countries, and with a lack of pluralism in the forms of interaction among the members of the system. 'The West' was defined as all the NATO countries and those countries in Europe not belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The data consist of the number of memberships of 'the West' in International Governmental Organizations (IGO), in International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO), and in Business International Organizations (BINGO) of each

country. The results indicate that the interaction patterns form a hierarchical chain: IGO→INGO→BINGO. Interaction is stratified according to the wealth of the countries. IGO-memberships can be expressed as the function of GNP, and INGO-memberships as the function of GNP/capita. BINGO-memberships have some curious features. The dispersion of trade and the voting activity in national elections correlates differently with BINGOs than other forms of interaction. Finally, some implications are dealt with. (Abstract supplied)

1297
COLLOQUIUM: "25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY." Peace and the sciences, no. 2, 1970: 1-84.
JX1901.P25, 1970

A colloquium held by the International Institute for Peace June 20-21, 1970, in Vienna.

A discussion by European scholars of U.N. achievements and failures, particularly in the area of international security, together with proposals for making the United Nations more effective. The participants differ in their assessments of the United Nations largely according to whether they are East or West Europeans.

1298
Dimitrijević, Vojin. [THE RIGHTS OF THE REGIONAL PACTS AGAINST THE FORMER ENEMY STATES IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS] Die Befugnisse der Regionalabkommen gegenüber ehemaligen Feindstaaten nach der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen. Osteuropa--Recht, v. 16, Sept. 1970: 157-169.
LL

Studies the present significance of Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter, stressing that the position of Article 53 in that section of the charter devoted to regional arrangements indicates its continued influence in the future. The author discusses the exemptions from the workings of other parts of the charter granted those nations privileged by Article 53, the states so privileged, the problem of the legal continuity of the present regimes with those in power in the countries defeated in World War II, and the implications of the superpower military blocs for Article 53. Dimitrijević calls for the abrogation of these enemy-state clauses as dangerous for world peace, since the participation of the vanquished countries in the present bloc system means the loss of Security Council objectivity.

1299
Doehring, Karl. [HAS THE UNITED NATIONS FAILED, OR IS IT SUCCESSFUL?] Sind die Vereinten Nationen gescheitert oder erfolgreich? Der Staat, v. 9, no. 4, 1970: 475-480.
LL

Critique of Heinhard Steiger's article "The League of Nations, the United Nations and the Near East," cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography. Doehring argues that although Steiger's critique on the United Nations is justified, his arguments depend too much on the Platonic ideas of a perfect legal order and an effective world government. Doehring examines whether the United Nations has not improved the international legal order in comparison to that of the last century, and he concludes that it has, since even the obligation of a state to justify its position before the forum of U.N. members places moral and legal restrictions on its actions. Even though atrocities still take place and many problems remain unsolved, the United Nations has contributed to progress in international law. Its only failure is that it has not achieved an ideal situation.

1300
Gonionskii, S. CRISIS IN OAS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1971: 22-27.
D839.I465, 1971

The resurgence of anti-imperialist feeling within Latin America is thwarting the planned development of the Organization of American States (OAS) as the American "ministry of colonies." Washington conceived the OAS as an instrument for crushing the national liberation movement in the New World, but the Latin American countries are using it to resolve their own urgent socioeconomic problems. The break began with American intervention in the Dominican Republic and was heightened by the rejection of an Inter-American Defense Board, the debate on the amended charter, and the election of non-North Americans to primary executive positions. Latin Americans now wish to construct inter-American relations on the basis of genuine Latin American unity. At the Washington meeting in June 1970 the U.S. lost its campaign to widen the powers of OAS regional bodies and to interfere in internal affairs on the pretext of fighting terrorism. It is now clear that its desperate campaign to isolate Cuba is bankrupt, and at least one American observer has become aware that the OAS is in political decline.

1301
Gromyko, Andrei A. [SPEECH] Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Nov. 24, 1970: 4-7.
D839.C87, v. 22

Condensed from Pravda and Izvestiia, Oct. 23, 1970. Slav Rm

During the quarter century of the United Nations existence, the task of preserving the peace has become ever more complicated. However the international instruments and mechanisms for coping with this task have been correspondingly augmented. Proposals advanced by the Socialist countries in such areas as international security and disarmament have significantly broadened the possibilities for a stable, lasting peace. The tensions rising from the effort to implement these proposals have been particularly manifested in Vietnam and the Near East, where the Soviet Union's position has been distorted by falsehoods. In Europe, the first prerequisite for peace remains the recognition of the German Democratic Republic; in the near East, Israeli compliance with the U.N.

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resolution must be insisted on. The convocation of an all-European security conference and the Soviet proposal for a collective security system are receiving world approval. On the whole the Soviet Government considers the balance of U.N. activity during its first quarter century positive. The numerous practical proposals advanced by the Soviet Union have shown its readiness to go all the way to general and complete disarmament. Acceptance of commitments on disarmament questions should involve the broadest possible range of states. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, all the nuclear powers must participate. While holding to general and complete disarmament as its ultimate goal, the Soviet Union will strive for agreements on individual measures limiting the arms race. The next order of business is the seabed and chemical and biological warfare. The Soviet Union hopes that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will lead to positive results.

1302
Lusky, Louis. LAWMAKING FOR PEACE: THE FARTHER SHORE. Political science quarterly, v. 86, Mar. 1971: 37-56. H1.P8, v. 86

Although a focus on the control of nuclear weapons was well conceived during earlier stages of their development, the magnitude of existing nuclear arsenals confronts mankind with a more immediate problem, namely, how "to create institutions that will minimize the likelihood that the men who control the big weapons will elect to use them." Most scholars who approach this problem proceed from the assumption that the existing structure of international relations will continue indefinitely, but it is also possible to construct a model of international relations based on need; in this case, the need to prevent war. The problem, then, is to create a world federation based on the rule of law, the potential dangers of which must be weighed against the dangers of the present nation-state system. A world federation might entail a perpetuation of what in many cases is an unpopular status quo, create a dangerous monopoly of military power, and threaten personal liberties with a massive police establishment. These problems are not insuperable, however, as is demonstrated by the progressive centralization of a rather loose union of states in the United States. Law is both a liberating and repressive force. Just as some forms of domestic activity (for instance, driving on the left-hand side of the road) must be repressed to insure greater safety and freedom, so a world law of war prevention would deprive each nation of some liberties in order to guarantee peace and release the constructive energies of man.

1303
Reynolds, Charles V. WHY NOT ADMIT RED CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS? Berkeley, Calif., McCutchan Pub. Corp. [1970] 103 p. E183.8.C5R48 1970

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Boston College, under the title: United States opposition to the representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Bibliography: p. 95-99.

Contents.--Crux of the problem--imperialism vs. communism.--China in world history.--Traditional United States-China policy.--China, the United States and the United Nations.--Post-Korean War Chinese-American relations.--American and world-wide public opinion.--Importance of Russian-Chinese territorial disputes to the question.--Some solutions and their merit.--A solution--argument in the affirmative.--Appendices.--Index.

Proposes that Communist China replace Nationalist China in the U.N. Security Council and that China be given five seats in the General Assembly, one of which would be allocated to the representative of Taiwan. Reynolds dismisses two-China solutions to the questions of Chinese recognition and membership in the United Nations as unworkable. He contends that the unjust isolation of China from the world community prevents progress on such important problems as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

1304
Sanokoev, SH. THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AT THE UN ANNIVERSARY SESSION. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1971: 15-21, 27. D839.I465, 1971

The discussion of the problems of peace and security at the anniversary session of the United Nations was, as usual, kept at a high level only by the actions of the Socialist delegates, as demonstrated by Gromyko's deep analysis of the international situation and his concrete program for solving today's problems. The reasons for the lessening role and significance of the United Nations were specifically and consistently revealed by the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security prepared jointly by the Socialist countries. The Socialist document not only clarifies the purposes of the charter, but also contains specific provisions for eliminating "the hotbeds of armed conflict." The political demagogery and hypocrisy that predominate in bourgeois diplomacy were apparent in the opposition to any action proposal for strengthening international relations. The Socialist states played a large part in preparing a program to implement the decree ending colonialism and in approving the Second Development Decade. At the same time, the Soviet Union fought the fallacious effort to subordinate the struggle for peace and international security to the clamor of the young, independent countries for aid in development. The Czech delegation played a role in the adoption of the Declaration on the Principles of International Law.

1305
Sayeed, Mohammad Ali. HOW TO MAKE THE UNITED NATIONS EFFECTIVE. Pakistan horizon, v. 23, no. 4, 1970: 375-382. DS376.P32, v. 23

An address delivered at a meeting of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Oct. 22, 1970.

The failure of the United Nations to attain its objectives is due not to any inadequacy in its machinery but to the unwillingness of its membership to resolve problems solely on their merits. Whenever justice is obviously thwarted by political expediency, the moral force otherwise innate in U.N. actions is irretrievably lost. The 1956 Suez crisis and the Kashmir plebiscite are examples of the United Nations "polished and punctilious fraudulence." The real achievements of the United Nations in some areas, including the encouragement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, have been possible because of the good will of the participants. This kind of moral commitment is needed to overcome the gap between the world body's pious resolutions and their implementation.

1306
Schümperli, Walter. [THE UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIALIZATION] Die Vereinten Nationen und die Dekolonisation. Bern, Lang, 1970. 158 p. (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 3: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften, Bd. 5)
JX4027.S28
Bibliography: p. 146-150.

Contents.--The fundamental position of the United Nations toward colonialism.--U.N. attempts to engage in the decolonialization process (1945-1960).--The declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples (1960).--Setting up the Special Committee on Decolonialization (Special Committee of Seventeen).--Rhodesia--an example of the working method of the Special Committee of Seventeen.--Summary.

Views the role of the United Nations in the process of decolonialization as subordinate to that of the colonial powers themselves. Schümperli distinguishes between the political and economic aspects of colonialism. Decolonialization does away with political and military control by the colonial power, but colonialization itself cannot be erased, because it brings with it educational, medical, and economic aid that the developing countries do not wish to renounce. The United Nations cannot act against the colonial powers because its members cannot agree and because the U.N. Charter does not grant sufficient power. The author traces the attempts of the United Nations to establish the lacking legal base and demonstrates, using the example of Rhodesia, that the influence of the international organization remains weak because its inability to implement its resolutions forces it to depend on voluntary compliance. The preconditions for decolonialization must arise from within the colony. The main role played by the United Nations has been to give the developing countries a place to act together and to express their views to the world public.

1307
Steiger, Heinhard. [THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE NEAR EAST] Völkerbund, Vereinte Nationen und der Nahe Osten. Der Staat, v. 9, no. 4, 1970: 433-474.
LL

Examines the peacekeeping power of the League of Nations and the United Nations through the example of Near East tensions. Steiger analyzes the problems of international law that have arisen in the area since 1922, when the League of Nations instituted Palestine as a "national home for the Jewish people," and the attempts of the United Nations to improve the situation. The author concludes that the United Nations has failed because it lacks consensus on the prevailing legal criteria and that therefore it cannot settle a conflict peacefully and objectively. He advocates instituting an independent organ, free of national or political interests, that can settle disputes, mediate between the adversaries, and make recommendations to the political bodies that have the power to carry them out. Consensus on vital problems must be worked out before a conflict arises and one party forces its opinion on the other. In this respect the conventions on genocide and the resolutions on human rights are steps in the right direction.

1308
Väyrynen, Raimo. STRATIFICATION IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1970: 291-309.
AS9.J6, 1970

This article explores some characteristics of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and their development. The most central findings are (1) very rapid increase in the number of economic and subregional organizations as compared with other types of IGOs, and (2) increasing stratification within transregional and global organizations and decreasing stratification within regional and subregional ones. Furthermore, stratification has increased most notably within economic and military IGOs, while the opposite is the case among socio-cultural and coordinative organizations. These trends might indicate the increasing significance of the 'bargaining model' of international relations, especially in economic matters between developed and developing countries. Thus far, the realization of this structural model has not been possible for one simple reason: there is no collective organization strong enough in the Third World, so Great Powers have been able to apply a 'one-at-a-time'-policy in organizational interaction with developing countries. A typology of international organizations based on the ranks of member states is presented. This typology, for example, indicates that low total and high average rank of member states leads to a higher probability of organizational agreement upon great sectoral scope and high range in decision making. (Abstract supplied)

1309
Zehnder, Alfred. [SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS] Die Schweiz und die Vereinten Nationen. Hrsg. von der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen. Bern, H. Lang [1970] 95 p.
JX1977.2.S924

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Contents.--Introductory remarks.--The arguments of opponents and supporters.--The United Nations: its goals and principles, its organization, and its work.--Switzerland and the United Nations.--Conclusions.

Reviews the arguments for and against Swiss membership in the United Nations and analyzes U.N. structure, Switzerland's foreign policy and relationship with the United Nations and U.N. agencies, and the question of neutrality. Zehnder remarks that approximately one-third of the Swiss population favors membership, one-third opposes it, and one-third remains undecided or uninterested. He urges that the Swiss commit themselves to the U.N. goals of promoting peace, since these coincide with Swiss foreign policy. The political and legal barriers to membership posed by Switzerland's desire to safeguard its neutrality can be solved, and Swiss isolation is neither politically nor economically desirable. Switzerland already works closely with the United Nations in many of its specialized agencies, and the time has come for Switzerland to become a full-fledged member of the international forum.

## INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1310
Clausen, Christian. [THE U.N. PEACE MISSION IN CYPRUS] Die UNO-Friedensmission in Zypern. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 8, Nov./Dec. 1970: 442-449. illus.
U3.034, v. 8

Gives a brief historical and geographical survey of Cyprus and describes the structure and the functions of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The main task of UNFICYP is not to suppress fighting, but rather to avoid or dampen any small incidents that might lead to greater conflict. The peacekeeping mission has been quite successful because of the tact of its actions and the objectivity of the reports of the observation posts. Currently the situation in Cyprus is quiet. Economic needs require the cooperation of the adversaries, especially in the promising field of tourism. Although schools are segregated, the relationship between Greeks and Turks has slowly normalized since 1967. The two sides show increasing willingness to negotiate, but their troop strength remains at too high a level for effective economic development. The presence of the peacekeeping mission (of which Austria is a part) will continue to be needed.

1311
Goldmann, Kjell. PEACE-KEEPING AND SELF-DEFENCE. Paris, International Information Center on Peace-keeping Operations, 1968. 59 p. (International Information Center on Peace-keeping Operations. Monograph, no. 7) JX1981.P7I53, no. 7

Contents.--Introduction.--The self-defence doctrine.--UNEF 1956-58: the precedent.--ONUC 1960: the application.--ONUC in Katanga 1961-63: a peace-keeping force at war.--Two epilogues: the creation of UNFICYP and the end of UNEF.--The dilemma.--Notes.

Describes and analyzes the norms that govern the operation of U.N. peacekeeping forces. Goldmann focuses on three major U.N. peacekeeping operations, in Egypt and Gaza, the Congo, and Cyprus, to determine how U.N. peacekeeping forces have interpreted and applied the doctrine of self-defense. He concludes with an examination of the dilemma posed by demands on U.N. forces to be effective, maintain their own security, and exercise restraint without violating the commitment to remain peaceful.

1312
Gyani, Prem S. CHARACTERISTICS AND SOME ASPECTS OF LAUNCHING U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCES. Paris, International Information Center on Peace-keeping Operations, 1968. 13 p. (International Information Center on Peace-keeping Operations. Monograph, no. 6) JX1981.P7I53, no. 6

U.N. peacekeeping operations differ from conventional military operations in several important respects. U.N. peacekeeping forces function through the interpositioning of troops, not the attainment of military objectives, and serve primarily as observers and mediators. Unlike national armies, U.N. forces are typically called into being only after an emergency arises, so that planning and logistical support have to be improvised for each new crisis. U.N. forces are dependent on member states to provide personnel, materiel, and financial support, and they are subject to greater political pressures than national armies. A review of the process by which a U.N. peacekeeping force is organized illustrates some of the peculiar difficulties facing a U.N. commander. The obvious solution to many of these problems would be the establishment of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping contingent, but such a solution is not politically feasible at present.

1313
Jose, James R. AN INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: ADVANTAGES, IMPEDIMENTS, IMPLICATIONS. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1970. xiv, 334 p. JX1404.J65
Bibliography: p. 179-194.

Assesses the possibility of establishing a multilateral military force within the framework of the Organization of American States, concentrating on the political and legal factors operative in the inter-American system and on relevant international factors that could foster or limit the establishment of a permanent military force. Jose asserts that the absence of the institutional prerequisites necessary to sustain such a force renders the creation of a permanent inter-American force unrealistic.

1314
Sheikh, Ahmed A. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING MILITARY OPERATIONS. Pakistan horizon, v. 23, no. 4, 1970: 395-413. DS376.P32, v. 23

Analyzes problem areas in the logistics of U.N. military forces from the conceptual and practical points of view. Sheikh comments that past military operations executed by the United Nations generally have been characterized as operationally inefficient and inordinately expensive. He makes seven basic recommendations for the effective integration of the logistics of possible future military operations into their overall strategy. The conclusion stresses the operational requirement that U.N. civil and military personnel concerned with military operations be informed of changes in political control.

## OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1315
Cahn, Anne H. A STUDENT'S VIEW OF PUGWASH. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 36-37. TK9145.A84, v. 27

Recommends an alternative procedure for selecting conference participants to help Pugwash "recapture that sense of pioneering, . . . deep feeling of responsibility and obligation to effectuate change for the betterment of lives of people everywhere." Cahn contends that Pugwash needs "fresh blood" and new ideas. She urges choosing two-thirds of the conferees on the basis of their expertise and reputations and the remaining third on a competitive basis, judging them on papers written for the conference.

1316
[CAN PEACE BE MADE?] Ist Friede machbar? [Von] Eugen Biser [u.a.] München, Kösel [1969] 139 p. (Münchener Akademie-Schriften, Bd. 51)
BT736.4.I85
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The peace of God, by Eugen Biser.--Peace research and the theory of international organization, by Nicolaus Sombart.--The Christian concept of peace and the modern peace of nations, by Hans Maier.--Peace mission--a concrete task of Christians, by Hermann Pfister.--Renunciation of force as a means of ensuring peace, by Swidbert Schnippenkoetter.

Reports presented to a conference of the Catholic Academy of Bavaria on the contributions of theology and the Church to the disciplines and social organizations working for peace. Sombart calls peace research the science, and international organization the institutional system, that will make peace possible. Biser expresses the reservations of theology as to the possibility of peace without divine assistance. Maier points to the success of religion in eliminating intrastate war and its failure to use international law to ban interstate war. Pfister warns against permitting the Communists to rob Christianity of the idea and the word "peace," and Schnippenkoeter refers to the practical politics of the renunciation-of-force agreement, the Brezhnev doctrine, and the new Ostpolitik.

1317
Dimitriu, Paul. TASKS FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMISSION. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 1, no. 2, 1970: 189-191.
N&CPR

Prof. Johan Galtung has proposed the creation of a security commission for Europe, a suggestion that merits further consideration. According to Galtung, the commission secretariat could function as a peace and security research institute. Drawing on previous work in this field but making scientific contributions of its own, the secretariat could investigate such matters as the pedagogy of peace and security, the process of transition from cold war to a peace structure, disarmament, denuclearization, cooperative efforts in the mass media, and the harmonization of legal codes. It could undertake structural analyses and trends and future research of specific European security problems, and it could prepare documentation for any decision the commission might have to make. Now, as the cold war declines in intensity and antagonistic divisions dissolve, is the moment for converting theory into practice. Science must be substituted for political argument wherever possible. Only the scientific method can identify the causes of conflict and release and institutionalize latent pacific energies of peace groups. In this regard, a study of cybernetics and the potential of electronic computers is particularly important.

1318
Eide, Asbjørn. TRAINING FOR PEACE ACTION: THE VIENNA EXPERIENCE. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 2, no. 1, 1971: 95-96.
N&CPR

In 1970, individuals affiliated with the Fund for Peace and the World Federalists joined with others experienced in U.N. peacekeeping and mediation to launch a pilot project for the eventual establishment of a World Peace Academy. The first 4-week instruction program was given in July and consisted of courses in general theory, peacekeeping, mediation, and social change. Some participants with practical backgrounds were impatient with the theoretical work that was offered, and there were difficulties in defining the scope and substance of the course in social change. Conceptual and ideological differences appeared, and the need to attract financial support resulted in undue pressures in favor of traditional approaches to peace at the expense of more radical solutions. All in all, however, the project was a success. It benefited especially from the pragmatic and comprehensive approach, which permitted the consideration of both traditional and newer methods of peace maintenance that aim at the elimination

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of structural violence. In the long run developing a genuine social-change course within a peace academy framework may prove impractical, but some other institution could assume the responsibility for this aspect of the program, with the caveat that communications between the two would have to be maintained to prevent them from working at cross purposes. Perhaps this could be assured by common or very similar theory courses.

1319
Frei, Daniel. [PREVENTING WAR AND SECURING PEACE. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Kriegsverhütung und Friedenssicherung. Eine Einführung in die Probleme der internationalen Beziehungen. Frauenfeld und Stuttgart, Verlag Huber [1970] 258 p.
JX1952.F75
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Introduction: the problem of war and peace.--Peace utopias.--Idea and practice of collective security.--Peacekeeping functions of the United Nations outside the system of collective security.--International law procedures to settle conflicts.--The principle of deterrence.--The efforts for disarmament.--Diplomacy and "crisis management." Imperial "pax".--Basic questions regarding the international system.--Index.

Defines and describes peace utopias and means of preventing war, such as collective security, deterrence, disarmament, diplomacy, crisis management, imperialism, etc., analyzing the possibilities and limits of their effectiveness. In order to prevent war and secure peace, either all conflicts must be abolished, by such means as limiting the interests of all nations and thereby curtailing freedom, or conflicts must be resolved through political settlement. Frei believes that although imperialism works quite well it is undesirable. Collective security does not function because it presupposes an integrated system in which national interests no longer play a significant role. U.N. peacekeeping procedures can limit and clarify national interests and aid the solution of a conflict by interpolating world opinion, but sometimes this can escalate the crisis. Disarmament can work only under supervision of a supranational body, but arms control measures offer hope as an intermediate step. Diplomacy, crisis management, and deterrence are dangerous in that they all toy with violence, but they possess a real potential that has been recognized by responsible politicians. Effective means to prevent war and secure peace can be found only in a truly international system. Developing such an integrated system would be preferable to improving the conflict system, but a world state is utopian. Frei concludes that this dilemma can be solved only "by developing procedures that can prevent war and secure peace and that not only more or less regulate the existing conflict system but also contribute to changing this system into an integrated system." Crisis management seems to offer the most rational and effective tool.

1320
Gregg, Richard B. THOUGHTS ON NONVIOLENCE AND CIVILIZATION. Fellowship, v. 37, Jan. 1971: 14-16. illus. JK1901.F45, v. 37

Since war is essentially a breakdown of civilization, workers for peace must learn to look upon themselves as workers for civilization. This means working to create new feelings and habits of mind for a whole people and requires in the worker, besides patience to persevere in a lengthy process, a firm belief in the fundamental decency and unity of mankind. Human unity and the will to cooperative enterprise originate in primitive mankind's experience with cooperation against common dangers and in the child's experience of mother love and the companionship of playmates. It is clear from this that the role of motherhood in the building of a new civilization is certain to be a vital one. Awareness of these universal elements in human experience also gives the strength needed to face up to turmoil and uncertainty. Efforts to strengthen political opposition to the hawks do not go deep enough. A transformation at a level more profound than that of politics, law, economics, or education must be aimed at. Men's feelings and attitudes must be altered. It may seem dangerous to put so much trust in one's fellow man, but "all down the ages, life in one form or another has found little niches where the margins of safety were very small, but sufficient." The civilization worker in America seeks the same goal that Gandhi sought in India--to build a better civilization. Constructive work of this kind, a sort of preventative medicine, is the most enduring.

1321
Haavelsrud, Magnus. TEACHING ABOUT WAR AND PEACE. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 1, no. 4, 1970: 381-384. N&CPR
"Notes": p. 384.

Teaching about the issues of war and peace requires careful planning. Experience with teaching projects in Europe and America indicates that student interest is sufficient to justify a curriculum focusing on war and peace issues. That experience also reveals a deficiency of knowledge about these matters among student populations. The aim of war and peace instruction should be to enable students to approach difficult questions, including those with a moral dimension, rationally rather than emotionally. It should also inculcate a more optimistic attitude toward the future by acquainting the student with constructive methods of conflict resolution and by combating the notion that war is inevitable. Some observers fear that a discussion of these issues would cause too much anxiety among students, but the limited evidence indicates that this fear is groundless. Indeed, learning that constructive mechanisms are available for the resolution of conflict may remove anxieties induced by doubts already present about the future. In general, instruction in war and peace issues should lead to "increased participation in international politics and a greater feeling of efficacy in conflict resolution, as well as an active 'peace' concept including integration and cooperation between nations."

1322
[HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE RESEARCH] Historische Beiträge zur Friedensforschung. Hrsg. von Wolfgang Huber. Stuttgart, E. Klett Verlag [1970] 242 p. (Studien zur Friedensforschung, Bd. 4)
JX1952.S88 Bd. 4
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Is a world order without war possible? Tasks and possibilities of peace research, by Georg Picht.--The concept of peace in the New Testament and its consequences, by Peter Stuhlmacher.--Peace does not come through the church--theses on Kant's writings on peace, by Eike Christian Hirsch.--The peace discussion of the educated Germans in the decade of the French Revolution, by Otto Dann.--Protestant theology and the church at the outbreak of the First World War, by Wolfgang Huber.--The attempts at arms control between the two world wars, by Friedrich Klein.--Conclusion, by Wolfgang Huber.--The authors of this volume.

Biblical-exegetic discussions and essays on Kant's philosophy of peace. The authors stress the value of history in peace research, investigating whether analogies exist between previous and present conflict situations and attempting to discern what modern peace research can learn from previous conflict solutions. Picht suggests that peace research develop not only models of a possible peace order but also strategies to mobilize political, social, and economic energies for its realization. To do so, peace research must uncover the real concerns of mankind, such as improving the ecology and developing the Third World, so as to avoid wasting time and effort pursuing such imaginary interests as space flight. Dann criticizes peace research for not doing justice to the historical circumstances under which certain theories developed. Historical peace research must critically analyze previous conceptions of the tasks and possibilities of peace research in order to relate to modern peace research.

1323
Italiaander, Rolf. [PEACE THINKERS AND THOUGHTS] Friedensdenker und Friedensgedanken. [Hrsg. von der Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Hannover, 1970] 78 p. (Schriftenreihe der Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Friedensprobleme, Heft 6)
JX1963.I783

Contents.--From a message to English students.--In search and in pursuit: Albert Schweitzer looks for a definition. From Pindar to Erasmus of Rotterdam. From William Penn to Immanuel Kant. Alfred Nobel and his peace prize. The first prize until the end of the first World War. Fridtjof Nansen and the chain of brothers. After the Second World War. The growth of the atomic danger. No world peace without racial peace. The peace prize given by the German Book Trade Association. Christians, a Jew, a humanist. A poet, a philosopher, a statesman, a publisher. From Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan to Nelly Sachs. Men of the ecumenical movement, socialists, and an African. Victor Hugo's hope. Provoke peace!--Afterword.

Comments on the personalities and thinking of winners of the Nobel Peace Prize and of the German Book Trade Association Peace Prize, with some references to historical figures described as having followed the injunction of the Psalms: "Seek peace and pursue it."

1324
Kaiser, Karl. [PEACE RESEARCH IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. OBJECT AND TASKS OF PEACE RESEARCH, ITS STATUS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AS WELL AS POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS OF FURTHERING IT] Friedensforschung in der Bundesrepublik; Gegenstand und Aufgaben der Friedensforschung, ihre Lage in der Bundesrepublik sowie Möglichkeiten und Probleme ihrer Förderung. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht [1970] 271 p.
JX1904.5.K32
Bibliography: p. 188-241.
Contains a list of research institutes and societies compiled with the help of Reinhard Meyers.
Study commissioned by the Foundation Volkswagenwerk.

Contents.--Introduction: the revived interest in peace research.--Tasks, object, and methods of modern peace research.--Peace research in the Federal Republic of Germany.--Priorities and problems of furthering peace research and research relevant to peace research in the Federal Republic of Germany.--List of societies and institutions that scientifically deal with peace problems and futurology research, engage in peace research or research relevant to peace research, or publish scientific reports on the subject.--Science and peace: a selected bibliography on the literature on peace research, research relevant to peace research, and futurology research.--Appendix.

Stresses the growing need for peace research in the nuclear era, especially for West Germany, which is situated in one of the world's major tension areas. Kaiser analyzes the origin of modern international peace research, outlines its tasks as an applied science, and cites the necessity of coordinating the goals of "positive" and "negative" peace and medium- and long-range peace research. He distinguishes between actual peace research and related sciences and describes the problems of applying peace research to politics. Although research requests from the government are desirable, peace research must remain independent and critical toward the state. It must not become overly theoretical, nor should it be too eager to adopt new scientific theories as panaceas. It must not assume the inevitability of the status quo or deterrence. The remaining half of the book contains a list of research institutions and an extensive bibliography.

1325
Marty, William R. NONVIOLENCE, VIOLENCE, AND REASON. Journal of politics, v. 33, Feb. 1971: 3-24.
JA1.J6, v. 33

"The propriety, or morality, of the use of violence or nonviolence depends upon the circumstances and cannot be settled by any absolutist rules." Three types of nonviolence may be distin-

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guished: passive, persuasive, and coercive. Proponents of a general theory of nonviolence may argue that nonviolence is morally superior to violence because it is an expression of love that redeems both parties to a dispute, appeals to conscience and respects an opponent's freedom and dignity, relies on spiritual rather than physical force, or constitutes a commandment of religious faith. An analysis of each type of nonviolence, however, reveals that at least in some circumstances adherence to strict nonviolence may result in greater hatred, loss of freedom and dignity, and even violence than would a resort to violence itself. Nor can absolute nonviolence be justified by an appeal to Christian scriptures and doctrine. Violence cannot be equated with hatred and brute force since, like nonviolence, it can sometimes be an expression of love and may diminish the likelihood of either individual or international violence. The threat of nuclear annihilation does not force a choice between nonviolence and nonexistence, as some have claimed, and the use or threat of violence is probably essential to bring about any significant disarmament.

1326
Noack, Paul. [PEACE RESEARCH--A SIGNAL FOR HOPE?] Friedensforschung--ein Signal der Hoffnung? [Freudenstadt] Eurobuch-Verlag A. Lutzeyer [1970] 152 p. (Bonn-aktuell, 1)
JX1963.N67
Bibliography: p. 128-139.

Contents.--pt. 1. Introduction. Peace research in Bonn. The concept of peace and its changes. History of peace. Peace and science. German efforts.--pt. 2. Activities at the universities. German institutions. Foreign institutions.--Appendix.--Remarks.--Index of persons.

Examines the general conditions for peace and analyzes the history and present state of peace research. Noack argues that the West German Government should provide incentives and means for peace research but that peace research itself must remain autonomous. Because of their interdisciplinary nature, universities and big private institutions capable of attracting the greatest "big-science brains" are best qualified to conduct intensive peace research. The author describes the contributions of German peace researchers: Weizsäcker in philosophy, Senghaas in the social sciences, Mitscherlich in psychology, Kimminich in international law, and Gamm in education. He concludes that the future of the world might well depend on whether or not peace research can find the key to conflict resolution.

1327
Phillips, Claude S. EDUCATION FOR MANKIND: A STRUGGLE FOR MEANING. Current anthropology, v. 12, Feb. 1971: 75-80.
GN1.C8, v. 12

Reports on activities of the Conference on Education for Mankind, which met Apr. 5-11, 1968, in Chicago, under the sponsorship of the Council for the Study of Mankind and the Center for the Advancement of Intercultural Studies. Early sessions of the conference were devoted to consideration of "violence, the preservation of minority cultures, religion, and understanding" and later ones, to the problems of education. There was a general feeling among the participants that mankind is endangered and that education is not living up to its responsibilities. Some were pessimistic in this regard, but others saw hope in the possibility of educating men to a better understanding between cultures.

1328
Roberts, Adam. RESEARCH ON A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY DEFENCE. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 1, no. 3, 1970: 286-288.
N&CPR

The last decade has seen a modest increase in research on the possibility of devising nonviolent, or at least nonmilitary, means of national defense. This effort encompasses studies of various types of nonviolent action in the past and investigations aimed directly at devising a prepared and coordinated policy of civilian or nonviolent defense. The current literature on this subject is well worth consulting but confirms a suspicion that both as a practical proposal and as a field of research civilian defense is still at a primitive stage. The danger arises that too much will be claimed with too little evidence. The failure of the resistance in Czechoslovakia must be admitted, adding marginally to pessimism about finding alternatives to military defense. It is important to note, however, that since it involved no advance planning, the Czech resistance scarcely qualifies as full-fledged civilian defense. Some argue that the difference between the spontaneous efforts of the past and programed civilian defense is so great that evidence derived from the former is irrelevant and must be replaced by new data generated by games, scenarios, and experiments. The use of these techniques ought to be encouraged, but by themselves they are insufficient. The need now is for general comparative studies of the historical evidence and of the contexts in which civilian defense is most likely to be effective. These studies would complement the work that has already been done and bind the investigation of civilian defense to other academic disciplines and ongoing political developments.

1329
Sampson, Ronald V. THE ANARCHIST BASIS OF PACIFISM. [London] Stuart Morris Memorial Fund, Peace Pledge Union [1970] 19 p.
HM278.S16
Bibliography: p. 19.

Contends that pacifism and anarchism presuppose and reinforce each other. Sampson defines pacifism as the refusal to take human life under any circumstances and anarchism as the refusal to seek domination over other persons. He considers any compromise of these standards to be retrogressive and self-defeating.

1330
Senghaas, Dieter, comp. [PEACE RESEARCH AND SOCIAL CRITICISM] Friedensforschung und Gesellschaftskritik. München, Hanser, 1970. 224 p. (Umweltforschung, Bd. 2) JX1963.S45
Bibliography: p. 212-218.

Contents.--Introduction.--State organization and war, by E. Krippendorff.--Political and military dimensions of present war and peace problems, by Dieter Senghaas.--Peace research--a political science? by C. Koch.--The intertwining of armaments, economy, and science, by F. Vilmar.--Causes and changes of modern imperialism, by F. Vilmar.--The contribution of the international organization to promoting peace, by Eva Senghaas-Knobloch.--Human aggression and international politics, by K. Horn.--From aggressive threat to defensive warning. The concept of social defense, by T. Ebert.--Subject and name index.--About the authors.

Essays illustrating the political and scientific impetus of critical peace research and emphasizing the need for social change. Senghaas distinguishes between peace research, which strives to abolish war as a policy, and conflict research, which accepts the existence of conflict and attempts to manage and settle it. He criticizes status-quo-oriented research that finds deterrence an acceptable means of preventing war, although he recognizes the limited progress toward détente made by arms control. Krippendorf favors organizing or strengthening political groups that can achieve drastic changes in the existing world order, and he favors radical-international peace research. Vilmar argues that to criticize the economic exploitation of the developing countries no longer suffices; rather, the ideological claims of the power elites in East and West must be questioned. Senghaas-Knobloch analyzes the role played by international organizations in promoting peace and concludes that although much has been achieved within and through them, they cannot ensure peace because of differing national interests, the excessive influence of the superpowers, and the inadequacy of funds for international cooperation. Ebert studies civilian defense based on peaceful resistance as an alternative to deterrence and suggests a mutual, gradual "transarmament" to civilian defense, first by the neutral and small powers, then by the superpowers.

1331
Stadelmann, Ludwig. [ARMED PEACE? SITUATION AND HOPE OF MAN IN THE ATOMIC AGE] Bewaffneter Friede? Lage und Hoffnung der Menschheit im Atomzeitalter [Bad Goisern, Neues Leben, 1970] 32 p. DB99.2.S73
Includes bibliographical references.

Calls for the renunciation of force as a principle of political life, dissolution of the Austrian Armed Forces, and complete reliance on passive resistance. Stadelmann condemns the maxim that arms ensure peace and rejects war as anti-Christian.

1332
Steltzer, Hans G. [FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICIES AS MEANS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE] Auswärtige Kulturpolitik als Mittel der Verständigung und Friedenserhaltung. Ausblick, v. 21, Oct. 1970: 25-28. DD68.A2A8, v. 21

Culture embraces science, technology, sports and society, in addition to the arts. Worldwide cultural exchange, more today than ever before, is needed to aid better international understanding among the nations and to reduce tensions. Cultural policies, together with economic and security policies, make up an integral part of foreign policy. In the long run they must rest on general political goals, the foremost of which in German foreign policy is the creation of a permanent and just peace in Europe. Peace, security, and well-being can be achieved only by overcoming existing differences and cooperating in an atmosphere of trust. Modern means of communication, private and government support of bilateral and multilateral cultural exchange, and educational aid to the Third World can build a bridge between haves and have-nots and establish a true dialog between people of all countries and classes. Work with youth should be stressed and special attention given to the interests of ethnic Germans abroad. Germany as a whole has a very rich culture; maintaining the cultural unity of the divided country can contribute to détente.

1333
[STUDIES ON PEACE RESEARCH] Studien zur Friedensforschung. Bd. 1. Hrsg. von Georg Picht und Heinz Eduard Tödt. Stuttgart, E. Klett Verlag [1969] 239 p. JX1952.S88 Bd. 1
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Peace research as a problem for church and theology: introduction to Studies on Peace Research, by Heinz Eduard Tödt.--Disarmament attempts since 1945: failures and partial successes, by Eberhard Menzel.--Provocation for peace in the dialog between theology and international law, by Ulrich Duchrow.--Peace research under the interdiction of deterrence, by Dieter Senghaas.--Peace (Shalom) in the Old Testament, by Claus Westermann.--Kant's doctrine of eternal peace and its meaning for peace research, by Günter Freudenberg.--Who guarantees peace? On Kant's work "On Eternal Peace," by Hermann Timm.

Presents basic problems and debatable concepts in peace research, focusing on the worldwide and ecumenical contributions made by theology and churches to scientifically clarify peace problems and their relation to theological questions. Menzel states that although disarmament is mentioned as a goal in the U.N. Charter, it could not be achieved during the cold war, an era too dynamic politically. Within the Western European Union, however, an effective model for arms control was worked out, and even the problem of international verification was solved. The desire of both the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve general disarmament is promising, and so are the nuclear nonproliferation treaties. Senghaas deplores the world's continuing state of "organized peacelessness," the failure of peace research to recognize that policies of threat, power, and national interests are rooted in the deterrence sys-

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tem. A peaceful world is possible only beyond deterrence, and as long as peace research does not dare criticize deterrence and policies of aggression it will remain irrelevant. A peaceful world without arms would be no more irrational than the present ridiculous investment and waste of human resources on military purposes. Senghaas appends to his article a bibliography of the most important recent works on peace research. Both Freudenberg and Timm discuss Kant's philosophies relating to peace, and Timm takes a critical view of Freudenberg's essay.

1334
THE VATICAN AND WORLD PEACE: A BOSTON COLLEGE SYMPOSIUM; edited by Francis Sweeney. Gerrards Cross, Smythe, 1970. 128 p.
JX1963.V37
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by Francis Sweeney.--Introductory remarks, by Michael P. Walsh.--The Vatican and its role in the world order, by Eugene V. Rostow.--The Holy See and the work of peace, by Arnold J. Toynbee.--Peace and national sovereignty, by John G. Clancy.--The Vatican's East-West policy since Pope John XXIII, by Robert A. Graham.--The contribution of the Holy See to world peace in the areas of diplomacy, development and ecumenism, by H. E. Cardinale.--Afterword, by Norman Cousins.

Papers presented to a conference held at Boston College, March 27, 1968, on "the work of the Holy See for the establishment of world peace, as carried on by the Vatican in its several agencies and its diplomatic representatives, and especially by the Popes themselves." The aim of the conference was to go beyond a mere survey of the historical record to explore ways in which the Vatican might better use its instruments of moral suasion to advance the cause of peace. In the main address, Cardinale reviews the Vatican's contributions to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the search for social justice, and the reconciliation of the faithful during the Pontificates of Pius XII, John XXIII, and Paul XI.

1335
Wagar, W. Warren. TOWARD THE CITY OF MAN. Center magazine, v. 1, Sept. 1968: 33-41. illus.
N&CPR

Today the best minds in Western society belong to the Organization, an unfortunate situation indeed, because solutions to the problems that beset mankind cannot be found within the confines of routine. Servants of the Organization appeal to the governments of the world to set things right, but these governments are part of the corrupt, degenerate, and immoral nation-state system. That system is obsolete; its willingness to risk the annihilation of humanity proves the point. Besides, its cultural basis is hopelessly undermined. It is foolish, however, to believe, as many do, that the nation-state is going to surrender its powers peacefully. Man's best hope is to construct out of the ruins of the old culture a new world culture, the foundation for an authentic world community and government. Of what relevance are these thoughts to efforts to draft a world constitution? The building of a world order requires "myths, legends, martyrs, heroes, and symbols, both aesthetic and intellectual." A draft constitution must be seen in this light. It will need a preamble. This might take the form of a new Declaration of Independence that will affirm the unity of man, the freedom of the person, and the community of wealth. Does all this seem a bit utopian? If so, remember that "all institutions are simply ideas translated into will and action." Ideas will be the seeds of the new world republic.

1336
Woodcock, George. STUDY WAR NO MORE. Canadian forum, v. 50, Feb. 1971: 368-371.
AP5.C125, v. 50

Excursus on pacifism suggested by the reading of Peter Brock's Twentieth-Century Pacifism (New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970). Woodcock emphasizes the book's unintended revelation that the empire-building British have been at the same time the people most inclined toward pacifism. The Christian dissent of the Quakers and the Diggers is a historic example of the tendency of reformers in Britain to seek peaceful methods of change. Modern pacifism originates in a literalist view of Christian teaching; Gandhi, for example, had to borrow from the West for his doctrine. Woodcock concludes that pacifism is a western tradition that is strongest in countries influenced by Anglo-Saxon political institutions and dissenting Christianity.

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# IV. GENERAL ANALYSES OF, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

## THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1337
Ferrell, Robert H. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES: BALLETS AT THE BRINK. American heritage, v. 22, Feb. 1971: 5-7, 96, 98-100.
E171.A43, v. 22

Highlights disarmament talks from the 19th century to the present. At The Hague in 1899 a conference of nations discussed such proposals as a ban on "the throwing of projectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons." The only product of the conference was the establishment of a tribunal to hear disputes brought to it voluntarily. A second Hague conference in 1907 was even less important. In 1921 a nine-power conference met in Washington to negotiate naval arms reduction and power balances in the Far East. The conferees quickly learned that problems of definitions would make ratios or proportional reductions virtually impossible. In 1932 a World Disarmament Conference met in Geneva, where many of the same problems were encountered; the discussions were quietly abandoned in 1934. After World War II the United States, operating from its nuclear monopoly, extended the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal on atomic energy, which called for a ban on future nuclear weapons and some international sharing of atomic energy. It was transformed into the Baruch plan with additional "enforcement provisions." When the plan was presented to the United Nations, the issue of international inspections, now a traditional argument, first entered the scene.

1338
Forndran, Erhard. [ARMS CONTROL; SECURING PEACE BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT] Rüstungskontrolle; Friedenssicherung zwischen Abschreckung und Abrüstung. [Düsseldorf] Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag [c1970] 272 p. (Krieg und Frieden Beiträge zu Grundproblemen der internationalen Politik) JX1974.F62 1970
A revision of the author's thesis, Bonn.
Bibliography: p. 251-268.

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The point of departure: the disarmament and defense policy of the United States, 1953-60.--pt. 2. Strategies of arms control: the characteristics and problems of arms control policy.--pt. 3. Arms control in practical policy: arms control and the security and defense policies of the United States, 1961-63.--Conclusions.

Reviews arms control during the fifties and sixties, focusing on U.S. military and foreign policy under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and the changes in the priorities of the world powers. Today's diplomacy is plagued by the dilemma of choice between European security policies and the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The author believes that arms control does not necessarily lead to the abolition of the arms that help to maintain stability; rather arms control is a prerequisite to disarmament. Arms control can act as an instrument of international politics, a compromise between deterrence and disarmament. Although the world powers are interested in avoiding total destruction and are willing to cooperate to a certain extent, the disarmament negotiations of the last decade have not solved the great problems, which are now complicated by China's nuclear potential. Whether the complexities of technical developments and political decision processes in the arms field will be overcome in the future remains to be seen.

1339
Hoffmann, Fredrik. ARMS DEBATES--A 'POSITIONAL' INTERPRETATION. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1970: 219-228. AS9.J6, 1970
"PRIO-publication no. 11-7."

This article is based on debates on security problems in four different parliamentary assemblies. (La Chambre des Députés, 1903, the German Reichstag, 1911, the British Parliament, 1927, and the US Senate 1963) The original aim of the project was to register what changes occur in the structures of argumentation in these debates. The main finding, however, is that the principal arguments are the same in all four debates in spite of great differences in the outside objective situation. The 'radicals' and the 'conservatives' each use one and the same set of arguments in all four debates. This leads to the conclusion that the debaters' view on security policy are not decided by objective factors. Because of the ambiguity of this kind of problem, basic political attitudes structure the debaters' perceptions of 'reality'. Finally, the structures of argumentation in the debates are explained by concepts developed in an article by Samuel Huntington. (Abstract supplied)

1340
Lieberman, Joseph I. THE SCORPION AND THE TARANTULA: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL ATOMIC WEAPONS, 1945-1949. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970. xiv, 460 p. JX1974.7.L46
Bibliography: p.[435]-440.

A "history of the futile efforts to control atomic weapons during the first years of the atomic age while America was still the world's only



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nuclear power." Lieberman focuses on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the year and a half following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He concludes that the United States and the Soviet Union share equally in the responsibility for the failure of these negotiations since neither was able to overcome the misunderstandings resulting from narrowly defined national interests.

1341
Tate, Merze. THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION; THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS TO 1907. New York, Russell & Russell [1971] xiv, 398 p.
JX1974.T3 1971
Bibliography: p. 365-368.

Contents.--Introduction: Resumé of the movement for disarmament to 1870.--pt. 1. Public opinion and the movement for disarmamanent, 1870-1898: Liberal and radical influences on the movement for a limitation of armaments. The movement for disarmament within the universal peace congresses, 1889-1898. The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the question of disarmament. The churches and the Arbitration Alliance. The jurisconsults' approach to the disarmament question. Official opinion and the limitation of armaments. Conclusion: the influence of public opinion upon the movement for a limitation of armaments.--pt. 2. The Tsar's Rescript: The origin of the rescript: influences which may have moved the tsar. The origin of the rescript: motives which may have actuated the tsar's ministers. The pacifists and the Tsar's Rescript. Public opinion and the Tsar's Rescript. The opinions of international jurists on the disarmament problem. The attitude of governments towards the Tsar's Rescript.--pt. 3. The movement for disarmament, 1899-1907: The first Hague conference. The movement for a limitation of armaments between the first and second Hague conferences. The second Hague conference. Summary and interpretations.--Index.

A critical history of pre-1907 movements for a general, simultaneous limitation or reduction of armaments. In this work, which first appeared in 1942, Tate contends that disarmament, by which she means "the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety," is not a moral but a political problem and can be understood only in a political context. She finds the crux of the disarmament problem during this period to have been dissatisfaction with the status quo and unwillingness to yield any essential advantage.

## GENERAL ANALYSES

1342
Damien, George D. ARMING THROUGH DISARMAMENT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Mar. 1971: 30-38. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Normative analysis breaks down the exclusiveness of concepts established by logical-empirical analysis. According to the latter, concepts like "living" and "dying," or "armament" and "disarmament," are separate and mutually exclusive conceptual realities; normative analysis reveals their interdependence. Applied to arms control issues, normative analysis brings to light critical features of the armament-disarmament process. It also tells the analyst a great deal about Soviet arms control policy. Normative analysis shows that the perfection of a weapons system is its negation and that a weapon may be "functionally" negated by its non-use. Significantly, a weapon that has been functionally negated undergoes a qualitative change in the enhancement of its value as an instrument of political coercion. Soviet arms control policy is based on this insight. In coming years the Soviet Union can be expected to sign agreements with the United States to establish nuclear-free zones or limit particular offensive and defensive weapons systems. For the United States, however, the consequence of this latter type of agreement will be an intensification of the inflationary cycle. This is precisely what the Soviet Union intends, knowing full well that an attack on the U.S. dollar is an attack on U.S. security. The difficulty is that security, armament, and disarmament are interrelated in a complex and dynamic way. There can be no security without armament and, as has been shown, no armament without disarmament. But "armament negates disarmament, and vice versa, while disarmament negates security."

1343
DISARMAMENT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 8, Jan. 1971: 29-33. JX1977.A1U564, v. 8

Arms control and disarmament resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 7, 1970 with breakdown of voting and an explanation of some votes. Resolutions requested depositary governments to open the seabed treaty for signature and ratification; urged nuclear-weapon states to curb the arms race, suspend testing in all environments, and suspend deployment of nuclear-weapon systems, and called on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to make a more intensive disarmament effort. Resolutions dealing with chemical and biological warfare asked for strict observance of the Geneva Protocol, invited all nonsigning states to sign and ratify the Geneva Protocol, and directed the CCD to continue consideration of the problem of chemical and biological weapons. The Assembly also called for an improvement in worldwide seismological capabilities to facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, instructed the CCD to continue working toward a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, and called on the nuclear powers to adhere to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

1344
Mastny, Vojtech, ed. DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS, 1964-69. New York, Facts on File [1970] 254 p. (Interim history) JX1974.7.M28
A Facts on File publication.

Partial contents.--1964: Red Chinese nuclear test. Threat of nuclear proliferation. 1964's

nuclear tests.--1965: UN Disarmament Commission activity. NATO & nuclear policy. 1965's nuclear tests.--1966: Arms race accelerates. Geneva talks. Progress toward A-arms limitation. 1966's nuclear tests.--1967: Non-proliferation. New weapons developments. 1967's nuclear tests.--1968: Non-proliferation treaty. New weapons. 1968's nuclear tests.--1969: United States ABM policy debated. Non-proliferation treaty. Preparations for strategic arms talks. 1969's nuclear tests.

1345

Nixon, Richard M. SOUND LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS URGED BY PRESIDENT NIXON. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Mar. 15, 1971: 310-311.
JX232.A33, v. 64

A message from the U.S. President to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which reconvened at Geneva, Switzerland, on Feb. 23, 1971. President Nixon stated that an opportunity now exists to make progress on the control of chemical and biological weapons. The control of biological weapons presents fewer problems, however, and should be tackled separately. The United States will support, as part of any convention to limit biological weapons, "an unambiguous commitment engaging all parties to undertake further negotiations regarding limitations on chemical weapons." The main stumbling block with respect to chemical weapons is the problem of verification, which it now becomes the common task to solve. The United States will support efforts by the committee to ban underground nuclear weapons tests, "to improve worldwide seismological capabilities in order to facilitate such a ban," and "to achieve a greater understanding of the verification issue." In addition to the above matters, the United states would like to see the committee give increasing attention to problems of conventional arms limitations.

1346

Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 20th, Fontana, Wis., 1970. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATION: PUGWASH ASSESSMENT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 20-23.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Statement drawn at the 20th Pugwash Conference by Working Group II, which reviewed progress in disarmament and arms limitation agreements among the nations of the world. Included in the group's statement are views on the concept of deterrence, first-strike capability, chemical and biological weapons (CBW), nuclear proliferation, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It was emphasized that despite SALT and the nonproliferation treaty the threats inherent in the arms race have not decreased significantly and that the final objectives of arms control and disarmament must be general and complete disarmament. The group agreed that unilateral disarmament in the realm of CBW is imperative, as is the elimination of all secrecy, including that which surrounds defensive bacteriological research.

1347

Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 20th, Fontana, Wis., 1970. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, "PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: A PROGRAMME FOR THE SEVENTIES." [London, Printed by Taylor & Francis, 1970?] 292 p.
JX1974.P8 1970

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Reports from working groups: International security problems. European security arrangements. Disarmament and arms limitation.--pt. 2. Proceedings of the plenary sessions.--pt. 3. Papers submitted to the conference: Status of current negotiations at Geneva Disarmament Conference, by G. Bunn. The non-proliferation treaty--status and prospects, by E. L. M. Burns. On disarmament and arms limitation, by V. S. Emelyanov. On the consequences of nuclear war--a reminder, by B. T. Feld. Quantitative and qualitative aspects of the arms race, by V. V. Larionov. Strategic debates, by V. V. Larionov. Environmental pollution: radiation, by Patricia J. Lindop and J. Rotblat. SIPRI experiment on verification of non-production of chemical warfare agents by direct observation in commercial production plants, by J. K. Miettinen. On the problem of disarmament, by G. Nadjakov. ABM at SALT: NCA or zero level? by G. Rathjens and S. Weinberg.

Papers, working group reports, and plenary session proceedings of the 20th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Fontana, Wis., Sept. 9-15, 1970. The conference theme "Peace and International Cooperation: A Programme for the Seventies" was interpreted broadly by the participants to encompass ecological, resource, population, and development problems in addition to the peace and security issues that have been the central concern of previous Pugwash meetings.

1348

Thierry, Hubert. [ATOMIC WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY] Les armes atomiques et la politique internationale. [Paris, Dunod, 1970] 125 p. (Dunod actualité) JX1974.7.T5

Discusses the impact of arms control and disarmament, deterrence, and nuclear proliferation on international relations. Thierry surveys new developments in arms control, including the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the draft seabed treaty, efforts to ban underground nuclear tests, and the Strategic Arms Llimitation Talks. He concludes that the superpowers have begun to explore the path toward reason instead of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation and urges that France follow this example.

1349

United Nations. Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs. Disarmament Affairs Division. THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, 1945-1970. New York, United Nations [1970] xvi, 515 p.
JX1974.U37
Sales no.: 70.IX.1.

Contents.--Introduction: evolution of machinery and approaches.--pt. 1. Initial efforts: 1946-

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1950: The Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission for Conventional Armaments.--pt. 2. General disarmament, 1951-1970: Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, 1951-1958. General and complete disarmament, 1959-1970. Economic and social consequences of disarmament.--pt. 3. Collateral measures of disarmament: Collateral measures of disarmament. Outer space and disarmament. The problem of the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. --pt. 4. The discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests: Early initiatives, 1954-1958. The period of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1958-1962. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban, 1964-1970.--pt. 5. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Nuclear-free zones.-- pt. 6. The question of bacteriological (biological) weapons: Efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.--Postscript.--Appendices.

A survey of the work of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament during the quarter-century 1945-70. The deliberations and negotiations on various disarmament matters are outlined, and the results achieved or the stage reached in the consideration of each complex of issues and problems is indicated. Any attempt to interpret this work or relate it to events taking place outside the organization or present the views of particular states is eschewed. The appendixes contain treaties, General Assembly resolutions, draft treaties, and other proposals relating to arms control and disarmament.

1350
United Nations. Secretary General, 1961- (Thant). BASIC PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT. Reports. New York, United Nations, 1970. 265 p.
DLC
Sales no. E.70.I.17 (paperbound).

Contents.--Economic and social consequences of disarmament.--Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for states of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.--Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.

Reports prepared by the Secretary General of the United Nations at the request of the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, the probable effects of nuclear weapons in war, the implications for non-nuclear-weapon states of the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the problems of chemical and biological weapons. The aim of these studies was "to ascertain the real magnitude of the potential danger of the arms race, in particular the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction." Besides evaluating "the immense risks for human life involved in the development and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical and bacteriological (biological)," and weighing "the heavy, and often crippling, economic burdens [men] are carrying as a result of the arms race," the reports offer suggestions as to how these risks and burdens might be reduced.

1351
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. REPORT. 9th; 1969. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 60 p. illus. (Its Publication 54)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 54

Contents.--Introduction.--Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.--Nuclear arms control proposals.-- Chemical and biological weapons control.--Arms control measure for the seabed.--Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.--Conventional arms and military expenditures.--Mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.--General Advisory Committee.--Agency operations.--Appendixes.

The Agency's ninth annual report, covering the period Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1969. The report covers major U.S. activities and proposals in the field of arms control and disarmament during the year and includes information about the Agency's mission, operations, and organization. Official documents dealing with arms control topics of concern to the U.S. Government during 1969 are appended, along with further details of Agency operation.

1352
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. REPORT. 10th; 1970. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970] 50 p. illus. (Its Publications 57)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 57

Contents.--Introduction.--Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.--Arms control measures for the seabed. --Chemical and biological weapons control.--Nonproliferation treaty.--Transfers of conventional arms.--Mutual and balanced force reductions.--Impact of reduced defense expenditures on the American economy.--Agency operations.--General Advisory Committee.--Appendixes.

Report on the operations of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its 10th year. Its mission is to develop and recommend measures to dampen the arms race and lessen the threat of war. Subjects of international negotiations on arms control and disarmament matters reported during 1970 include strategic arms limitation, the denuclearization of the seabed, and the nonproliferation treaty. The Agency's organization and such operations as formulating and coordinating policy and planning and conducting research are also discussed.

1353
Winn, Ira J. TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 35-37.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

In the name of national defense and security each superpower continues to produce sophisticated

weapons in an arms race that is creating fear and insecurity. National defense and national security have become mutually incompatible, and the former is being purchased at the price of the latter. The feel for genuine national security has been lost through the superpowers' confusion of armaments with defense and defense with security and through the refusal of either power to stop the upward spiral of weaponry and remove the underlying sources of international tension and strife. If the United States is genuinely interested in national and world security, it must "direct at least half of the defense budget through the [Arms Control and] Disarmament Agency, the United Nations, the war on poverty, and to technical assistance to developing countries." Instead, it blindly pursues a defense policy that is wasteful, archaic, and reactive. A new defense policy that fulfills social as well as military needs must be formulated. Unarmed forces, designed to promote security at home and abroad in the form of social and economic reconstruction, should receive a substantial share of the defense budget. A national security depletion tax, which would offer tax incentives to investors in health, education, and overseas social and economic development programs, should be created to fund the huge budget pool that will be required. Similarly a peace fund, "into which would pour 50 per cent of war production profits over 12 per cent as well as 50 per cent of R&D costs over original estimates" is needed. Money from this source could fund the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other related peace-centered efforts that could be eventually centralized in a department of peace.

## COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

1354
Badurina, Berislav. DISARMAMENT: TODAY'S IMPERATIVE. Review of international affairs, v. 21, Dec. 20, 1970: 3-5.
D839.R4, v. 21

Speaking through the United Nations at its 25th anniversary session, the small powers still urge the large to press forward to general and complete disarmament. The small and medium countries of the world perceive the harmful consequences of a quickening pace of armament and only slow progress toward disarmament. They decry the increased tension, lack of security, and social and economic problems thus generated. At the same time the small nations recognize that the major responsibility for disarmament lies with the superpowers, who tend to operate according to their own priorities rather than the needs of the international community. In contrast, Yugoslavia and others seek "equal participation of all countries" in discussions of disarmament.

1355
WORKING TO STOP THE ARMS RACE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 12-16. JX351.A3, v. 23

Summarizes the activities of the two sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) held in Geneva from February 17 to April 30, and from June 16 to September 3, 1970. Attention was focused on negotiations on a seabed treaty and supplementary measures to ban chemical and biological weapons. On a Canadian initiative the CCD considered the potential international capability for seismological monitoring of an underground nuclear test ban. Aspects of general and complete disarmament and efforts to prepare a program for the Disarmament Decade in the 1970's were also discussed.

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# V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

## REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR (COMMAND AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS, ESCALATION, ACCIDENTAL WAR, NEGOTIATION, DISENGAGEMENT, NEUTRALIZATION)

1356

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. HOW WARS END. Special editor of this volume: William T. R. Fox. Philadelphia, 1970. 262 p. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) H1.A4, v. 392

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--The problems of war termination: The causes of peace and conditions of war, by William T. R. Fox. War termination and conflict theory: value premises, theories, and policies, by Berenice A. Carroll.--Success and failure in ending war: Wars prolonged by misunderstood signals, by George H. Quester. War termination in Latin America, by Bryce Wood. How hostilities have ended: peace treaties and alternatives, by Quincy Wright. --The decision to seek peace: Domestic politics and peacemaking: reconciling incompatible imperatives, by Robert Rothstein. The domestic origins of peace, by Robert Randle. War termination as a problem in civil-military relations, by Morton H. Halperin.--The calculus of peacemaking: Provisionality and finality, by Paul Seabury. Political rationality in ending war, by Paul Kecskemeti. --Nuclear wars: Civilian sanctuary and target avoidance policy in thermonuclear war, by Edmund O. Stillman. Issues of thermonuclear war termination, by Herman Kahn.--Index.

Essays on the problems of terminating wars. Most of the essays focus on the termination of limited wars, particularly the Vietnam War; the final two essays are concerned with the termination of thermonuclear wars.

1357

Bark, Dennis L. CHANGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE; THE BONN-MOSCOW TREATY OF AUGUST 1970. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, Jan. 15, 1971: 216-218. PN6121.V52, v. 37

Moscow will honor the treaty with West Germany only as long as it remains compatible with Soviet policy goals, consolidates the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, and requires no Soviet concessions on major European problems. The shortsightedness of Western optimists is evident in the political and economic concessions West Germany is prepared to make for the illusion of détente. Since the signing of the treaty in August 1970, West Germany has concluded several economic agreements highly beneficial to the sagging Soviet economy, but the Soviet Union has not budged in its refusal to recognize West Berlin as a part of West Germany. The cold war remains very much alive; the West must not allow itself to be deceived by the Soviet wolf in sheep's clothing.

1358

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. AFTER NEO-ISOLATIONISM, WHAT? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 9-13. TK9145.A84, v. 27

"Article . . . based in part on the results of a new round of senior-level 'political exercises' conducted by the Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., under a contract with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Although a U.S. nonintervention strategy can correct the problem of overinvolvement it might not accomplish its larger purpose of conflict control. The United States may be unwilling to use military power in future local conflicts, but nevertheless it may still have to deal with conflicts that threaten a larger peace. Until now U.S. policymakers have considered only military action, at the expense of other conflict-relevant alternatives in the political, economic, social, and psychological spheres. The United States should apply these conflict-relevant alternatives within the framework of a conflict-avoidance strategy by reappraising American policy toward countries undergoing revolutionary movements and break away from automatically taking sides. Thus it could work to strengthen fragile democratic centers and supply people who can combine change with freedom or even, in some cases, work with indigenous extremists. With increasing recognition by the superpowers of the folly of viewing all incipient local conflicts as Soviet-U.S. confrontations, America must stop gaging its reputation on a day-to-day boxscore of relative influence throughout the world. For the United States to be in control of incipient conflict situations or weigh its power on the rare occasion when a vital balance is at stake, it will need decisionmaking machinery adequate to deal with complex problems ahead of time. However the difficulty of attracting the serious attention of government leaders to conflict situations before they become acute and the dominance of diplomatic and military elements in the United States augurs ill for the Nation's ability to play the creative role required by a nonintervention strategy.

1359

Burchett, Wilfred G. THE NIXON PLAN AND INDOCHINA REALITIES. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1971: 45-49. D839.I465, 1971

President Nixon's five-point plan for Indochina is unrealistic demagogery, designed not for the conference table in Paris but for the oncoming American elections. His call for an immediate cease-fire in place is ludicrous in a guerrilla war where there are no fixed lines. With the memory of the Diem government's repudiation of the 1954 Geneva agreement in mind, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (NLF) must insist on all forces remaining intact until an acceptable agreement is negotiated. As futile as a cease-fire in place without an American commitment to get out of South Vietnam would be the convocation of an international conference, which certainly cannot solve problems the Paris negotiators cannot solve. Nixon's so-called "new" troop-withdrawal offer turned out to be the old, preposterous demand for mutual, simultaneous troop withdrawals, the equivalent of offering to withdraw Americans from "Vietnam if Vietnamese also quit Vietnam." Nixon's call for a political solution "which would reflect the existing relationship of political forces" disingenuously avoids the question of who is to decide what reflects the existing relationship of political forces. Mr. Nixon also knows well that prisoners of war have never been released before the cessation of hostilities. All in all, Nixon sees South Vietnam as a colony kept under permanent U.S. garrison while Asians fight Asians in the rest of Indochina. Eventually Washington will have to come to terms with the basic reality in Indochina, the determination of its peoples to attain real independence.

1360

Carroll, Berenice A. WAR TERMINATION AND CONFLICT THEORY: VALUE PREMISES, THEORIES, AND POLICIES. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 14-29.
H1.A4, v. 392

Conflict theory has an abstract appearance, but it is basically a field of applied social research, in which theories and their policy implications are profoundly affected by the underlying objectives and value premises of the conflict theorist. On the whole, conflict theory today operates from value premises favoring the reduction, moderation, or stabilization of conflict rather than its intensification; in practice, if not in theory, this tends to align it with status quo interests. The initial impact of this value orientation was to discourage study of war termination, but in recent years conflict theorists have begun to turn their attention to this problem. Some who have done so have seen wars as "fightlike," some as "gamelike." In both cases, the studies have been heavily influenced by assumptions congenial to the prevailing value premises. In particular, conflict theorists have sought to view abstractly the conflicts they study, to fit them into symmetrical models, and to focus upon conflict behavior--military action and strategic options--rather than upon the antagonistic interests or political issues in conflict. In certain recent studies applying conflict theory to current problems of war termination, these values and assumptions have led to conceptual schemes and policy conclusions strikingly similar to Defense Department strategies of pacification and to standing policy positions of the United States government, in particular with respect to the war in Vietnam. (Abstract supplied)

1361

Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Round table, no. 241, Jan. 1971: 33-41.
AP4.R6, 1971

Recites the recent history of disarmament negotiations and explains the associated problems, deadlocks, and frustrations. The partial test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty are dealt with in some detail, and mention is made of the Antarctic Treaty, the outer space treaty, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. After explaining that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were planned as a result of anxieties expressed by nonnuclear nations over the nonproliferation treaty, Lord Chalfont outlines possible consequences of the talks. The most positive might be some diminution of nuclear weapons stockpiles, or at least some restrictions on testing of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles or deployment of ABM's. If the talks fail, the nonproliferation treaty may be in danger, and discussion of general and complete disarmament will be merely academic.

1362

Churba, Joseph. PERCEIVING OPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.] Documentary Research Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1970. 45 p. col. map.
D863.2.R9C48

In breaking out of their historic isolation through seapower, the Soviets have altered the strategic equation in the eastern Mediterranean and have gained the revolutionary momentum in the Arab East. The U.S., however, retains a certain geopolitical check on the physical expansion of the U.S.S.R. in the region, which renders precarious present Soviet gains in the radical Arab states; this check is not altogether of U.S. making, but rather a consequence of the independent strength of Israel, Turkey, and Iran, and of the conservative Arab states. Nevertheless, in terms of world strategy and economy the Middle East appears to be an area of declining importance. Whereas this assessment may be true only for the West, the military options in the region for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., are prohibitive except perhaps in the event of unilateral direct intervention by either power. Still, the significance of the reality of constraints on military options is not fully understood; and so long as the interplay between great power and local rivalries continues, the incentive for regional initiatives toward modus vivendi in local conflict is not to be expected. The principal task for the superpowers, therefore, is to widen further the scope for regional maneuver by initiating a process of mutual disengagement through joint and reciprocal measures, and by eliminating for certain, the threat

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of an accidental East-West collision. The alternatives are continued entanglement in local conflicts; the threat of accelerated pressures and tensions; and higher risks toward the prohibitive choice between diplomatic paralysis and great-power confrontation on peripheral issues. (Abstract supplied)

1363

CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA: A READER ON THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. Edited by Marvin and Susan Gettleman and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan. New York, Random House [1970] 461 p. maps.
DS557.C28C6

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Early heritage and colonialism.--pt. 2. Independence and the Geneva Accords of 1954.--pt. 3. The struggle for neutrality in Laos.--pt. 4. The struggle for neutrality in Cambodia.--pt. 5. The furtive war in Laos.--pt. 6. The war spreads to Cambodia.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Documents, articles, speeches, radio broadcasts, and other statements on the war in Laos and Cambodia. The editors stress the need for historical perspective as a prerequisite for understanding and resolving the present conflict. The contributors include scholars, journalists, and participants in the conflict, most of whom are strongly critical of U.S. involvement.

1364

Ellsberg, Daniel. LAOS: WHAT NIXON IS UP TO. New York review of books, v. 16, Mar. 11, 1971: 13-17.
AP2.N655, v. 16

President Nixon is at least as committed as any of his predecessors in office to maintaining an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam, but he also recognizes that he must reduce U.S. casualties and war costs in order to be reelected in 1972. He hopes to achieve this by reducing U.S. troop levels to between 50,000 and 150,000, greatly intensifying the air war in Cambodia and Laos, and threatening North Vietnam with "decisive" bombing if Hanoi tries to regain the initiative. North Vietnam is thus forced to choose between a "Korean solution" and massive destruction, perhaps including a U.S.-supported invasion of the North. The administration appears unconcerned about the effects of intensified bombing on the peoples of Cambodia and Laos, just as it has shown little concern for Vietnamese civilians. The number of refugees and civilian casualties in Cambodia and Laos has greatly increased since Nixon took office, most of them the victims of U.S. bombing. "It is against this background of two decades of American official and public ignorance about and indifference to our impact upon the people of Indochina that one must understand the ease with which the Nixon Administration has sold the slogan: 'The war is trending down.'"

1365

Fox, William T. R. THE CAUSES OF PEACE AND CONDITIONS OF WAR. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 1-13.
H1.A4, v. 392

What makes wars end ("the causes of peace") and what keeps wars from ending ("the conditions of war") has been much less studied than what makes wars start ("the causes of war") and what keeps wars from starting ("the conditions of peace"). Past inattention to war termination problems is variously explained by political scientists' concern with war avoidance, strategists' concern with victory and deterrence, and pervasive doubts that thermonuclear war can be kept from running its full course. Protracted, large-scale, nonatomic asymmetrical war--limited for the major power participant but unlimited for the local, post-colonial minor power--and apocalyptic thermonuclear exchange are the two types of war which mainly concern students of war termination. Although there is brief reference to forces making the participants in thermonuclear war strenuously seek early termination, if only to save their cities, the main emphasis is on war termination in large-scale, limited war. The problem is discussed chiefly from the point of view of a major power seeking to take a "turn toward peace," eschewing victory but unwilling to accept defeat. Factors favoring termination are discussed in terms of the world political pressures for peace, constraints keeping the two sides from using fully the coercive force available, competing high-priority domestic policy objectives, the translation of battlefield results into more realistic expectations and moderated war objectives, the continuous calculus of sacrifices still to be made and gains still to be realized, and the problem of making peace proposals which are both understood and acceptable. (Abstract supplied)

1366

Giddings, Ralph L. BATTLE MANAGEMENT FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Jan. 1971: 49-52. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Dynamic real-time battle management is essential to integrating the Nation's strategic weapons systems. The ABM defense must be coordinated to prevent the use of Nike-X missiles against reentry vehicles that have already been neutralized by the sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system (SABMIS), while coordination of an ICBM attack is necessary to eliminate unnecessary duplication against enemy targets that have either moved (for example, an empty silo) or have been destroyed. Should an arms control agreement reduce the number of ICBM's available to the United States, real-time battle management could provide a more credible deterrent by minimizing the uncertainties associated with a nuclear attack. By increasing the efficiency of the deterrent, it would afford an additional safeguard to any strategic arms limitation agreement and thereby make possible a meaningful alternative to escalation of the arms race. Opposition to real-time battle management stems mostly from rivalry among the services for control of individual weapons systems, but attempts to assert civilian control over the military in all strategic situations have also hindered the realization of this vital concept.

1367
Halperin, Morton H. WAR TERMINATION AS A PROBLEM IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 86-95.
H1.A4, v. 392

Three military groups with different interests will influence decisions regarding war termination. Each will believe that it is advocating what is in the national interest but will view it from a different perspective. The field commander will believe that his theater is of central importance and that military victory is possible. The military services will be concerned about their continuing autonomy and growth and will evaluate proposals for war termination from this perspective. The general staff in the nation's capital will be sensitive to domestic and foreign political considerations and will view their mission as compromising between civilian and field commander views. Civilian political leaders will be concerned with the post-war domestic implications. Civilians are frequently dependent on the military for information on both allied and enemy war capability. Field commanders generally believe that time is on their side, but are likely to be cautious in promising success in any given period. At the same time, they tend to exaggerate tactical successes. To procure adoption of the desired policy, military leaders may threaten a coup, threaten to resign, or issue public statements pre-empting policy. The most potent weapon of the civilian leader is to fire the field commander. Pressure to end a war will usually come from civilians, who will need the support of the general staff to overrule the field commander. (Abstract supplied)

1368
Joiner, Harry M. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION. [Geneva?] 1969. 263 l. (Graduate Institute of International Studies. Mémoire de diplôme, diplôme no. 107)
JX1311.J63

Typescript.
Bibliography: leaves 255-262.

A paradigm of international negotiation, which could "serve as an adequate base from which the important concept of negotiation can be examined in an effort to understand, control, and predict specific instances of international bargaining encounters." Joiner studies the roles national characteristics and goals play in negotiations, examining the impact of such variables as power, language, culture, and attitudes; discusses the relationship between formulation of national goals and of specific proposals during negotiations to express these goals; distinguishes the principal negotiator from the negotiator, describing their duties and roles; examines the effect of certain psychological and personal variables on the outcome of negotiations; and surveys the techniques of persuasion, including communication, warnings, threats, and bluffs. The author completes his model by outlining the conditions under which formal negotiations are held and the exogenous forces affecting negotiations and by investigating the role of informal, nonplenary sessions. Joiner concludes that future negotiation studies should concentrate on not only the formal proceedings but on informal channels of communication in order to examine the content of decisions made at this crucial level.

1369
Kahn, Herman. ISSUES OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR TERMINATION. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 133-172.
H1.A4, v. 392

"Paper . . . largely drawn from a Hudson Institute report, 'War Termination, Issues and Concepts,' by William Pfaff, Edmund Stillman, and [Herman Kahn]."

The possibility of thermonuclear war is here faced and its termination probed, in view of the fact that the missiles for such a war are already in existence and its actuality is therefore not truly "unthinkable." The premise is advanced that the '70's are perhaps the last decade of safety from such a war. Features of a modal model are explored, and six basic and omnipresent threats are discussed. The concept of a war of reciprocal reprisals is presented, as are the cases of ad hoc cease-fire, conditional cease-fire, and the continuation of war with both "rational" and "irrational" outcomes. Ways to hypothecate force in a stable balance-of-terror environment are then examined, and eleven types of war outcome analyzed. The various situations enhancing acceptability of at least an ad hoc cease-fire are listed, and the possible results of taking the recommended design cases seriously are emphasized. A sample mobilization scenario is given in the concluding remarks of warning. (Abstract supplied)

1370
Kecskemeti, Paul. POLITICAL RATIONALITY IN ENDING WAR. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 105-115.
H1.A4, v. 392

The terminal stage of an armed conflict is reached when both sides agree to accept the military outcome (i.e., the "asymmetrical" or "symmetrical" distribution of armed strength) existing at that time as the basis for determining the political payoffs accruing to each. The payoff distribution corresponding to the "asymmetrical" outcome (monopoly of armed strength for one side, the other being defenseless) is the political "stake." The more "symmetrical" the outcome, the greater the difference between the actual payoffs and the "stake." Both "asymmetrical" and "symmetrical" outcomes, however, may be reversible as long as the adversaries still have mobilizable potentials at their disposal. Whether a given outcome will be accepted by both sides as the "terminal" one depends on their judgments concerning two questions: (1) whether the outcome can be reversed by renewed efforts, and (2) whether the "stake" is high enough to justify an attempt in this direction. This suggests two kinds of "rational" criteria for terminating armed conflicts: the "irre-

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versibility" principle, and the principal of "correspondence between effort and stake." Now "reversibility" depends, in part, on the effort that the belligerent in question is willing to make, and hence on the "correspondence" principle; it is argued, however, that objective, "rational" decision criteria for "correspondence" cannot be defined, because there is no common measure between "costs" and political "payoffs." It is argued that one can speak of a "rational" conclusion of conflicts only to the extent that a "convergent reorientation" of the basic political outlook of the adversaries takes place, as a result of which the controversial issues underlying the conflicts are liquidated. (Abstract supplied)

1371
Leont'ev, A. THE LAOS DEBACLE AND AFTER. New times, no. 16, Apr. 21, 1971: 8-9.
D839.N483, 1971

The headlong flight of Saigon's elite units out of Laos is also a defeat for the Vietnamization policy. The Laos venture failed to achieve a single goal set by its organizers because Americans lost the advantages of surprise and were unprepared for so well equipped an enemy. Washington may choose to ignore this further proof that escalation is worse than useless, but it is already suffering the augmented offensive thrust of the freedom fighters. The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union repledged Soviet aid and support for the liberation movement in Southeast Asia.

1372
Lynch, Hugh F. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS. Naval War College review, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 71-88.
N&CPR

Examines the presidential decisionmaking process to identify constraints limiting the executive's freedom to employ tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars outside the NATO-Warsaw Pact area. Lynch thinks military necessity secondary to the overriding considerations of domestic and international politics or other considerations of national strategy. Although domestic pressures or the opinion of friends and allies can be overruled by a strong President, other factors discouraging the selection of the nuclear option may be beyond his control. The circumstances that might impel authorization of nuclear weapons in limited war are difficult to project. However, the impact of all factors in the decisionmaking process should be understood by the high levels of military command.

1373
Morgenthau, Hans J. WHAT PRICE VICTORY? New republic, v. 164, Feb. 20, 1971: 21-23.
AP2.N624, v. 164

President Nixon still hopes for a military victory in Vietnam despite public and congressional opposition to the war, which is in reality opposition not so much to the war as such as to high American casualty rates not balanced by perceptible gains. "Search and destroy" tactics were bound to fail against an enemy that constitutes virtually the entire population of a country; the indiscriminate destruction of the population that is required to win such a war can be achieved more effectively and economically by aerial bombardment. The Cooper-Church amendment essentially ratified and legitimized this shift in tactics, but it also limited the administration's freedom of action by restricting the use of U.S. ground troops. Under these circumstances, Nixon's commitment to win the war from the air "casts an ominous shadow not only over Southeast Asia but over the United States and Western Civilization itself." Since even intensified and extended conventional aerial bombardment is not likely to prove decisive, pressure to use "tactical" nuclear weapons is certain to increase. Unconditional disengagement remains the only rational solution to the war, and it is possible that the military's desire to preserve itself as an effective fighting force may yet favor this solution. The issue remains in doubt, however, and at some point the administration will have to choose between "the nuclear 'final solution' . . . [and] the Algerian solution of unqualified disengagement."

1374
NEGOTIATION AND STATECRAFT; A SELECTION OF READINGS. Compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (pursuant to S. Res. 311, 91st Cong.) of the Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 59 p.
JX4473.N4

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Selections ranging in time from 800 B.C. to the present, that include fables, fairy tales, memoirs, and theoretical essays.

1375
Paul, Roland A. LAOS: ANATOMY OF AN AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 533-547. map. D410.F6, v. 49

A history and analysis of U.S. involvement in Laos since 1961. Paul considers it unlikely that the United States would commit ground combat troops to Laos even if a Communist takeover appeared imminent. He concludes that any settlement, de facto or otherwise, based on recognition of the existing battle line between Communist and non-Communist forces would be preferable to continuation of the conflict.

1376
[PEKING'S UNANIMOUS JUDGMENT ON THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT] Peking verurteilt massiv den deutsch-sowjetischen Vertrag. China-Analysen, v. 9, Oct. 1970: 31-34. DS701.C356, v. 9

Summarizes the Chinese press reaction to the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement. Moscow is accused of having betrayed East Germany and of willfully endangering European security by its cooperation in the technological development of

West German militarism. Most striking is the Chinese failure to comment on the possible significance of the Moscow-Bonn pact for future Sino-Soviet relations.

1377
Plischke, Elmer. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCING AND THE SUMMIT: MACRO-ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION. Orbis, v. 14, fall 1970: 673-713.
D839.068, v. 14
Bibliographical footnotes.

Explains the role of "summit conferencing" in contemporary diplomatic relations by presenting a macrosynthesis of its use by U.S. presidents. Presidential involvement in summit conferences has become a widely used diplomatic technique. Plischke states that serious questioning of the value of summit conferences is directed at the President as a negotiator over specific issues, especially when popular expectations are high and consequences are uncertain. He concludes that the summit conference is a vital part of international diplomacy and that much can be accomplished when the meeting is carefully planned and wisely employed. Tables present the types of international conferences, presidential participation in summit meetings from 1782 to the present, and a detailed summary of presidential participation from the beginning of this century.

1378
Quester, George H. WARS PROLONGED BY MISUNDERSTOOD SIGNALS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 30-39. H1.A4, v. 392

Various kinds of stimulus for war can be identified. Men and nations may simply be incompatible with each other. Both sides may expect a prolonged war to produce military victory, at least one of them necessarily being in error. The strategic situation may handsomely reward those who violate truces and launch sneak attacks. Each side may be overrating the other's willingness to launch such attacks, thereby misunderstanding the other's commitment to peace. History offers a number of examples of wars prolonged by misunderstanding of peace signals. Yet the stimuli listed suggest that the explanation for any war typically must be more complicated. Statesmen may therefore misunderstand signals because they want to, because basic strategy suggests they come out better that way. Forcing an opponent to make his signals extremely clear may produce more favorable substantive terms, and also guard against the other side defaulting on his promises. An important problem with peace signals is that they will not necessarily bind the nation that sent them. Pessimists would argue that signals and promises in international politics can never be effective without some higher authority to enforce them. Yet this overstates the problem, since various mechanisms explain why a nation which has offered peace will thereafter be a little more constrained than before. (Abstract supplied)

1379
Randle, Robert. THE DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF PEACE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 76-85.
H1.A4, v. 392

A variety of pressures is felt by the policy-makers of a belligerent actor impelling them to make peace. Internal pressures originate with the legislature, the elites, public opinion, advisers of the policy-makers and the ministries of the government. History provides us with the examples from which we can generalize when peace moves are constrained or permitted by forces within the polity of a belligerent. (Abstract supplied)

1380
Randle, Robert F. GENEVA 1954; THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1969. xvii, 639 p. illus.
DS550.R3
Bibliography: p. [611]-618.

Contents.--pt. 1. Prelude to Geneva: the diplomacy of nonintervention.--pt. 2. The Geneva conference and world politics.--pt. 3. The Geneva agreements: analysis and implementation.--Appendix: documents pertaining to the settlement of the Indochinese war.

A history of negotiations and events leading up to negotiations at the 1954 Geneva conference, and a legal analysis of the results of the conference. Randle contends that the Geneva agreements were too vague and otherwise legally defective to bring lasting peace to Indochina. Participants in the negotiations reached a consensus on the terms of a cease-fire, disengagement, and regroupment, but sharply disagreed on the question of the neutralization of Indochina and other political questions. Neither the United States nor the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) committed itself to a formal timetable for elections or other means of achieving a political settlement, nor was the SEATO treaty a violation of the agreements, since each state was permitted to seek help from any state or collectivity of states to insure its defense. Randle concludes that disillusionment among Vietminh leaders, who may have been led to expect a genuine political settlement, was possibly the most pernicious effect of the Geneva agreements.

1381
Roots, John McCook. DAVID BEN-GURION TALKS ABOUT ISRAEL AND THE ARABS . . . "PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN REAL ESTATE." Saturday review, v. 54, Apr. 3, 1971: 14-16.
Z1219.S25, v. 54

Report of an interview with former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion contends that Israel should offer to return all Arab lands occupied during the 1967 war except for Jerusalem and the Golan heights in order to secure peace with its Arab neighbors. He considers the time propitious for Israel to make peace because of Arab willingness to recognize Israel in exchange

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for the return of Arab territories and the realization that Israel's physical survival is no longer at issue, at least in the short term, and because of the threat posed by the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East.

1382
Rothstein, Robert. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND PEACEMAKING: RECONCILING INCOMPATIBLE IMPERATIVES. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 62-75.
H1.A4, v. 392

The intrusion of domestic politics into questions of foreign policy and peacemaking has usually had a negative impact. This has been true in a number of earlier small wars--for example, the Boer War and the French struggles in Indo-China and Algeria. It appears to be equally true in the Vietnam war. The force of this argument is illustrated by discussing the policy-making style of the American Government, with some references to the British and French cases, first in normal circumstances, and then in situations where each has had to contend with rising dissent both within the elite and by the general public. Some effort has been made to indicate the difficult kinds of choices which confront a democratic government in this situation. Insofar as the government attempts to manipulate public dissent to silence elite critics, another argument is made for the unique importance of dissent by former officials to counterbalance the government's control of information and expertise. The situation which develops in these cases seems to indicate that the intrusion of domestic politics inhibits the possibility of successful peace negotiations. (Abstract supplied)

1383
Schwartz, Stephan A. INTERPOSITION & INTERMINGLING: NEW STRATEGY DEFINED. Navy, v. 14, Feb. 1971: 17-21. illus. VA49.N28, v. 14

A report on remarks by Adm. B. J. Semmes, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, and Adm. David C. Richardson, Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to a seminar on Soviet naval strategy, together with verbatim extracts from the presentations of the two admirals. Both speakers expressed concern over the strategic implications of the intermingling of Soviet and U.S. fleet units, which happens in the Mediterranean frequently and elsewhere less frequently. This intermingling has permitted the Soviet Union to make use of a strategy of interposition, which "consists in placing one's forces both civilian and military between the enemy and his objective and thus imposing on that enemy the onus of further escalation and greater risk if his objective is to be achieved." Together, intermingling and interposition have created some very dangerous and risky situations, as in Haiphong Harbor.

1384
Seabury, Paul. PROVISIONALITY AND FINALITY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 96-104.
H1.A4, v. 392

International conflicts since World War II have shown a decline in the forms and modalities of beginnings and endings which are characteristic of Western war since the seventeenth century. As the custom of declaring war has become apparently obsolete, so the termination of conflicts involves, at best, accord on provisional settlement, in which authoritative action and agreement on a political settlement are set aside. A stress on provisionality rules out "concord" as a basis for peace. As political strategy, peacekeeping works within a narrow time frame. The article explores strategic perspectives on provisional settlements. (Abstract supplied)

1385
Slater, Jerome. INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION; THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REVOLUTION. Foreword by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York, Harper & Row [1970] xviii, 254 p. illus.
E183.8.D6S55 1970
Bibliography: p. [241]-245.

Discusses the causes of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S. policy during and after the crisis, and the assumptions and expectations that have determined U.S. foreign policy outside Europe. Slater contends that the primary motivating force behind U.S. intervention was the fear of a Communist takeover similar to that in Cuba. According to Morgenthau this obsession blurred America's perception of the realities involved and led to inaccurate reports from diplomats on the scene. The other motivating force was the fear that the American public would strongly denounce any failure to prevent the spread of communism. Slater criticizes U.S. policy after the intervention for not using the opportunity to institute military reform measures that could have created the prerequisites necessary for major political and social changes in the Dominican Republic. He adds that this policy of preserving the status quo has been demonstrated not only in the Dominican Republic but in all Latin America.

1386
Stanley, Timothy W., and Darnell M. Whitt. DÉTENTE DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE 1970'S. Published for the Atlantic Council of the United States. Cambridge, Mass., University Press of Cambridge [1970] xiv, 170 p. map. (University Press of Cambridge series in the social sciences) D849.S7
Includes bibliographical references.

Discusses the main issues of European security, including the German problem, mutual force reductions, and the relationship of tactical nuclear weapons to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; explores Soviet motivations in connection with the proposed European security conference; and examines the chances for détente in the coming decade. The authors assert that in view of Soviet motivations and history a negative short-run conclusion

about Moscow's call for a European security conference cannot be avoided. In their view, parallel progress in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, followed by a series of exploratory talks and continuing East-West consultation, may offer the best hope of arriving at a better understanding of the central issues of European security and the underlying political conflict.

## CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

1387
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, Aug. 1, 1970: 6-7. D839.I453, v. 7

British arms shipments to South Africa will heighten tensions in the Indian Ocean area and dehumanize the nonwhite Africans and the Asians living in the Republic. South Africa's covert aggression against its neighbors is manifest in the large increase in its defense budget over the past decade. It is difficult for even the U.N. Security Council to accept the contention that these arms will be used for external defense and not for the purpose of enforcing apartheid. Despite efforts by the Council to weaken South Africa's racist policies, the Republic continues its subversive course while it is being universally condemned for it.

1388
Hinterhoff, Eugene. ARMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 26-33. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

Argues that in view of the Soviet Union's growing naval strength the Western powers have an interest in the survival of white rule in the Republic of South Africa and in the participation of that state in a regional maritime coalition to protect the southern sealanes from Soviet interference. There are but two alternatives in South Africa--a cooperative, Western-oriented white regime, or an antiwhite (racist) and probably Communist black regime. This being the case, Great Britain should reconsider its embargo on arms shipments to South Africa. The proposed coalition would consist of the United States, Great Britain, Portugal, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil.

1389
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers. ARMS AND APARTHEID: THE U.S. SHOULD CUT LOOSE. Nation, v. 212, Mar. 29, 1971: 390-394. AP2.N2, v. 212

The United States is risking the opprobrium of all of black Africa through its refusal to actively oppose the resumption of British arms sales to the Republic of South Africa. Some NATO allies are even urging that a special relationship be established with South Africa because of its increasing strategic importance as an outpost on the Indian Ocean. Closer U.S. ties to South Africa would not only result in guilt by association and the alienation of America's blacks, however, but would discourage the increasingly vocal South African opposition to apartheid. The long-term interests of the United States require that it bring pressure on the Heath government to abandon plans to sell arms to South Africa, support the removal of South West Africa from South African administration, increase financial aid to the South African client states of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, urge American firms in South Africa to pay top wages to nonwhites, and encourage South African critics of apartheid.

1390
Irwin, John N. NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Feb. 22, 1971: 221-227. JX232.A33, 1971

Statement "made before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress on Feb. 2," 1971.

Outlines the goals, guiding principles, and administrative structure of the U.S. International Security Assistance program. Included is a table showing the amounts expended in grant and loan programs and received in cash and credit sales under the assistance programs for fiscal years 1965-1971. The major object of the program is to assist partners to develop their own defense capabilities against external and internal threats, since "as allies improve their defense posture, the threshold at which U.S. forces are likely to be called upon for support under existing treaty commitments will be correspondingly raised." The Government is concerned with the problem of local arms races and tries "to discourage countries from obtaining equipment by sale or grant which would prove an economic burden or which, by its appearance in a particular country, would trigger a demand for comparable end-items in neighboring countries."

1391
Spence, J. E. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DEFENCE OF THE WEST. Round table, no. 241, Jan. 1971: 15-23. AP4.R6, 1971

A reprint of this article appears in Survival, v. 13, Mar. 1971: 78-84. U162.S9, v. 13

Examines arguments for and against resumption of British arms sales to South Africa and concludes that reasons for denying sale are stronger. On the affirmative side: Britain's extensive investments in South Africa should be protected from outside aggression; South Africa is dependable and completely anti-Communist; the Cape route becomes increasingly important to Western oil transport the longer the Suez Canal remains closed; denying arms to South Africa invites the Soviet Union to take advantage of the defense gap; South Africa's relations with other African nations are improving, so joint protection is desirable; improved relations between Britain and South Africa deriving from arms sales might lead to more discussion and flexibility in dealing with racial problems. Spence feels, on the other hand, that fears of the

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Russian menace are probably exaggerated. Further, providing aid to South Africa will inevitably endanger Britain's relations with the "African states of the Commonwealth," who in turn may be more receptive to Soviet or Chinese assistance. Spence concludes that "it could be argued that the protection of Western interests on the African continent as a whole requires a more sophisticated approach than the deployment of military force in association with the one state in the world which arouses such passionate and bitter hostility."

## NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1392
Barnaby, Frank. SALTING DOWN NON-PROLIFERATION. New scientist, v. 49, Mar. 4, 1971: 476-477.
Q1.N52, v.49

It was the aim of the nonproliferation treaty not only to prevent the emergence of other nuclear-weapon states but also to clear the way for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Success of the treaty as a nonproliferation measure depends directly on progress by the superpowers toward nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, little progress is being made, and the treaty may not survive its first review conference, scheduled for 1975. Even if it survives its capacity to prevent proliferation is suspect. Few of the potential developers of nuclear weapons have ratified the treaty, and two of the nuclear powers, France and Communist China, have abstained. Beyond this, nuclear technology, particularly that pertaining to uranium enrichment, may be advancing so rapidly that the treaty will be out of date long before it has time to take effect, a drawback of all partial arms control measures. Success in controlling nuclear proliferation is a major prerequisite to the internationalization of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Everything depends on the superpowers, "but how often have they behaved like ostriches in the past?"

1393
Delcoigne, Georges C., and G. Rubinstein. NONPROLIFERATION AND CONTROL: PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Feb. 1971: 5-7. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Examines some of the obstacles to a truly effective nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The establishment and maintenance of a central system for monitoring fissile materials, the treatment of members of the International Atomic Energy Agency who do not ratify the nonproliferation treaty, the equitable distribution of the financial burden, and the many ambiguities of treaty interpretation are discussed. These problems cannot be resolved theoretically; solutions await practical experience with a working treaty and safeguards system.

1394
FURTHER DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT: THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTATIONS, JANUARY-JUNE 1968. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by command of Her Majesty, March 1969. London, H. M. Stationery Off., 1969. 335 p. ([Gt. Brit. Foreign and Commonwealth Office] Miscellaneous, 1969, no. 9)
JX1974.7.F86

[Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by command] cmnd. 3940.
"In continuation of Miscellaneous no. 8 (1967), cmnd. 3346, and Miscellaneous no. 16, cmnd. 3767."
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, January-March 1968.--Twenty-second resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly.--Meeting of the Security Council, 17-19 June 1968.

Documents and speeches from sessions of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly, and the Security Council held between January and June 1968 on the nonproliferation treaty.

1395
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INDIA--FOUR VIEWS. Indian & foreign review, v. 7, June 1, 1970: 9-11, 17-19.
D839.I453, v. 7

Parts of this article are reprinted from the Times of India, May 13, 1970, and the Indian Express, May 16, 1970.
N&CPR

Four views on India's nuclear weapons policies and programs. Frank Moraes criticizes the nonproliferation treaty because, as he sees it, the treaty forbids nonnuclear countries to conduct experiments on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He concludes that nuclear weapons would be too costly anyway, and he would rather see India develop its nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Samar Guha advocates the production of tactical nuclear weapons to prepare against the growing Chinese nuclear threat, but Girilal Jain disagrees, noting that nuclear weapons would have a deleterious effect on Indian society as well as on defense policy. Som Dutt favors nuclear weapons but stresses that in view of the widening gap between Indian and Chinese nuclear capabilities the time for acquisition is now.

1396
POWER REACTORS '71. Nuclear engineering, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 89-118.
TK9001.N75, v. 16

General information, technical data, and progress schedules, in tabular form, for all the world's nuclear power reactors--planned, under construction, and operational.

1397
United Nations. Office of Public Information. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. New York, 1969. 67 p. (Its United Nations publication OPI/372) JX1974.7.U445

Reports on the findings of a study prepared by the U.N. Secretary General, with the assistance of qualified experts, on the possible effects of nuclear weapons; traces the origins of the nonpro-

liferation treaty (NPT); discusses the issues of the treaty's effect on the security of nations and on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and examines the significance of the NPT within the larger framework of disarmament. The treaty and a Security Council resolution recognizing the dangers of nuclear aggression and reaffirming the inherent right of individual and collective defense are appended.

1398
Weinberg, Alvin M. NUCLEAR ENERGY: A PRELUDE TO H. G. WELLS' DREAM. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Apr. 1971: 407-418. D410.F6, v. 49

The skepticism of cynics notwithstanding, H. G. Wells' vision of a world of peace and plenty based on nuclear energy is capable of becoming reality. Since President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan was proposed in 1953, cooperation between nuclear scientists and technicians all over the world has increased dramatically. It is true that this cooperation has thus far yielded relatively few practical results, but fusion reactors and fission breeders promise to change this in the near future. Two projects now under consideration may have a major impact within the next 15 years: the Indo-Gangetic Plain tube-well project and the project for nuclear desalting in the Middle East. It is not unrealistic to expect that within the next 50 years nuclear energy will provide a cheap and ubiquitous source of power available to all nations.

## CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

1399
Brown, Frederic J. UNITED STATES CHEMICAL WARFARE POLICY, 1919-1945. A STUDY OF RESTRAINTS. Genève, 1967. 234 p.
UG447.B74

Thèse--Geneva.
Bibliography: p. 222-230.

Examines "the range of inhibitions and stimulants influencing American decision-makers both before and during American participation in" World War II to determine why chemical agents were not employed. Brown reviews the impact on national policymakers of the use of chemical agents in World War I, the evolution of various restraints on their use during the interwar period, and the reasons for British, German, Japanese, and American restraint during World War II. He concludes that public opinion and legal restrictions conditioned both political and military leaders against the use of toxic agents, but the most important inhibiting factor was the lack of general acceptance of chemical warfare among the military.

1400
THE CONTROL OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971. 130 p. JX1974.C693
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Legal aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, by R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal.--The use of herbicides in war: a political/military analysis, by David E. Brown.--The military value and political implications of the use of riot control agents in warfare, by Stewart Blumenfeld and Matthew Meselson.--Limitations on chemical and biological warfare going beyond those of the Geneva Protocol, by Archibald S. Alexander.--Comments.--Appendix.

Essays on the legality and military uses of tear gases, herbicides, and similar chemical agents in light of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Baxter and Buergenthal argue that the intention of protocol was to prohibit all forms of irritant chemicals and probably anti-plant chemicals as well. (This article was separately annotated and cited as item 902, v. 7, no. 2, of this bibliography.) Brown finds the military disadvantages of herbicides to be relatively insignificant compared with their political costs. The use of herbicides by the United States in Vietnam risks an unintended escalation of chemical and biological warfare and renders an effective arms control agreement on chemical and biological weapons more difficult to achieve. Blumenfeld and Meselson similarly contend that "the limited military value of CS in Vietnam, the gradual decrease in U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the need for the United States to provide leadership in eliminating CBW all dictate a U.S. policy that would lead to the phasing out of the use of riot control agents and to a return to the traditional U.S. stance of not using gas weapons of any kind in war." Alexander asserts that all nations not now parties to the Geneva Protocol, especially the United States, must adhere to it to make the protocol effective. He proposes that the protocol be broadened to include a total ban on the production and on the use of chemical and biological weapons, even in retaliation, and recommends that the ban be extended to riot-control, harassing, and incapacitating agents and herbicides.

1401
Cookson, John, and Judith Nottingham. A SURVEY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. New York [Monthly Review Press, 1971, c1969] 420 p.
UG447.C664 1971

In part one, reviews documentation of the use of chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam, Korea, and the Yemen and discusses CBW policy, research, and expenditures in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany. Part two describes chemical and biological agents, their use in warfare, and counteractive measures. A concluding general assessment of all the data provided notes that if Vietnam represents the pattern for future wars and CBW proves effective against guerrillas, the future use of these weapons is almost certain.

1402
Lappé, Marc. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. In The social responsibility of the scientist. Edited by Martin Brown. New York, Free Press [1971] p. 95-118.
Q125.S714

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Reviews the historical development of chemical and biological warfare with concern for the scientists employed directly or obliquely in such development. How can a life scientist ethically accept the transformation of his research into techniques of mass destruction? The author's impression is that scientists have been reluctant to consider these consequences. Specifically they have been slow to criticize the applications of chemical warfare in Vietnam. They have tended to support current military policy or claim that they must remain politically aloof. Lappé also points out what he considers to be serious contradictions between military estimates of the effects of the defoliation program in Vietnam and the grimmer appraisals of objective experts.

1403
Meselson, Matthew S. TEAR GAS IN VIETNAM AND THE RETURN OF POISON GAS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 17-19.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Testimony given before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1970 describing the uses of riot gas (CS) in Vietnam and warning of the "proliferation of chemical warfare readiness." Meselson contends that by introducing chemical warfare in Vietnam the United States is risking opening up a kind of war that has been kept closed for 45 years. He concludes that "the advantage of using this gas is not nearly equal to the hazard of breaking down that traditional psychological expectation that gas will not be used."

1404
Neilands, J. B. CHEMICAL WARFARE. In The social responsibility of the scientist. Edited by Martin Brown. New York, Free Press [1971] p. 81-94.
Q125.S714

Describes several chemical agents that have been or could be used in Vietnam. Attention is called to herbicide distribution through Operation Ranch Hand, which, the author contends, essentially employs starvation as a weapon. Use of herbicides could markedly alter the ecology and produce soil degeneration and erosion as well as a change in climate. Neilands also refers to the use of "riot control" or "harassing" gases and their effects on civilian populations. After citing several international weapons agreements, the author concludes that because of its "massive and unrestrained use of herbicides and antipersonnel gases in Vietnam, the United States is in violation of numerous international laws, including those pertaining to genocide."

1405
Rogers, William P. DEPARTMENT URGES SENATE APPROVAL OF GENEVA PROTOCOL ON POISONOUS GASES AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Mar. 29, 1971: 455-459.
JX232.A33, v. 64

Testimony in support of an administration request for Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Secretary points out that this is only one of a number of measures undertaken by the administration to bring chemical and biological weapons under control and that ratification would improve the outlook for other arms limitation proposals in this field, such as the United Kingdom draft convention on biological weapons and measures to control the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The administration is recommending ratification with the reservation that the United States retains the "right to retaliate with chemical weapons should any enemy state or its allies use either chemical or biological weapons against [it]." The United States "considers the term 'bacteriological methods of warfare' as used in the protocol to embrace all biological methods of warfare and the use in warfare of toxins however produced." It also holds that the protocol "does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents."

1406
Thomas, Ann V., and Aaron J. Thomas. LEGAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press [1970] 332 p. JX5135.C5T55
"Research conducted by Southern Methodist University under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Contents.--pt. 1. CB weapons and conventional international law: The nature and use of CB weapons. Sources of the law of war. Efforts at treaty control of CB weapons. Attempts between the wars to outlaw CB weapons. CB weapon regulation efforts since World War II.--pt. 2. CB weapons and other sources of international law: Customary law of war. General principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Subsidiary means for determination of legal limitations on CB warfare. Conclusion.--Notes.--Index.

Traces the development of international law relating to chemical and biological weapons and describes the practices and legal positions of the major powers regarding such weapons. The authors examine both the treaties that deal specifically with chemical and biological weapons and those that deal with relevant customary laws of war and general principles of international law. They conclude that existing international law is too ambiguous and chaotic to govern the use of chemical and biological weapons, and they urge negotiations that would lead to the prohibition of the possession, manufacture, and use of all lethal or severely injurious chemical and biological weapons.

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

1407
Barsukov, IU. STRANGE POSITION. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Mar. 9, 1971: 27.
D839.C87, v. 23
Translated from Izvestiia, Feb. 7, 1971.
Slav Rm



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The stand taken by Gerard C. Smith, U.S. representative at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, against an initial agreement limiting defensive strategic weapons bewildered his auditors at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee session. The "peculiar picture" he presents is that of a man who is charged with responsibility for carrying on the talks but who wishes to persuade the Senate not to consider seriously this fine first step toward an agreement that will also embrace offensive weapons.

1408
Clemens, Walter C. SALT, THE NPT, AND U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS. Asian survey, v. 10, Dec. 1970: 1037-1045. DS1.A492, v. 10

Considers the possible effects of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) on future U.S.-Japanese defense relations and on the effectiveness and scope of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. A SALT agreement limiting the superpowers' defensive systems would improve Soviet-U.S. relations and contribute to Japan's overall ability to influence world affairs. It would probably not stimulate Chinese nuclear development. An agreement would also perpetuate the main outlines of existing U.S.-Japanese defense relations. Pressures for change in Japan would develop, but mainly in the direction of passive neutralism rather than reliance on military power. On the other hand, failure of the negotiations would increase the domestic pressures in Japan for the creation of an independent nuclear force and cause increased tensions in Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. Clemens argues that an independent Japanese nuclear force would be disadvantageous to U.S.-Japanese interests because it could spur a similar decision by India and, later, other Asian nations. He notes that the success of SALT would enhance efforts toward nonproliferation by demonstrating to the threshold powers that the superpowers are taking positive steps to curb the arms race.

1409
Fromm, Joseph. REAL ISSUE IN ARMS TALKS. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, Mar. 22, 1971: 26. JK1.U65, v. 70

The United States would prefer an arms deal to an arms race with the Soviet Union, but what the Soviet Union would prefer is far from clear. For a while, the Soviet strategic arms buildup seemed to be tapering off, but in March came news of preparations to deploy new ballistic missile systems, including an advanced-generation missile bigger than the SS-9. Should this prove to be true, the United States can be expected to respond with an intensified ABM program and a new submarine offensive system. In the meantime, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which so far have failed to produce agreement even on general principles, have been dealt a sharp setback. The major obstacle to progress in the talks has been the Soviet Union's refusal to discuss limitations on both offensive and defensive systems. The United States would like an agreement limiting ABM systems to national capitals and offensive missiles to 2,000, while leaving multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and qualitative improvements to missile forces unchecked. Another bone of contention is the U.S. bomber force in Europe, which the Soviet Union insists be brought under any limitation of offensive strategic weapons but which the United States classifies as a tactical force. The outlook for a breakthrough is dim indeed, but it does not follow that the talks are finished. By both superpowers the talks are still seen "as a kind of 'permanent dialogue' that offers the best hope of sooner or later curbing the arms competition."

1410
Gray, Colin S. SALT AND STABILITY. Canada and the world, v. 36, Mar. 1971: 3-6. illus. D839.W53, v. 36

Assesses the progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), examines the obstacles to an agreement, and speculates on the type of agreement that may come out of the talks. Gray reviews the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, emphasizing the destabilizing effects on mutual deterrence of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) and the ABM. He concludes that a comprehensive agreement featuring restrictions on MIRV's is unlikely, but an agreement freezing those weapons that can be easily inspected and limiting ABM deployment to reduce the first-strike incentive of a potential aggressor is possible.

1411
Lederberg, Joshua. A FREEZE ON MISSILE TESTING. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 4-6, 43. TK9145.A84, v. 27

One of the most serious side effects of the arms race is the perpetual suspicion about possible technological breakthroughs. At one level this has reinforced mutual distrust, while at another it has caused a continuous and costly search for technical innovations. The arms race has led to huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy the world many times over; the ABM, which is potentially destabilizing; and the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, which complicates the deterrence equations by giving its possessor a better chance of achieving a first-strike capability. Of all the new weapons systems that have been included in, or are being contemplated for, strategic weapons systems, the naval option gives the greatest room for mutual advantage. Despite its expense an underwater retaliatory force is less vulnerable than land-based missiles and has long been advocated as the way to separate the retaliatory force from the vulnerable cities. Because antisubmarine warfare and detection could not reach the point of reliably removing an underwater retaliatory force in a surprise attack without having first been widely tested, an agreement to freeze missile testing would best ensure the force's invulnerability and "provide the utmost assurance against the perpetuation of a costly technology race."

1412
Ognibene, Peter J. THE ABCS OF ABM. Commonweal, v. 94, Mar. 19, 1971: 31-34. AP2.C6897, v. 94

XUM

Asks for a slowdown, reduction, or elimination of the Safeguard system as a significant unilateral step toward worldwide peace and stability. This gesture would be accepted by the Soviets as a recognition of their slowdown of SS-9 development and their proposals to curtail ABM construction. The Nixon administration's rigid demand for a comprehensive initial agreement should be replaced by acceptance of the Soviet proposal to consider defensive arms first. Ognibene offers a 10-point "Primer" on the ABM and its place in nuclear strategy.

1413
Plate, Thomas G. UNDERSTANDING DOOMSDAY; A GUIDE TO THE ARMS RACE FOR HAWKS, DOVES AND PEOPLE. Foreword by George S. McGovern. New York, Simon and Schuster [c1971] 221 p. tables.
UA10.P55

Appraises the factors contributing to the arms race and leading the superpowers toward doomsday. Plate examines the action-reaction cycle and the military-industrial complex, contending that the arms race is less the result of these factors than of domestic politics and interservice squabbling. The author studies the various types of agreements available to the superpowers and the problems each power faces at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and concludes that a limited freeze would be no guarantee against a large-scale nuclear war. He asserts further that the exclusion of Communist China from the talks is not a hopeful sign that nuclear war will be averted in the next decade. A glossary of nuclear terminology and a who's who of the military-industrial complex are among the appendixes.

1414
Scoville, Herbert. THE LIMITATION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. Scientific American, v. 224, Jan. 1971: 15-25. illus. T1.S5, v. 224

Compares U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons systems and assesses the prospects and probable effects of various strategic arms limitation agreements. Scoville contends that an agreement to limit the number of ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and long-range bombers without placing restrictions on their replacement or substitution might actually accelerate the arms race by encouraging greater efforts to improve the quality of strategic weapons. An agreement to limit the total payload of each nation, with or without restrictions on the number of delivery vehicles, would present extremely difficult problems of verification that would probably make it unacceptable to one side or the other. The ideal agreement would be one that froze offensive strategic forces at present levels and types of weapons, but this too would be difficult to verify. "The most immediately practical method of controlling offensive weapons would involve a freeze on existing systems, a ban on the construction of new launchers and a restriction on any changes in deployed systems to those that do not change their external characteristics. Such an agreement would provide some valuable limitations on qualitative improvements and would be adequately verifiable by unilateral means." A ban or limitation on ABM systems is a prerequisite to any workable limitation on offensive forces, and every effort should be made to limit multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles despite the problems of verification and attendant risks to security.

1415
Scoville, Herbert. TOWARD A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970. 47 p.
JX1974.7.S35

Contents.--The need for limitations.--A freeze on strategic arms.--Verification.--Obstacles and alternatives.--Conclusions.--Appendix: strategic force structures.--Glossary.

Proposes a freeze on the deployment of the major strategic weapons systems at existing levels, preferably, but not necessarily, including a moratorium on the testing of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Scoville explores various approaches to a strategic-arms freeze, and outlines the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. He maintains that a freeze could be adequately verified by national means if on-site inspection proved an obstacle to agreement.

1416
Shestov, V. WHAT IS HIDDEN BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA SCREEN? Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Mar. 2, 1971: 6-8.
D839.C87, v. 23
Translated from Pravda, Feb. 4, 1971.
Slav Rm

The Soviet Union believes that prior to the implementation of complete disarmament, steps to contain the nuclear-arms race are possible and useful. Unfortunately it has become clear that certain important Western circles are attempting to discredit the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Leaders of the American military-industrial complex who are disturbed by the possibility of a reduction in budgetary appropriations are raising the imaginary specter of a "Soviet threat." The Safeguard system and the "territorial defense" concept disguise programs for the creation and development of new weapons that will lead to new spirals in the arms race. As the Pentagon subsidizes the aircraft and shipbuilding firms it strengthens its worldwide network of military, naval, and air bases. Even the Americans admit that these bastions of militarism are aimed against the Soviet Union. The American position is that while certain limitations on the strategic armament of both countries are acceptable, no limitation can be imposed on American nuclear weapons stationed at forward areas near the Soviet Union. At the same time the Americans pursue a course of building up military preparedness that is incompatible with any constructive approach to the agenda of the talks. A mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic arms can be reached only by the observance of mutual security and the banning of unilateral military advantage.

1417
Strauss, Lewis L. THOUGHTS ON HELSINKI. National review, v. 22, Dec. 29, 1970: 1398.
AP2.N3545, v. 22

The negotiations on arms control are the "most crucial enterprise in which [the American] government is engaged." Negotiators on both sides of the table feel the deep sense of urgency imposed by the nature of atomic warfare and recognize that disarmament is essential for survival. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks reportedly have been characterized by a reasonableness that permits moderate optimism despite the long Russian record of treaty violations. The sense of security and confidence of both parties could be enhanced by reviving and insisting upon the principle of verification and control, which America unwisely abandoned in 1963. Mutual verification would allay mutual suspicion better than any other provision of an arms limitation and control agreement, "however solemnly it may be covenanted."

1418
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. CONCLUDE THIRD PHASE OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Jan. 11, 1971: 55. JX232.A33, v. 64

A joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique issued at Helsinki, Finland, on Dec. 18, 1970, at the close of the third phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The discussions dealt with a wide range of questions relating to "the problem of limiting strategic offensive and defensive armaments" and "clarified a number of aspects of the matters discussed." The delegations are determined "to pursue the negotiations with the aim of limiting strategic offensive and defensive armaments" and have agreed to resume discussions on Mar. 15, 1971, in Vienna.

1419
Wolfe, Thomas W. [THE SOVIET UNION AND SALT. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS] Die Sowjetunion und SALT. Der Einfluss wirtschaftlicher und militärischer Erwägungen auf die Haltung in den Gesprächen über eine Begrenzung der strategischen Rüstungen. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Jan. 10, 1971: 17-29.
D839.E86, v. 26

Discusses recent Soviet economic development and the relationship between the military and the Politburo in light of Western speculations on whether economic pressures and apparent internal controversy will lead the Soviets to seek nuclear balance with the United States or strategic superiority. Wolfe concludes that economic pressures have indeed had a hand in leading the Soviet Union to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), but that economic questions are not the determining factor either now or in the future, when China will move more noticeably into the picture. Internal controversies, interservice rivalry, and tendencies toward patriotic military glorification make it difficult to determine how and to what extent the military influences Soviet policy. Soviet leaders will probably avoid taking a stand opposed by their professional military advisers, but they are not likely to leave SALT, since this would contradict the goals of Soviet diplomacy, which seeks to further détente in Europe and reduce outside pressures on the Soviet economy.

## REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1420
Bender, Peter. [6 × SECURITY. APPREHENSIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE] 6 × [i.e. Sechsmal] Sicherheit. Befürchtungen in Osteuropa. Köln, Berlin, Kiepenheuer & Witsch [1970] 250 p.
DR48.5.B43

A publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Abstract of last chapter was cited as item 452 in vol. 7, no. 1, of this bibliography.

Contents.--Introduction.--What does security mean?--German Democratic Republic.--Poland.--Czechoslovakia.--Hungary.--Rumania.--Bulgaria.--Balance.

Analyzes the security concerns and policies of the six Warsaw Pact states in view of their history and geography, their relations with one another, with the Soviet Union, and with NATO, Moscow's special relationship with Washington, and the Soviet fear of China. Bender presents the European situation from the point of view of East Europe. Apprehensions about the West first and then about the Soviet Union are more ideological-political than military. East-West rapprochement can be achieved only through an understanding of the security problems in the Eastern countries. East Germany will feel more secure as its stability as a sovereign state grows; Poland's main fear is the security of the Oder-Neisse border; Czechoslavakia is mainly interested in the practical measures promoting East-West détente, hoping to derive more freedom from Moscow; Hungary is quietly but steadily working at its own liberation while remaining cooperative toward the Soviet Union, and it is interested in the dissolution of the two military blocs; Rumania strives toward better relations among the states, thus working toward a neutrality that will reduce the importance of the differences between East and West and render the military alliances meaningless; Bulgaria desires neutrality in the Balkan and Mediterranean areas and seeks guarantees from the superpowers to safeguard the political status quo. The author concludes the problems of European security can be solved only by gradually rendering them insignificant through international cooperation, arms control, and disarmament.

1421
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard Nicolaus, Graf von. [EUROPE: A WORLD POWER] Weltmacht Europa. Stuttgart, Seewalt Verlag [1971] 195 p.
JN15.C63

Contents.--Introduction.--The fourth world power.--The Eurasian world empire.--Europe as a great nation.--History of the idea of Europe.--The birth

of the European Federation.--Approaches to the goal.--What should be done.

Urges the unification of Europe to counter the Soviet drive to hegemony. Strauss' introduction says that after having fought the idea of European unity long advocated by Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Soviet Union has now preempted it and works for a Europe united under Moscow. The proposed European security conference is a step toward this goal. Coudenhove-Kalergi thinks Europe has until 1973, the probable date of American military withdrawal, to decide whether to be a larger Switzerland or a larger Czechoslovakia, a fourth world power or a fiefdom of the Warsaw Pact. Great Britain and Italy must enter into the Bonn-Paris friendship pact to unite the 215 million peoples and allow them to participate as equals in a European security conference.

1422
Gorokhov, A. THE USSR'S STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1971: 3-8. D839.I465, 1971

The attainment of European security, one of the most complex of all international problems, can now realistically be considered feasible. The forces of war are blocked by the Socialist community. This historically unprecedented situation is coupled with a mounting tendency among Western European states to accept the principles of peaceful coexistence. The long-term Socialist program for European security mapped out by the 23d Communist Party Congress, the Bucharest Declaration, the Karlovy Vary Conference, and the Moscow International Meeting provided for a territorial status quo and the participation of all states, regardless of their social systems. The Foreign Ministers Conference of the Warsaw Treaty powers at Prague and, more recently, at Budapest proposed a concrete agenda whose consideration would achieve positive results and create the conditions for solving more complex security problems in the future. Successful completion of this agenda would entail the repudiation of the use of force and lay the foundation for extensive and diversified all-European collaboration in trade, economics, science, and technology on equitable principles. Two major foreign policy acts--the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement and the Soviet-French protocol and document--have further cleared the atmosphere preparatory to holding an all-European conference on problems of security and cooperation.

1423
Groeben, Hans von der. [EUROPE: WISH AND REALITY. AN INTERIM BALANCE OF EUROPEAN POLICIES] Europa: Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Eine Zwischenbilanz der Europa-Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Jan. 10, 1971: 1-8. D839.E86, v. 26

The European Economic Community has successfully established free trade, sound competition, and common foreign trade policies, thereby furthering Europe's integration. NATO and the West European Union have given European countries the security to pursue cultural, economic, and political cooperation. However no progress was made in truly uniting Europe under common foreign and defense policies. Monetary and fiscal policies could not be coordinated sufficiently to create a European capital market independent of the American dollar. Regional and transnational cooperation developed in the fields of industry, technology, and science, but the attempts of the national governments to uphold national sovereignty undermined its political basis. International government intervention within the framework of the European Community would prove fruitful. At a summit conference of six heads of state at The Hague it was decided to expand the Common Market to an Economic and Monetary Union (the mechanisms of which are outlined in the Werner plan), strengthen political cooperation, and take up admission negotiations with Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland. But intentions to strengthen Europe will have success only if they are carried out in a greater framework of political and social integration. European questions must not be left to the technocracy; rather they must be discussed internationally and democratically by parties, unions, youth organizations, and other such bodies, setting a course for the European Parliament and creating a constitution for a new society in a united Europe.

1424
Kray, Bruno. [PREVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE] Vorschau auf die Konferenz. Neue Politik, v. 15, Dec. 5, 1970: 5. H5.N377, v. 15

Three European countries, the United States, and Canada are the suggested participants in the proposed European security conference. Of these, only the small countries have expressed unreserved consent. France, among the remainder, shows the least reserve, although together with the United States and Great Britain it stresses the need for thorough preparation and for benefits for the satellite states. With an eye to the Chinese threat and improved trade relations with the West, the East wants to base the conference on the vague concept of "renunciation of force." If viewed in terms of the status quo, this simply means strengthening the superpowers and weakening the smaller countries. NATO will probably require that détente also cover armaments, not limited to the Eastern proposal for withdrawal of foreign troops, and that the Berlin problem be solved first. In actuality the meaning of "renunciation of force" will most likely be determined in Berlin, rendering the European security conference superfluous. Yet the question of the right of self-determination remains. Have the European people been so intimidated by the excesses of violence in the past decades that they have forgotten what it means?

1425
Krüger, Heinz. [BERLIN AS A DISTURBING FACTOR IN THE EAST-WEST DÉTENTE. LACK OF INITIATIVE AND COURAGE IN BONN] Berlin als Störfaktor der West-Ost-Entspannung. Mangelnder Bonner Initiative-Mut. Neue Politik, v. 15, Dec. 5, 1970: 3-4. H5.N377, v. 15

Although rapport between East and West is improving and the West German treaties with Poland and the German Democratic Republic are internationally welcomed, the issue of Berlin, which blocks the ratification of the treaties, increasingly disturbs the conduct of world politics. The German Democratic Republic must be recognized and given equal rights, especially in such areas as the regulation of traffic and mail, which should be handled contractually by the German Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and West Berlin. The German Democratic Republic does not submissively accept regulations imposed by Moscow or the four powers. The Federal Republic, however, has not attempted to equalize its power within the Western alliance and currently cannot solve the German question without its partners. Bonn should take the initiative to negotiate independently and on an equal basis with East Germany on all matters that can lead to better relations between the two states, thereby automatically solving the Berlin deadlock, obviating dangerous parliamentary opposition, and opening the path to numerous agreements. These inter-German agreements could be secured by the four powers or the United Nations.

1426

Kutzner, Gerhard. [THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)] Die Organisation der Amerikanischen Staaten (OAS). [Hamburg] Hansischer Gildenverlag, Heitmann [1970] 399 p.
JX77.K55 Heft 62

Bibliography: p. [379]-392.
Publications of the Institute for International Law at the University of Kiel, 62.

Contents.--pt. 1. Inter-American cooperation up to today: Inter-American system, Pan-Americanism, and OAS. The phase of the Pan-American Congress without the participation of the United States and Brazil (1826-1889). The phase of international conferences of the American states until the end of the Second World War (1889-1945). Regional and universal tendencies at the San Francisco Conference, 1945. Working out the treaty bases of the OAS. Further developments to the present.--pt. 2. The nature of the OAS: The legal nature of the OAS. Tasks and goals of the OAS according to the charter, and the organs responsible for their realization. Membership. Leading principles of international law of the OAS. Relationship of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The political nature of the OAS. The idea of an inter-American defense force.--pt. 3. The structure of the OAS: The organs of the OAS. Special units and committees of the OAS.--Conclusion.

Describes the development and structure of the Organization of American States (OAS). In recent years the work of the organization has quite successfully concentrated on the economic and social problems of Latin America. The OAS has not been able to solve the basic problems underlying conflict in the region, however. This reflects not a failure of organizational structure or legal instruments to settle conflicts, but rather reflects member states' inefficiency or reluctance to use existing resources. Power unbalance will continue to hinder political cooperation, and new ideological differences will create additional problems. Only time will tell whether the proposed Latin American Common Market will be able to realize Bolivar's concept of integration or lead to a split in the inter-American system.

1427

LANDMARKS IN EUROPEAN UNITY: 22 TEXTS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Edited by S. Patijn. Introduction by Henri Brugmans. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1970. 223 p. (European aspects: a collection of studies relating to European integration. Series E: Law, no. 10) HC241.L32

English and French.
Added t. p. in French: Jalons dans l'Europe unie.
Bibliography: p. 221-223.

A collection of 22 resolutions, speeches, statements, communiques, and other documents relating to the progress toward European unification. Brugmans, in his introduction, compares this progress to "the famous procession of Echternach, with two steps back for every three forward--and sometimes even the other way around!"

1428

Lindemann, Helmut. [THE PRESSURE FOR DÉTENTE] Der Zwang zur Entspannung. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, v. 21, Nov. 1970: 641-644.
HD4809.G38, v. 21

The West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement represents the need for détente. The superpowers are attempting to reduce tensions and limit conflicts at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in the Near East, and in Indochina, in an effort to move from confrontation to coexistence and to restrain their own interests and work out viable solutions in tense regions while taking into consideration the motivations and freedom of action of the inhabitants of these regions. Unstable economic conditions in the Soviet Union and dissatisfaction with administration policies in the United States are moving both countries to seek rapprochement, since it has become clear that military escalation increases rather than decreases insecurity. Other countries must adapt themselves to the new relationship between the superpowers; in this respect the Moscow treaty contributes to détente. The world would not understand Bundestag attempts to block the treaty.

1429

Lvov, M. REALISM WILL PREVAIL. New times, no. 11, Mar. 17, 1971: 8-9.
D839.N483, 1971

Although the proposed European security conference will consolidate the achievements of the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, it will also move the process of European détente one step further ahead. The shopworn arguments against the conference have been drowned out by the clamor of informed public opinion. Now the United States and its allies continue to resist by demanding qualifications pertinent not to convening the confer-

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ence but to its practical preparation. The December 1970 session of the NATO Council stipulated as preliminary conditions the "satisfactory conclusion" of the talks on Berlin and the satisfactory conduct of all other talks. To link a European security conference with problems that have no bearing on European security is overt sabotage.

1430
Mayrzedt, Hans, and Helmut Romé. [WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM THE EAST EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT. BIBLIOGRAPHY, DOCUMENTATION, COMMENT] Die westeuropäische Integration aus osteuropäischer Sicht. Bibliographie--Dokumentation--Kommentar. Wien, Laub [1968] 162 p. (Schriftenreihe der Akademischen Vereinigung für Aussenpolitik an der Universität Innsbruck, Bd. 3)
HC241.M39

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Bibliography of Eastern European literature: Economic integration of Western Europe. Neutrality and European integration.--pt. 2. Soviet documentation.--pt. 3. Comment on the theses: Review of Soviet views on the European Common Market, by Rolf Sannwald. Czech opinions on the economic integration of Western Europe, by Vladislav Pavlat. Why is the Soviet Union against a special Austrian treaty with the European Common Market? by Hans Mayrzedt.

Bibliography and translations into German of Soviet and Soviet-satellite literature on the East European attitude toward the political and economic integration of Western Europe, with special reference to the position of Austria and other neutral states. The bibliography and translations are supplemented by three original syntheses of East European opinion on aspects of the European Common Market. The bibliography on West European economic integration emphasizes the relationships of member and nonmember states to the European communities. The longest translation is that of a documentary report on the Common Market and Euratom prepared in 1957 by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. The significance of this basic document as expanded by the 32 theses of 1962 and later pronouncements is analyzed by Sannwald. Mayrzedt suggests that Austria defer to Soviet fears and refrain from seeking membership in the Common Market until a calmer atmosphere prevails.

1431
Petrocelli, Peter. OLD REALITIES AND NEW MYTHS: OSTPOLITIK AND THE AMERICANS. SAIS review, v. 15, winter 1971: 13-19.
D839.S35, v. 15

Demonstrates the compatibility between Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik and continued West German participation in the Atlantic Alliance. Petrocelli points out that West Germany has kept its allies informed of its diplomatic maneuvering and is well aware of the Soviet Union's limited tolerance of alien influences in Central Europe. If Washington's reaction to the new Ostpolitik has been one of benign neglect, it is because the division of Germany is tacitly recognized as a necessary stabilizing factor in European politics. A continued Anglo-American military presence in West Germany is actually crucial to a credible Ostpolitik. In addition to demonstrating that West Germany is not isolated, the Anglo-American force frees Bonn from the need to expand its own military power, with psychological effects that could endanger European détente.

1432
Pierre, Andrew J. THE BONN-MOSCOW TREATY OF 1970: MILESTONE OR MIRAGE? Russian review, v. 30, Jan. 1971: 17-26. DK1.R82, v. 30

Examines the possible long-term significance of the treaty between Moscow and Bonn signed on Aug. 12, 1970. Pierre thinks that the Soviet military and political overcommitment explains its interest in détente in Europe. He points to the Warsaw Pact acceptance at Budapest of the NATO agenda proposals as evidence of Soviet willingness to accommondate itself to a serious security effort. The ever-present Berlin problem, the great impediment to popular acceptance of the treaty, demonstrates again that East Germany is the most difficult obstacle to be overcome by Brandt's new Ostpolitik. A series of agreements between West Germany and the East European nations, including Poland, is very possible. Pierre concludes that the treaty may offer new opportunities in the long-term process of détente, although serious limitations exist upon what can be accomplished by West Germany's Ostpolitik alone. The success of Bonn's recognition "of the status quo in order to overcome it" will depend on such external factors as a Soviet-American agreement on arms control.

1433
Rubinski, IU. THE LOGIC OF COEXISTENCE: PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN EUROPE. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, Jan. 22, 1971: 33-38.
DK266.A2R37, v. 12
Translated from Izvestiia, Dec. 27, 1970.
Slav Rm

Because peaceful coexistence must be based on sources of mutual advantages, the loss of which would be equally detrimental to all parties, the Socialist countries have formulated an agenda for the proposed all-European conference that combines the political and economic aspects of security. The basic problem originates in the American usurpation of East Europe's historic role as West Europe's trading partner and the influx of American capital that continues despite the European Common Market. Increasing the volume of the exchange between the two European socioeconomic systems while improving its commodity structure is difficult, but the present Soviet-French economic, scientific, and technical cooperation exemplifies the approach to be suggested. Western European countries would be enabled by this cooperation to counter the American penetration and to stabilize their payment balances. This kind of multilateral economic cooperation "planned years ahead and guaranteed organizationally would doubtless serve as a vital factor in improving the political atmosphere."

1434
Schwarz, Hans P. [INTENTIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR EUROPE: TWO CONCEPTS OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE] Absichten und Aussichten für Europa: zwei Konzepte einer europäischen Sicherheits-Konferenz. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Jan./Feb. 1971: 15-25. H5.P75, v. 16

Comments on the concepts of the future European state system underlying the maximum and minimum approaches to the proposed European security conference. Those advocating the maximum approach seek an agenda preparatory to a fundamentally new state system; adherents of the second approach are concerned only with supplementing and reinforcing present stability. Schwarz argues that East-West relationships are now characterized by a kind of community-referenced multilateralism, exemplified in the military area by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and in the economic sphere by the Common Market and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The danger is that the suprabloc relationship set up by a conference will weaken or extinguish this kind of multilateralism. The Soviets expect that a European security conference will reduce American influence in Western Europe and consequently enhance their own. They wish to create new Finlands in the West but have made it clear they will not tolerate liberal Czechoslovakias. Schwarz urges an agenda confined to problems capable of resolution by means and processes immediately available. All that can be expected of a conference is a clearing of the political atmosphere. The domestic repercussions of the displacement of the existing multilateralism by a suprabloc multilateralism set up by the conference in the form of neutralism, neonationalism, and distrust of American pledges may be more important than any international benefits obtained.

1435
Schwarz, Hans P., and Helga Haftendorn. [EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE] Europäische Sicherheitskonferenz. Opladen, Leske, 1970. 157 p. (Aktuelle Aussenpolitik) D1058.S38

Contents.--The Socialist states: the conference as a formula suggestor for European policy, by Wolfgang Wagner.--The United States: flexible scepticism, by Helga Haftendorn.--Great Britain and France: courteous reserve, by Walter Schütze. --The Scandinavian states: the conference as a platform for a multilateral détente policy, by Niels Jørgen Haagerup.--Italy: the conference as play material for tumultuous internal politics, by Hartmut Ullrich.--The Federal Republic of Germany: the conference as a vehicle for a Germany policy, by Bernhard Wördehoff.--The status of the interests of the Federal Republic: frames of reference and criteria, by Uwe Nerlich.--The European regional conference: proposals for a new system of all-European policy, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.--European security conference: a useful concept of détente policy? by Hans-Peter Schwarz.

A collection of articles on the areas of interest of the probable participants in the proposed European security conference and the question of the context and specificity of the agenda. Wagner describes the agenda formula suggested by the Eastern bloc as leading questions designed to provide answers favorable to Eastern interests. Because the diversity of interests of the Warsaw Pact states does provide room for diplomatic maneuvering, Wagner suggests accepting the invitation. Haftendorn considers arms control and disarmament too complex a problem for a general conference and fears possible resulting inhibition of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

1436
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session, and Ninety-second Congress, first session. Sept. 22, 1970, and Feb. 23, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 46 p. KF26.F6 1971

Testimony by representatives of the Departments of Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of U.S. ratification of Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The protocol commits the nuclear-weapon states to respect the aims of the treaty, to refrain from violating its provisions, and to forbear using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against any Latin American state that has ratified it. The testimony covers various matters relating to the protocol, including the implications of ratification for U.S. foreign and military policy, and the attitudes of Latin American states and the other nuclear powers.

1437
THE WAY TO NON-ARMAMENT, PEACE AND NEUTRALITY. Japan socialist review, no. 219, Jan. 15, 1971: 3-23. HX9.J3, 1971

A three-part statement from the Socialist Party of Japan defining its position on disarmament and a lasting peace in Asia. The statement proposes a policy to stem any revival of Japanese militarism and to politically, economically, and ideologically isolate the Self-Defense Forces from the people, thus disintegrating the forces; a policy toward a nonmilitary Asian collective security system; and a "policy for preventing Japanese monopolies' economic aggression against Asia and for developing peaceful economies in Asia through joint action."

1438
Wood, Bryce. HOW WARS END IN LATIN AMERICA. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. How wars end. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 392, Nov. 1970) p. 40-50. H1.A4, v. 392

Wars have ended in Latin America since 1850 in various ways. Until 1948 most of them ended on the victors' terms. Before the establishment of the Pan-American Union in 1889, the victors' terms received no international sanction; the three significant conflicts between 1932 and 1942--the Chaco, Leticia, and the Marañón--were concluded by military triumphs by Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru,

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but in all three instances internationally mediated settlements cloaked the military decisions in decent guise. Since 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) has prevented a significant number of disputes among Latin American states from developing into serious armed conflicts. New techniques of pacific settlement, particularly that of the capacity of the Inter-American Peace Committee to go, uninvited, to the scene of battle, prevent hostilities from becoming wars, so facilitating termination. Conflicts involving intervention by the United States present peculiar difficulties for the OAS; the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in which the United States ultimately requested coöperation from the other American states, may or may not point a way toward effective international limitations on the freedom of action of the one great power in the hemisphere. (Abstract supplied)

1439
Woronoff, Jon. ORGANIZING AFRICAN UNITY. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1970. 703 p.
DT30.W67

"The charter of the Organization of African Unity": p. [642]-648.
Bibliography: p. 680-689.

Cites the accomplishments, prospects, limits, and failures of the pan-African movement, traces its beginnings, and examines where it is heading. Woronoff analyzes the work of the Organization of African Unity, which is the most significant instrument of pan-Africanism. He concludes that despite several disappointments and failures, greater courage, realism, and willingness to compromise can help Africa recover its old dynamism.

## SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (OCEAN, SEABED, SPACE, ETC.)

1440
TREATY BANNING EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SEABED SIGNED BY 62 NATIONS AT WASHINGTON. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Mar. 8, 1971: 288-290.
JX232.A33, v. 64

Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, British Ambassador Lord Cromer, Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, and U.S. President Richard M. Nixon at the signing ceremony for the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, at Washington, D.C., Feb. 11, 1971. The Soviet Ambassador points out that while the Soviet Union strives "to do away drastically with the threat of a world war and to relieve mankind of the burden of military expenditures so urgently needed for peaceful development," it also "consistently comes out for more limited, partial measures of disarmament which contribute to the same overall goal." Both he and President Nixon stress the significance of the agreement as a step toward further, perhaps more comprehensive, measures to control weapons of mass destruction.

1441
U.N. ADOPTS PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SEABED EXPLOITATION AND DECIDES TO CONVENE COMPREHENSIVE LAW-OF-THE-SEA CONFERENCE IN 1973. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Feb. 1, 1971: 150-159.
JX232.A33, v. 64

Statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 26, 1970, by U.S. General Assembly Representative Claiborne Pell and on Dec. 8, 1970, by John R. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the committee, in the course of its consideration of two proposed resolutions. The texts of the "Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction," and a resolution on the "reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction and use of their resources in the interests of mankind, and convening of a conference on the law of the sea," are reprinted. They were approved by the committee on Dec. 15 and 16, 1970, and by the Assembly on Dec. 17. It is the view of the United States that passage of these resolutions will mark the end of an important and productive "exploratory phase" of the work on these problems. The pace of technological change makes it imperative, however, that the international community move quickly to implement these resolutions by negotiation of the necessary treaty arrangements.

## VIOLATION, INSPECTION, VERIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

1442
Boucher, Gary, Stephen D. Malone, and E. Fred Homuth. STRAIN EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN NEVADA. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Feb. 1971: 55-64.
QE531.S3, v. 61

"References": p. 64.

Summary and discussion of the recordings of strain effects of the JORUM (Sept. 16, 1969) and HANDLEY (March 26, 1970) nuclear explosions. The results show that a meter installation located as far away as 200 km. will record tectonic strain release from moderate to large explosions and that the research "appears to support the hypothesis that tectonic strain stored in the Earth's crust was released through some triggering mechanism by the explosion and later by its collapse events."

1443
Kratzer, Myron B. A NEW ERA FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. Nuclear news, v. 14, Feb. 1971: 40-43.
QC770.N75, v. 14

Describes the International Atomic Energy Agency's preparations to negotiate safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon parties to the nonproliferation treaty. In April 1970 the Agency

board established a Safeguards Committee to report on this matter. The committee's report is in the form of a model safeguards agreement and consists of two parts--a set of general provisions and more detailed safeguards procedures. Both parts, after lengthy consideration, have been approved in committee. While further problems can be anticipated, it is still significant that "for the first time in history the majority of the world's nations have agreed to subject a significant national undertaking to international verification."

1444
Simonitsch, Pierre. [INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION IN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: A DIFFICULT BIRTH] Die internationale Überwachung des Atomsperrvertrags: eine schwere Geburt. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, v. 21, Nov. 1970: 648-652.
HD4809.G38, v. 21

Examines various methods of verification, focusing on a "model treaty" establishing the verification system stipulated in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This model treaty has found general approval, because it does not reserve most rights to the superpowers and because it leaves each country sufficient protection for its own interests and industry. However, no satisfactory solutions have been found to the questions of financing and of determining liability in case of damage incurred by verification procedures. A special commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency will have to define terms carefully in order to rule out differing interpretations, determine the "strategic points" of the various types of nuclear reactors, and test the applicability of automatic registration machinery. The findings of this commission are to be appended to the treaty. The agency so far has failed to achieve its goal of universality and has only accentuated the disparity between the states. Of the 126 U.N. members, only 101 belong to IAEA. The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland are IAEA members without being U.N. members. Several IAEA members, even some permanent members of the 25-nation Board of Governors, will not sign the nonproliferation treaty (for example, France and India). The German Democratic Republic has membership in neither the United Nations nor IAEA, but it has already ratified the nonproliferation treaty and must therefore fulfill its verification obligations. China, the third nuclear power, together with North Vietnam and North Korea, stands totally outside the international community. A perfect method to prevent the "horizontal" spread of nuclear weapons is far from realization.

1445
Von Seggern, David, and D. G. Lambert. THEORETICAL AND OBSERVED RAYLEIGH-WAVE SPECTRA FOR EXPLOSIONS AND EARTHQUAKES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Dec. 10, 1970: 7382-7402.
QC811.J6, v. 75

Theoretical source spectra that are closely tied to empirical evidence from explosions and earthquakes are presented. The effects of the transfer functions of a layered medium on these source spectra are shown and a theoretical earthquake-explosion spectral ratio is defined for Rayleigh waves. By using spectral estimates on many widely distributed events, it has been found that explosions and earthquakes can be separated by splitting Rayleigh-wave energy between 10 and 50 sec into two period bands and calculating their ratio. Explosion ratios are confined to a narrow range. Earthquake ratios have a large scatter because they depend on depth and source mechanism parameters. (Abstract supplied)

1446
Willot, Albert. [DISARMAMENT. THE OBSERVATION POSTS] Désarmement. Les postes d'observation. [Bruxelles] Editions de l'Institut de sociologie [de l'] Université libre de Bruxelles [1968] 150 p. (Étude de science politique)
JX1974.W577

A plan to erect observation posts along the Iron Curtain to prevent a surprise attack and weaken the mistrust that has clouded East-West disarmament efforts. Willot examines the potential virtues and limitations of his plan and assesses its role in the future of partial or complete disarmament. He explores the political and technical methods by which his plan can best be put into effect and concludes by proposing a detailed treaty aimed at preventing surprise aggression through the use of observation posts.

1447
Wood's Hole Conference on Seismic Discrimination, Wood's Hole, Mass., 1970. COPIES OF PAPERS PRESENTED AT WOOD'S HOLE CONFERENCE ON SEISMIC DISCRIMINATION; working paper. [Alexandria, Va., Teledyne Geotech, 1971] 2 v. illus.
DLC

Conference held July 20-23, 1970, sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Dept. of Defense.

Unedited technical papers on present theories, methods, and capabilities of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions, particularly nuclear explosions, on the basis of seismic data.

## CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1448
COST OF CONFLICT; LECTURES GIVEN AT WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WINTER SEMESTER, 1968. John A. Copps, editor. Ann Arbor, Bureau of Business Research, University of Michigan [1969] 89 p. (Michigan business papers, no. 51)
HF5006.M46 no. 51
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The threat system, by Kenneth E. Boulding.--The diplomacy of violence, by Thomas C. Schelling.--The price of peace, by Seymour Melman. --National defense and regional development, by Roger E. Bolton.--Economic adjustments to peace in

the Far East and to ending the arms race, by Emile Benoit.

Lectures dealing with various economic aspects of war and peace. For the most part the speakers rejected the notion that the U.S. economy is dependent on defense expenditures and could not survive the transition to a peacetime economy.

1449
POTENTIAL CIVILIAM MARKETS FOR THE MILITARY-ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: STRATEGIES FOR CONVERSION. Edited by John E. Ullmann. New York, Praeger Publishers [1970] xxiv, 341 p. (Conversion of industry from a military to civilian economy)
HD9696.A3U58

Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development.
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--pt. 1. The present industry: The need for change, by John E. Ullmann. Characteristics of the electronics industry, by Anthony E. Malito, Jr. Manufacturing practices and the problems of conversion, by Eugene Foley. Trends in profitability, by Fred Halmos.--pt. 2. New markets: Office automation, by Earl J. Stresing. Automation of distribution, by Lawrence J. Wackerman. Automation of process industries, by Jon Blauner. The automation of piece parts manufacture, by David L. Dallob. Electronic controls for road traffic, by Gary Mauser. Electronic controls for railroad operation, by Gary Mauser. Aviation support equipment, by Stephen Gideon. Communication equipment, by Stephen Gideon. The electronic market potential of auto instructional devices, by Joseph Hoffmann. The electronic library, by John Baima. Medical electronics diagnostic and hospital design, by Alfred A. Meltzer. Medical electronics-prosthetics, by Vincent T. Turrini. The dimensions of change, by John E. Ullmann.

Surveys the present resources and markets of the electronics industry and assesses the prospects for generating nondefense markets to offset cutbacks in defense spending, which accounts for 60 percent of the industry's total market. In part 1 the structure, production facilities, finances, and problems of the electronics industry are analyzed. In part 2 the limits on natural growth of specific areas of the industry are delineated. The editor concludes that "the prospects of making up the entire market are poor and that therefore, interindustry transfers of employees and resources may be necessary."

1450
Rothschild, Kurt W. [ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PEACE] Ökonomische Aspekte des Friedens. Studium Generale, v. 23, Dec. 1970: 1228-1248.
AP30.376, v. 23

Economic reasons for war are found in imperialism, colonialism, and the military-industrial complex; the late President Eisenhower warned of the potential dangers of "the disastrous rise of misplaced power." Conversion from a war economy to a peace economy can be accomplished only by pressure of people truly interested in ecological, sociological, and peace concerns. Economic analyses and the experience of history have shown that if conversion programs are carefully planned disarmament will not disturb the economy. Peace research can develop economic and trade measures to improve the peaceful relations between nations, thus deescalating economic and noneconomic conflicts; it can aid economic development in the Third World, find common scientific research projects that can be undertaken cooperatively, and study new socioeconomic structures that will strengthen the solidarity of the people rather than fostering competition and advertising, which appeal to mankind's lowest instincts.

1451
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee. APPLICATION OF AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session. November 23 and 24, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 259 p.
KF27.G636 1970e

Discusses the ways that the aerospace and defense industries can apply their resources to solving the problems besetting the environment. Industry witnesses spoke of methods of dealing with air and water pollution; the problems industries are encountering in dealing with Federal environmental agencies; how these agencies could best utilize industry resources; and the extent to which research and demonstration projects supported by the Government have led to the development of pollution-control hardware.

## OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1452
Ahmad, S. Salahuddin. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND VIETNAM. Pakistan horizon, v. 23, no. 4, 1970: 414-420.
DS376.P32, v. 23

Suggests possible approaches to the unification of Vietnam and Korea, the "two Asian countries whose Northern and Southern halves are more closely integrated with their respective ideological systems than any other country in the world." In both cases the effort of the northern state to achieve unification was thwarted by American force. Overseas Koreans can reduce tensions by acting as channels of communication. After constituting independent commissions they might supervise elections or mediate conflicts. Student exchange is another significant step toward understanding and eventual union. Ahmad thinks Japan can persuade both the United States and the Soviet Union to act in concert in Korea and influence the two Korean states directly. The overseas Vietnamese Federation can work to revive the Geneva Agreement of 1954. A general election supervised by an international force constituted from the Asian and African developing countries should be its immediate goal.

1453
Collins, Frank. THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SCIENTISTS. Fellowship, v. 37, Jan. 1971: 9-11. illus. JK1901.F45, v. 37

Military dominance of science and technology has subverted the traditional scientific commitment to the disinterested pursuit of truth and the betterment of human life. The scientific community might never have awakened to the acute moral challenge posed by this development had it not been for the Vietnam War. The reasons for this are various: scientists themselves are divided over the matter of military preparedness; many have no clear views on this issue. In addition, the beliefs that science is itself morally neutral and that its consequences for good or ill cannot be predicted have been used by some to justify noncommitment. But arguments of this kind are invalid where research is undertaken with applications in view. Military research makes inevitable the production of ever more powerful and efficient weapons systems. Science shapes the world, but through military support for research the world shapes science, projecting today's political pathologies into the technology of tomorrow. This vicious cycle must be broken. It is the special responsibility of scientists to spell out the implications of current trends in military-dominated scientific research and technological innovation.

1454
Holden, Constance. NUCLEAR WASTE: KANSANS RILED BY AEC PLANS FOR ATOM DUMP. Science, v. 172, Apr. 16, 1971: 249-250. map. Q1.S35, v. 172

A U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) plan to convert an abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas, into a nuclear-waste disposal area has aroused opposition among Kansans concerned about possible safety hazards. The proliferation of civilian commercial nuclear plants is creating an urgent need for efficient methods of disposing of radioactive waste. The AEC contends that Lyons Nuclear Park, as the site is called, meets all reasonable safety standards and estimates that it will "hold all the nondefense atomic refuse this country will have accumulated by the end of the century--a total of 770,000 cubic feet, or 38,000 tons."

1455
Sharp, Gene. EXPLORING NONVIOLENT ALTERNATIVES. Introd. by David Riesman. [Boston, P. Sargent, 1970] xiv, 161 p. (An Extending horizons book) HM278.S447
Bibliography: p. 133-159.

Contents.--Introduction.--Creative conflict in politics.--The technique of nonviolent action.--National defense without armaments.--Research areas on nonviolent alternatives.--85 cases of nonviolent action.--A course program in civilian defense.

Contends that nonviolent action has proved efficacious as a means of political and social self-defense in the past and offers greater possibilities for the present than have yet been realized. Sharp questions the use of violence to achieve or maintain a humanitarian social order, describes various techniques of nonviolent action, and suggests areas in which further research into nonviolent alternatives may prove fruitful.

1456
Sheard, Michael H. EFFECT OF LITHIUM ON HUMAN AGGRESSION. Nature (London) v. 230, Mar. 12, 1971: 113-114. Q1.N2, v. 230

Reports the results of clinical tests of the effectiveness of lithium as an inhibitor of human aggression. Earlier studies have found that lithium is effective in the treatment of manic-depressive disorders, which frequently are characterized by hyperaggressive and hypersexual activity, and that it inhibits aggression in animals. The evidence amassed in the present study indicates that "whether inhibition of aggression by lithium has favourable or unfavourable results seems to depend on the adaptive significance of the aggressive behaviour for the individual, what opportunities exist for the development of other behaviour patterns, and constitutional factors." The mechanism by which lithium produces its effects is unknown.

1457
Silva, Ruth C. THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, AND THE "JUST" WAR. Dickinson law review, v. 75, fall 1970: 1-61. LL

Argues that religious objectors to particular wars who base their claims to conscientious-objector status on the just-war theory should be judged by the same criterion as religious pacifists, namely, the sincerity of their religious beliefs. Silva reviews the progressive secularization of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "religious training and belief" provision of the Selective Service Act and examines the requirement that objection be to "participation in war in any form." She concludes that if the establishment clause of the Constitution requires the Government to remain neutral toward religious beliefs and practices, as recent Supreme Court decisions indicate, then section 6(j) of the present Selective Service Act is unconstitutional because it favors pacifist religion over others.

1458
SMOKE WITHOUT FIRE. Nature (London) v. 230, Apr. 16, 1971: 418-419. Q1.N2, v. 230

There are reliable reports that the United States is reconsidering the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The results of an inquiry by the Secretary General of the United Nations into the capacity of member states to monitor such a ban were quite encouraging. It appears that by the end of the decade it should be possible to identify any underground nuclear explosion large enough to be of real military significance. Furthermore, many nations are now convinced that "the right to abrogate a treaty [is] the equivalent of all kinds of on-site inspection." The

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United States and the Soviet Union still consider nuclear weapons essential elements in their military research and development. They still think it safe to push ahead with ABM, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, and warhead development programs. There are signs, however, that they are beginning to have second thoughts. A comprehensive test ban, besides improving the partial test ban, would help to correct the asymmetry between nuclear and nonnuclear powers that was built into the nonproliferation treaty, and would limit the capacity of the superpowers to develop new kinds of warheads. Equally significant, by removing the need to verify compliance with the nonproliferation treaty, it would enable "the International Atomic Energy Agency to abandon a programme of inspection (among the nuclear have-nots) that threatens to become as much of an international hazard in its own right as any violation of the treaty."

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